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Climate Change
What do we know about climate change? What is the relationship between trade and climate 
change? How does trade affect greenhouse gas emissions and can more open trade help to 
address climate change? What is the range of national measures that can contribute to global 
mitigation efforts? These are just some of the questions discussed by this report by the World 
Trade Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme.
The Report aims to improve understanding about the linkages between trade and climate 
change. It shows that trade intersects with climate change in a multitude of ways. For example, 
governments may introduce a variety of policies, such as regulatory measures and economic 
incentives, to address climate change. This complex web of measures may have an impact on 
international trade and the multilateral trading system.
The Report begins with a summary of the current state of scientifi c knowledge on climate 
change and on the options available for responding to the challenge of climate change. The 
scientifi c review is followed by a part on the economic aspects of the link between trade and 
climate change, and these two parts set the context for the subsequent parts of the Report, 
which looks at the policies introduced at both the international and national level to address 
climate change. 
The part on international policy responses to climate change describes multilateral efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the effects of climate change, and also 
discusses the role of the current trade and environment negotiations in promoting trade in 
technologies that aim to mitigate climate change. The fi nal part of the Report gives an overview 
of a range of national policies and measures that have been used in a number of countries to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to increase energy effi ciency. It presents key features 
in the design and implementation of these policies, in order to draw a clearer picture of their 
overall effect and potential impact on environmental protection, sustainable development and 
trade. It also gives, where appropriate, an overview of the WTO rules that may be relevant to 
such measures.
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Climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing the international community. Mitigating global warming and 
adapting to its consequences will require major economic investment and, above all, unequivocal determination on 
the part of policy-makers. With a challenge of this magnitude, multilateral cooperation is crucial, and a successful 
conclusion to the ongoing global negotiations on climate change would be the fi rst step towards achieving 
sustainable development for future generations. As we march towards Copenhagen, we all have a responsibility to 
make a success of these negotiations. Climate change is not a problem that can aff ord to wait. It is a threat to future 
development, peace and prosperity that must be tackled with the greatest sense of urgency by the entire community 
of nations.
Th e WTO and UNEP are partners in the pursuit of sustainable development. As the principal UN agency for the 
protection of the environment, UNEP has years of experience in the fi eld of climate change. Th e WTO has also 
launched its fi rst ever trade and environment negotiation under the Doha Development Agenda. Certain climate 
change mitigation measures intersect with existing WTO rules and recent discussions in various fora have brought 
to the fore the importance of  better  understanding the various linkages between trade and climate change. 
Th is report is the outcome of collaborative research between the WTO Secretariat and UNEP. It reviews how 
trade and climate change policies interact and how they can be mutually supportive. Th e aim is to promote greater 
understanding of this interaction and to assist policy-makers in this complex policy area. Th e report uniquely 
examines the intersection between trade and climate change from four diff erent but correlated perspectives: the 
science of climate change; trade theory; multilateral eff orts to tackle climate change; and national climate change 
policies and their eff ect on trade. Th e report underlines that, as a critical fi rst step, governments must urgently 
seal a scientifi cally-credible and equitable deal in Copenhagen: one that addresses the need for both signifi cant 
emission reductions and adaptation for vulnerable economies and communities. Moreover, it highlights that there 
is considerable scope and fl exibility under WTO rules for addressing climate change at the national level, and that 
mitigation measures should be designed and implemented in a manner that ensures that trade and climate policies 
are mutually supportive.
With these fi ndings in mind, we are pleased to present this report. It is an illustration of fruitful and increasing 
cooperation between our two organizations on issues of common interest.
Foreword
Pascal Lamy
Director General
WTO
Achim Steiner
Executive Director
UNEP
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Th is Report provides an overview of the key linkages 
between trade and climate change based on a review 
of available literature and a survey of relevant national 
policies. It begins with a summary of the current state 
of scientifi c knowledge on existing and projected 
climate change; on the impacts associated with climate 
change; and on the available options for responding, 
through mitigation and adaptation, to the challenges 
posed by climate change (Part I). 
Th e scientifi c review is followed by an analysis on the 
economic aspects of the link between trade and climate 
change (Part II), and these two parts set the context for 
the subsequent discussion in the Report, which reviews 
in greater detail trade and climate change policies at 
both the international and national level. 
Part III on international policy responses to climate 
change describes multilateral eff orts at reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapting to the 
risks posed by climate change, and also discusses the 
role of the current trade and environment negotiations 
in promoting trade in climate mitigation technologies. 
Th e fi nal part of the Report gives an overview of a 
range of national policies and measures that have been 
used in a number of countries to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and to increase energy effi  ciency (Part IV). It 
presents key features in the design and implementation 
of these policies, in order to draw a clearer picture of their 
overall eff ect and potential impact on environmental 
protection, sustainable development and trade. It also 
gives, where appropriate, an overview of the WTO 
rules that may be relevant to such measures.
Climate change: the current 
state of knowledge
Climate change trends
Th e scientifi c evidence regarding climate change is 
compelling. Based on a review of thousands of scientifi c 
publications, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) has concluded that the warming of 
the Earth’s climate system is “unequivocal”, and that 
human activities are “very likely” the cause of this 
warming. It is estimated that, over the last century, the 
global average surface temperature has increased by 
about 0.74° C. 
Moreover, many greenhouse gases remain in the 
atmosphere for long periods of time, and as a result 
global warming will continue to aff ect the natural 
systems of the planet for several hundred years, even 
if emissions were reduced substantially or halted today. 
When greenhouse gases emitted in the past are included 
in the calculations, it has been shown that we are likely 
to be already committed to global warming of between 
1.8° and 2.0° C. 
Most worrying, however, is that global greenhouse gas 
emission levels are still growing, and are projected to 
continue growing over the coming decades unless there 
are signifi cant changes to current laws, policies and 
actions. Th e International Energy Agency has reported 
that global greenhouse gas emissions have roughly 
doubled since the beginning of the 1970s. Current 
estimates indicate that these emissions will increase by 
between 25 and 90 per cent in the period from 2000 to 
2030, with the proportion of greenhouse gases emitted 
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by developing countries becoming signifi cantly larger 
in the coming decades. 
Over the last half century greenhouse gas emissions 
per person in industrialized countries have been 
around four times higher than emissions per person 
in developing countries, and for the least-developed 
countries the diff erence is even greater. Th e member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), which 
are the world’s most industrialized countries, are 
responsible for an estimated 77 per cent of the total 
greenhouse gases which were emitted in the past. 
Th e emissions from developing countries, however, 
are becoming increasingly signifi cant: it is estimated 
that two-thirds of new emissions to the atmosphere 
are from non-OECD countries. Moreover, between 
2005 and 2030, the greenhouse gas emission levels 
from non-OECD countries are expected to increase by 
an average of 2.5 per cent each year, whereas the 
projected average annual increase for OECD countries 
is 0.5 per cent. 
Th e result of these increased emissions will be a further 
rise in temperatures. Current estimates of climate 
change have calculated that global average temperatures 
will increase by 1.4° to 6.4° C between 1990 and 2100. 
Th is is signifi cant, as a 2°-3° C increase in temperature 
is often cited as a threshold limit, beyond which it may 
be impossible to avoid dangerous interference with the 
global climate system. 
Climate change impacts
As greenhouse gas emissions and temperatures increase, 
the impacts from climate change are expected to 
become more widespread and to intensify. For example, 
even with small increases in average temperature, the 
type, frequency and intensity of extreme weather – 
such as hurricanes, typhoons, fl oods, droughts, and 
storms – are projected to increase. Th e distribution 
of these weather events, however, is expected to vary 
considerably among regions and countries, and impacts 
will depend to a large extent on the vulnerability of 
populations or ecosystems.
Developing countries, and particularly the poorest and 
most marginalized populations within these countries, 
will generally be both the most adversely aff ected by 
the impacts of future climate change and the most 
vulnerable to its eff ects, because they are less able to 
adapt than developed countries and populations. In 
addition, climate change risks compound the other 
challenges which are already faced by these countries, 
including tackling poverty, improving health care, 
increasing food security and improving access to sources 
of energy. For instance, climate change is projected to 
lead to hundreds of millions of people having limited 
access to water supplies or facing inadequate water 
quality, which will, in turn, lead to greater health 
problems.
Although the impacts of climate change are specifi c to 
location and to the level of development, most sectors 
of the global economy are expected to be aff ected and 
these impacts will often have implications for trade. 
For example, three trade-related areas are considered to 
be particularly vulnerable to climate change. 
Agriculture is considered to be one of the sectors most 
vulnerable to climate change, and also represents a key 
sector for international trade. In low-latitude regions, 
where most developing countries are located, reductions 
of about 5 to 10 per cent in the yields of major cereal 
crops are projected even in the case of small temperature 
increases of around 1° C. Although it is expected that 
local temperature increases of between 1° C and 3° C 
would have benefi cial impacts on agricultural outputs 
in mid- to high-latitude regions, warming beyond this 
range will most likely result in increasingly negative 
impacts for these regions also. According to some 
studies, crop yields in some African countries could 
fall by up to 50 per cent by 2020, with net revenues 
from crops falling by as much as 90 per cent by 2100. 
Depending on the location, agriculture will also be 
prone to water scarcity due to loss of glacial meltwater 
and reduced rainfall or droughts.
Tourism is another industry that may be particularly 
vulnerable to climate change, for example, through 
changes in snow cover, coastal degradation and extreme 
weather. Both the fi sheries and forestry sectors also risk 
being adversely impacted by climate change. Likewise, 
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there are expected to be major impacts on coastal 
ecosystems, including the disappearance of coral and 
the loss of marine biodiversity. 
Finally, one of the clearest impacts will be on trade 
infrastructure and routes. Th e IPCC has identifi ed port 
facilities, as well as buildings, roads, railways, airports 
and bridges, as being dangerously at risk of damage 
from rising sea levels and the increased occurrence 
of instances of extreme weather, such as fl ooding and 
hurricanes. Moreover, it is projected that changes in sea 
ice, particularly in the Arctic, will lead to the availability 
of new shipping routes. 
Climate change mitigation and 
adaptation
Th e projections of future climate change and its 
associated impacts amply illustrate the need for 
increased eff orts focused on climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. Mitigation refers to policies and 
options aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
or at enhancing the “sinks” (such as oceans or forests) 
which absorb carbon or carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere. Adaptation, on the other hand, refers to 
responses to diminish the negative impacts of climate 
change or to exploit its potential benefi ts. In other 
words, mitigation reduces the rate and magnitude of 
climate change and its associated impacts, whereas 
adaptation reduces the consequences of those impacts 
by increasing the ability of humans or ecosystems to 
cope with the changes. 
Mitigation and adaptation also diff er in terms of 
timescales and geographical location. Although the 
costs of emission reductions are often specifi c to the 
location where the reduction scheme is brought into 
action, the benefi ts are long term and worldwide, since 
emission reductions contribute to decreasing overall 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. 
Adaptation, by contrast, is characterized by benefi ts in 
the short to medium term, and both the costs and the 
benefi ts are primarily local. Despite these diff erences, 
there are important linkages between mitigation and 
adaptation. Action in one area can have important 
implications for the other, particularly in terms of 
ecosystem management, carbon sequestration and soil 
and land management. For instance, reforestation can 
serve both to mitigate climate change by acting as a 
carbon sink and can help to adapt to climate change by 
slowing land degradation.  
Most international action has been focused on 
mitigation. Th e emphasis on mitigation refl ects a 
belief – widely held until the end of the 1990s – 
that an internationally coordinated eff ort to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions would be suffi  cient to avoid 
the most signifi cant climate change impacts. As a 
result, mitigation eff orts are relatively well-defi ned 
and there is considerable information available on the 
opportunities and costs associated with achieving a 
given reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Greenhouse gas emissions arise from almost all the 
economic activities and day-to-day functions of 
society and the range of practices and technologies 
that are potentially available for achieving emission 
reductions are equally broad and diverse. Most studies 
addressing mitigation opportunities have, however, 
largely converged around a few key areas that have the 
potential to deliver signifi cant reductions in emission 
levels. Th ese include using energy more effi  ciently in 
transport, buildings and industry; switching to zero- or 
low-carbon energy technologies; reducing deforestation 
and improving land and farming management practices; 
and improving waste management. 
Several studies have concluded that even ambitious 
emission targets can be achieved through the use of 
existing technologies and practices in the areas identifi ed 
above. For instance, a study by the International Energy 
Agency demonstrates how employing technologies 
that already exist or that are currently being developed 
could bring global energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions back to their 2005 levels by 2050. 
Th e extent to which these opportunities are fulfi lled 
depends on the policies that are set up to promote 
mitigation activities. Multilateral agreement on a target 
for greenhouse gas stabilization in the atmosphere, as 
well as fi rm and binding commitments on the level 
of global greenhouse gas emission reductions that 
will be required to achieve this stabilization target, 
will be instrumental in the large-scale deployment of 
Executive summary
xTrade and Climate Change
emission-reduction technologies and practices. Policies 
and measures at the national level are also essential 
for creating incentives for consumers and enterprises 
to demand and adopt climate-friendly products and 
technologies. 
Financing, technology transfer and cooperation 
between developing and industrialized countries is 
another key factor in achieving emission reductions. In 
particular, bringing the potential of global mitigation 
to fruition will also depend on the ability of developing 
countries to manufacture, diff use and maintain low-
carbon technologies, and this can be facilitated 
through trade and technology transfer. Th e costs of the 
technological solutions will have implications for the 
relative emphasis given to various mitigation sectors 
and technologies. Technological development and 
reductions in the cost of existing technologies and of 
technologies yet to be commercialized will also have a 
signifi cant role to play in overall mitigation. 
Scientifi c analyses and multilateral debate on the costs 
of greenhouse gas emission reductions have, to a large 
extent, focused on two specifi c stabilization scenarios 
and targets. Th e fi rst target, to limit global warming to 
2° C, has been put forward by a number of countries. 
Th e second target of 550 parts per million (ppm) of 
CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) would lead to a scenario 
where the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere would 
be stabilized at around twice its pre-industrial level, 
which would correspond to a temperature increase of 
around 3° C. Th is scenario has been most extensively 
studied by the IPCC, since it is considered to be the 
upper limit for avoiding dangerous human interference 
with the climate system. 
Th e two stabilization targets would have very diff erent 
implications for the estimated macro-economic costs 
at the global level. Whereas the IPCC estimates that a 
stabilization target of around 550 ppm CO2-eq would 
result in an annual reduction of global gross domestic 
product (GDP) of 0.2 to 2.5 per cent, a stabilization 
target of 2° C would imply an annual reduction in 
global GDP of more than 3 per cent. In terms of 
“carbon pricing” (i.e. charging polluters a set price 
according to the amount of greenhouse gases emitted), 
the IPCC estimates that carbon prices of US$ 20-80/
tonne of CO2-eq would be required by 2030 to put the 
world on track to achieving stabilization of emissions 
at around 550 ppm CO2-eq by 2100. 
Activities focused on adapting to climate change are 
more diffi  cult to defi ne and measure than mitigation 
activities. Th e potential for adaptation depends on 
the “adaptive capacity” or the ability of people or 
ecological systems to respond successfully to climate 
variability and change. Contrary to mitigation, which 
can be measured in terms of reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions, adaptation cannot be assessed by any one 
single indicator. Moreover, its success depends on 
a large number of factors that are related to overall 
development issues, such as political stability, market 
development, and education, as well as income and 
poverty levels.
A range of responses to climate change are possible, 
covering a wide array of practices and technologies. 
Many of these are well-known and have been adopted 
and refi ned over the centuries to cope with climate 
variability, such as changing levels of rainfall. Studies 
focused on adaptation have noted that action is rarely 
based only on a response to climate change. Instead, 
in most cases, adaptation measures are undertaken as 
part of larger sectoral and national initiatives related 
to, for example, planning and policy development, 
improvements to the water sector and integrated coastal 
zone management, or as a response to current climate 
variability and its implications, such as fl ooding and 
droughts. 
It is generally recognized that technological innovation, 
together with the fi nancing, transfer and widespread 
implementation of technologies, will be central to 
global eff orts to adapt to climate change. Adaptation 
technologies may be applied in a variety of ways, and 
may include, for example, infrastructure construction 
(dykes, sea walls, harbours, railways, etc.); building 
design and structure; and research into, development 
and deployment of drought-resistant crops. 
Th e costs of these technologies and of other adaptation 
activities may be considerable. However, very few 
adaptation cost estimates have been made available 
to date, and they diff er considerably (with estimates 
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varying from US$ 4 billion to US$ 86 billion for 
annual adaptation costs in developing countries, for 
example). Nonetheless, there is broad agreement in the 
literature that the benefi ts of adaptation will outweigh 
the costs. 
As previously stated, technological innovation, as well 
as the transfer and widespread implementation of 
technologies, will be central to global eff orts to address 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. International 
transfer of technologies may broadly be understood 
as involving two aspects. One concerns the transfer 
of technologies which are physically embodied in 
tangible assets or capital goods, such as industrial plant 
and equipment, machinery, components, and devices. 
Another aspect of technology transfer relates to the 
intangible knowledge and information associated with 
the technology or technological system in question. 
Since it is predominantly private companies that retain 
ownership of various technologies, it is relevant to 
identify ways within the private sector, such as foreign 
direct investment, licence or royalty agreements and 
diff erent forms of cooperation arrangements, which 
can facilitate technology transfer. Moreover, bilateral 
and multilateral technical assistance programmes can 
play a key role in technology transfer. 
A continuing debate within political discussions and 
among academia has been whether the protection of 
intellectual property rights – such as copyrights, patents 
or trade secrets – impedes or facilitates the transfer of 
technologies to developing countries. One key rationale 
for the protection of intellectual property rights, and in 
particular patents, is to encourage innovation: patent 
protection ensures that innovators can reap the benefi ts 
and recoup the costs of their research and development 
(R&D) investments. On the other hand, it has also 
been argued that, in some cases, stronger protection of 
intellectual property rights might act as an impediment 
to the acquisition of new technologies and innovations 
in developing countries. While strong patent laws 
provide the legal security for technology-related 
transactions to occur, fi rms in developing countries 
may not have the necessary fi nancial means to purchase 
expensive patented technologies. 
Th e importance of intellectual property rights needs 
to be set in a relevant context. In fact, many of the 
technologies which are relevant to addressing climate 
change, such as better energy management or building 
insulation, may not be protected by patents or other 
intellectual property rights. Moreover, even where 
technologies and products benefi t from intellectual 
property protection, the likelihood of competing 
technologies and substitute products being available is 
thought to be high. Further studies in this area would 
be useful.
Trade and climate change: 
theory and evidence
Th e 60 years prior to 2008 have been marked by an 
unprecedented expansion of international trade. In 
terms of volume, world trade is nearly 32 times greater 
now than it was in 1950, and the share of global 
GDP it represents rose from 5.5 per cent in 1950 to 
21 per cent in 2007. Th is enormous expansion in 
world trade has been made possible by technological 
changes which have dramatically reduced the cost 
of transportation and communications, and by the 
adoption of more open trade and investment policies. 
Th e number of countries participating in international 
trade has increased: developing countries, for instance, 
now account for 34 per cent of merchandise trade – 
about double their share in the early 1960s. 
Th is expansion in trade raises questions such as: “Will 
trade opening lead to more greenhouse gas emissions?” 
and “How much does trade change greenhouse gas 
emissions?” Trade opening can aff ect the amount of 
emissions in three principal ways, which are typically 
referred to as the scale, composition and technique 
eff ects. 
Th e scale eff ect refers to the expansion of economic 
activity arising from trade opening, and its eff ect on 
greenhouse gas emissions. Th is increased level of 
economic activity will require greater energy use and 
will therefore lead to higher levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Th e composition eff ect describes the way that trade 
opening changes the structure of a country’s production 
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in response to changes in relative prices, and the 
consequences of this on emission levels. Changes in 
the structure of a liberalizing country’s production 
will depend on where the country’s “comparative 
advantage” lies. Th e eff ect on a country’s greenhouse 
gas emissions will depend on whether a country has 
a comparative advantage in emission-intensive sectors 
and whether these sectors are expanding or contracting. 
Th e composition of production in an economy that is 
opening its markets to trade may also be a response 
to diff erences in environmental regulations between 
countries (resulting in the “pollution haven hypothesis”, 
which suggests that high-emission industries may 
relocate to countries with less stringent emission 
regulation policies). 
Finally, the technique eff ect refers to improvements in 
the methods by which goods and services are produced, 
so that the emission intensity of output is reduced. Th is 
is the principal way in which trade opening can help 
mitigate climate change. A decline in greenhouse gas 
emission intensity can come about in two ways. First, 
more open trade can increase the availability, and lower 
the cost of, climate-friendly goods and services. Th is 
will help meet the demand in countries whose domestic 
industries do not produce these climate-friendly goods 
and services in suffi  cient quantities or at aff ordable 
prices. Such potential benefi ts of more open trade 
highlight the importance of the WTO’s current trade 
negotiations under the Doha Round, which aim to 
open markets for environmental goods and services. 
Second, as income levels rise because of trade opening, 
populations may demand lower greenhouse gas 
emissions. For rising income to lead to environmental 
improvement, governments must supply the 
appropriate tax and regulatory measures to meet the 
public’s demand. Only if such measures are put in 
place will fi rms adopt cleaner production technologies, 
so that a given level of output can be produced with 
fewer greenhouse gas emissions.
It has been pointed out, however, that the positive 
link between per capita income and environmental 
quality may not necessarily apply to climate change. 
Since greenhouse gas emissions are released into the 
atmosphere, and since part of the cost is borne by 
populations in other countries, there may not be a 
strong incentive for any given nation to take action to 
reduce such emissions, even if its citizens’ incomes are 
improving. 
Since the scale and technique eff ects tend to work in 
opposite directions, and the composition eff ect depends 
on the comparative advantage of countries and on 
diff erences in regulations between countries, the overall 
impact of trade on greenhouse gas emissions cannot be 
determined a priori. Th e net impact of greenhouse gas 
emissions will depend on the magnitude or strength of 
each of the three eff ects, and ascertaining this requires 
detailed empirical analyses.
Th ree aspects of the empirical literature on trade 
opening and emission levels have been reviewed: 
econometric or statistical studies of the eff ects of trade 
opening on emissions; estimates of the “environmental 
Kuznets curve” for greenhouse gases (which describes 
the relationship between higher per capita incomes 
and lower greenhouse gas emissions); and assessments 
– carried out by the parties to various trade agreements 
– of the environmental impact of these agreements. 
Most of the statistical studies reviewed indicate that 
more open trade will most likely lead to increased 
CO2 emissions, and suggest that the scale eff ect tends 
to off set the technique and composition eff ects. Some 
studies indicate, however, that there may be diff erences 
in outcomes between developed and developing 
countries, with environmental improvement being 
observed in OECD countries and environmental 
deterioration in developing countries. 
Th e empirical literature on the environmental Kuznets 
curve for greenhouse gas emissions has produced 
inconsistent results, although the more recent studies 
tend to show that there is no relationship between 
higher income and lower CO2 emissions. Studies 
that diff erentiate between OECD and non-OECD 
countries tend to fi nd evidence of an environmental 
Kuznets curve for the fi rst group of countries but not 
for the second. 
Although many developed countries now require 
environmental assessments of trade agreements that 
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they enter into, these assessments tend to be focused on 
national rather than cross-border or global pollutants. 
A few of these assessments have raised concerns about 
the possible increase in greenhouse gas emissions 
from increased transport activity, although none have 
attempted a detailed quantitative analysis of these 
eff ects. Some assessments have alluded to the potential 
of mitigation measures to reduce the eff ects of increased 
emissions from transport. 
Trade involves a process of exchange requiring that 
goods be transported from the place of production to 
the place of consumption. Consequently, international 
trade expansion is likely to lead to increased use of 
transportation services. Merchandise trade can be 
transported by air, road, rail and water. Maritime 
transport accounts for the bulk of international 
trade by volume and for a signifi cant share by value. 
Recent studies indicate that, excluding trade within 
the European Union, seaborne cargo accounted for 
89.6 per cent of world trade by volume and 70.1 per 
cent of global trade by value in 2006. 
International maritime shipping, however, accounted 
for only 11.8 per cent of the transport sector’s total 
contribution to CO2 emissions. Aviation represents an 
11.2 per cent share of CO2 emissions, rail transport 
constitutes another 2 per cent share and road transport 
has the biggest share, at 72.6 per cent of the total 
CO2 emissions from transport. Among the diff erent 
modes of transport, shipping is the most carbon-
emission effi  cient, and this should be taken into 
account when assessing the contribution of trade to 
transport-related emissions. 
International trade can serve as a channel for spreading 
technologies that mitigate climate change. Th e spread 
of technological knowledge made possible by trade 
provides one mechanism by which developing countries 
can benefi t from developed countries’ innovations in 
climate change technology. Th ere are several ways in 
which this transmission of technology can occur. One 
is through the import of intermediate and capital 
goods which a country could not have produced on 
its own. Second, trade may increase communication 
opportunities between countries, allowing developing 
countries to learn about production methods and design 
from developed countries. Th ird, international trade 
can increase the available opportunities for adapting 
foreign technologies to meet local conditions. Finally, 
the learning process made possible by international 
economic relations reduces the cost of future innovation 
and imitation. 
Beyond off ering opportunities for mitigation, trade 
can also play a valuable role in helping humankind 
adapt to a warmer future. Climate change threatens to 
alter geographical patterns of production, with food 
and agricultural products likely to be the most aff ected. 
Trade can provide a means to bridge diff erences in 
demand and supply, so that countries where climate 
change creates scarcity are able to meet their needs 
by importing from countries where these goods and 
services continue to be available. 
A number of economic studies have simulated how 
trade can help reduce the cost of adapting to climate 
change in the agricultural or food sectors. However, 
some of these studies also suggest that the extent to 
which international trade can contribute to adaptation 
depends on how agricultural prices – which are the 
signals of economic scarcity or abundance – are 
transmitted across markets. Where these price signals 
are distorted by the use of certain trade measures (such 
as subsidies), the contribution that trade can make 
to adaptation to climate change may be signifi cantly 
reduced. 
Finally, climate change can aff ect the pattern and 
volume of international trade fl ows. It may alter the 
comparative advantage of countries and lead to shifts 
in the pattern of international trade. Th is eff ect will be 
stronger in those countries whose comparative advantage 
stems from climatic or geophysical sources. Moreover, 
climate change can also increase the vulnerability of the 
supply, transport and distribution chains upon which 
international trade depends. Any disruptions to these 
chains will raise the costs of engaging in international 
trade. 
Executive summary
xiv
Trade and Climate Change
Multilateral work related to 
climate change
Multilateral action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions
International policy responses
Although scientifi c discussions regarding climate 
change date back more than a century, it was not until 
the 1980s that policy-makers started to actively focus 
on the issue. Th e IPCC was launched in 1988 by UNEP 
and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
to undertake the fi rst authoritative assessment of the 
scientifi c literature on climate change. In its fi rst report 
in 1990, the IPCC confi rmed that climate change 
represents a serious threat and, more importantly, 
called for a global treaty to address the challenge. 
Th e IPCC report catalyzed government support for 
international negotiations on climate change, which 
formally commenced in 1991, and concluded with 
the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 at the Earth 
Summit. Th e Convention, which seeks the stabilization 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous human interference with the 
climate system, was groundbreaking, as it represented 
the fi rst global eff ort to address climate change. 
Th e Convention elaborates a number of principles to 
guide its parties in reaching this objective, including the 
principle of “common but diff erentiated responsibility” 
fi rst articulated in the 1992 Earth Summit Rio 
Declaration, which recognizes that, even though 
all countries bear a responsibility to address climate 
change, countries have not all contributed equally to 
causing the problem, nor are they all equally equipped 
to address it. 
Although the Convention sets out the general 
framework for international climate change action, 
it did not create mandatory emission limits and 
commitments. However, as scientifi c consensus and 
alarm regarding climate change grew in the years 
following the Earth Summit, there were increased calls 
for the conclusion of a supplementary agreement with 
legally binding commitments for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. Th is increased political momentum 
ultimately led to the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997. Th e Protocol establishes specifi c and binding 
emission reduction commitments for industrialized 
countries, and represents a signifi cant step forward in a 
multilateral response to climate change.
Th e Kyoto Protocol builds on the UNFCCC principle 
of “common but diff erentiated responsibility” by 
creating diff erent obligations for developing and 
industrialized countries based on responsibility for past 
emissions and level of development. 
Developing countries (non-Annex I parties), for 
example, have no binding emission reduction 
obligations. In contrast, industrialized countries and 
economies in transition (Annex I parties) must meet 
agreed levels of emission reductions over an initial 
commitment period that runs from 2008 to 2012. 
Th e exact amount of emission reduction commitments 
varies among the industrialized countries, but the 
overall total commitment represents a reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions to at least 5 per cent less than 
1990 emission levels. 
In addition to establishing binding emission reduction 
commitments, in order to ensure compliance the 
Protocol also includes requirements for Annex I parties 
to monitor and report their greenhouse gas emissions. 
Annex I parties are also required to provide fi nancial 
and technological support to developing countries to 
assist in their eff orts to mitigate climate change. 
Th e Kyoto Protocol includes three “fl exibility 
mechanisms” (emission trading, Joint Implementation, 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)) to 
help parties meet their obligations and achieve their 
emission reduction commitments in a more cost-
effi  cient manner. Emission trading allows parties to 
buy emission credits from other parties. Th ese emission 
credits may be the unused emission allowances from 
other Annex I parties or they may be derived from Joint 
Implementation or CDM climate-mitigation projects.
Joint Implementation allows an Annex I party to 
invest in emission-reduction projects in the territory of 
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another Annex I party, and so earn emission reduction 
units that can be used to meet its own emission target. 
In a similar manner, the CDM allows an Annex I party 
to meet its obligations by earning emission reduction 
units from projects implemented in a developing 
country. However, given that developing countries 
do not have binding emission reduction targets, the 
CDM requires evidence that the emission reductions 
achieved through such projects are “additional” in the 
sense that they would not have occurred without the 
CDM fi nancing.
As the fi rst commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
has just begun, it is too early to determine the ultimate 
eff ectiveness of its provisions. Nonetheless, it appears 
that most industrialized countries will not be able 
to meet their targets by the end of the commitment 
period. Moreover, global greenhouse gas emissions 
have increased by approximately 24 per cent since 
1990, despite action taken under the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol. 
Climate change negotiations
Th e challenge now facing climate change negotiators 
is to agree on a multilateral response to climate change 
after the Kyoto Protocol’s fi rst commitment period 
has expired (i.e. in the “post-2012” period). At the 
13th UNFCCC Conference of the Parties meeting 
in Bali, Indonesia, in 2007, parties agreed on a “Bali 
Action Plan” with the aim of realizing long-term 
cooperative action on climate change. It was also agreed 
that the negotiations already under way on the post-
2012 commitments of Kyoto Protocol Annex I parties 
would continue as a separate negotiating track. 
While the two negotiating tracks are not formally 
linked, the negotiations around them are closely 
intertwined. Both negotiating eff orts aim at reaching 
agreement at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC meeting in December 2009 in Copenhagen, 
Denmark.
Th e Bali Action Plan calls for measurable, reportable and 
verifi able emission reduction commitments on the part 
of developed countries. Signifi cantly, it also considers, 
for the fi rst time, the involvement of developing 
countries in mitigation eff orts through non-binding 
“nationally appropriate mitigation actions”, which 
must be supported by fi nancing, capacity-building and 
technology transfer from developed countries. 
Under the separate negotiating track focused on 
post-2012 commitments for Kyoto Protocol Annex I 
countries, parties appear to be in general agreement 
that the Protocol’s cap-and-trade approach (i.e. limiting 
or capping emission levels and allowing carbon trading 
among countries) should be retained, but that specifi c 
mechanisms for achieving emission reductions require 
refi nement based on the lessons learned so far during 
implementation. However, no conclusions have been 
reached on the range of emission reductions to be 
undertaken by developed countries after 2012.
Montreal Protocol
While the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
represent the principal agreements addressing climate 
change, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer has emerged as another 
important mechanism for mitigating climate change. 
Th e Montreal Protocol was established in 1987 in 
response to stratospheric ozone destruction caused by 
chlorofl uorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting 
substances (ODS). Th e Protocol is focused on phasing-
out the consumption and production of nearly 
100 ODS chemicals. Th ese chemicals are deliberately 
not addressed under the UNFCCC or the Kyoto 
Protocol, although many are potent greenhouse gases 
which are used on a global scale.
Th e Montreal Protocol has been extremely eff ective 
in reducing the use of ODS. It is estimated that the 
Protocol will have decreased the contribution of ODS 
emissions to climate change by 135 GtCO2-eq over the 
1990 to 2010 period. To put this into perspective, this 
means that the Montreal Protocol has achieved four to 
fi ve times greater levels of climate mitigation than the 
target contemplated by the fi rst commitment period 
under the Kyoto Protocol.
Th e Montreal Protocol recently had another 
breakthrough that will further contribute to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. In 2007, the parties decided 
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to accelerate the phase-out of hydrochlorofl uorocarbons 
(HCFCs), which were developed as transitional 
replacements for CFCs. According to various estimates, 
phasing out HCFCs could result in an additional 
emission reduction of 17.5 to 25.5 GtCO2-eq over the 
period from 2010 to 2050. 
WTO trade and environment 
negotiations
In the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, 
members highlighted a clear link between sustainable 
development and trade opening – in order to ensure that 
market opening goes hand in hand with environmental 
and social objectives. In the ongoing Doha Round of 
negotiations, members went further in their pledge to 
pursue a sustainable development path by launching 
the fi rst-ever multilateral trade and environment 
negotiations. 
One issue addressed in the Doha Round is the relationship 
between the WTO and multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs), such as the UNFCCC. In this 
area of negotiations, WTO members have focused on 
opportunities for further strengthening cooperation 
between the WTO and MEA secretariats, as well as 
promoting coherence and mutual supportiveness 
between the international trade and environment 
regimes.
While, to date, there have been no WTO legal disputes 
directly involving MEAs, a successful outcome to 
the Doha negotiations will nevertheless contribute 
to reinforcing the relationship between the trade and 
environmental regimes. Th e negotiators have drawn 
from experiences in the negotiation and implementation 
of MEAs at the national level, and are seeking ways 
to improve national coordination and cooperation 
between trade and environment policies. 
Also in the context of the Doha Round, ministers 
have singled out environmental goods and services for 
liberalization. Th e negotiations call for “the reduction, 
or as appropriate, elimination of tariff  and non-tariff  
barriers to environmental goods and services”. Th e 
objective is to improve access to more effi  cient, diverse 
and less expensive environmental goods and services 
on the global market, including goods and services 
that contribute to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. 
Climate-friendly technologies can be employed to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change in diverse sectors. 
Many of these technologies involve products currently 
being discussed in the Doha negotiations, such as 
wind and hydropower turbines, solar water heaters, 
photovoltaic cells, tanks for the production of biogas, 
and landfi ll liners for methane collection. In this 
context, the WTO environmental goods and services 
negotiations have a role to play in improving access to 
climate-friendly goods and technologies. 
Th ere are two key rationales for reducing tariff s and 
other trade-distorting measures in climate-friendly 
goods and technologies. First, reducing or eliminating 
import tariff s and non-tariff  barriers in these types 
of products should reduce their price and therefore 
facilitate their deployment. Th e access to lower-cost and 
more energy-effi  cient technologies may be particularly 
important for industries that must comply with climate 
change mitigation policies (see Part IV). 
Second, liberalization of trade in climate-friendly 
goods could provide incentives and domestic expertise 
for producers to expand the production and export of 
these goods. Trade in climate-friendly goods has seen a 
considerable increase in the past few years, including 
exports from a number of developing countries. 
National policies to mitigate, 
and adapt to, climate change, 
and their trade implications
A number of policy measures have been used or are 
available at the national level to mitigate climate 
change. Th ey are typically distinguished as either 
regulatory measures (i.e. regulations and standards) or 
economic incentives (e.g. taxes, tradable permits, and 
subsidies). 
Th e range of climate policy measures that are in place 
or that are currently being considered are described 
according to their key objectives: internalization of 
the environmental costs of greenhouse gas emissions; 
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regulation of the use of climate-friendly goods and 
technologies; or the development and deployment of 
such goods. Th ese distinctions also provide a useful 
framework for considering the potential relevance of 
trade rules.
Price and market mechanisms to 
internalize environmental costs of 
GHG emissions
A key environmental policy measure, often used 
by regulators to induce change in behaviour, is to 
put a price on pollution. Th is Report describes two 
types of pricing mechanism that have been used to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions: taxes and cap-and-
trade systems. Such pricing tools aim at internalizing 
the environmental externality (i.e. climate change) 
by setting a price on the carbon content of energy 
consumed or on the CO2 emissions generated in the 
production and/or consumption of goods. 
Paying a price for carbon involves an additional cost for 
producers and/or consumers, and acts as an incentive 
to limit their use of carbon-intensive fuels and 
products, to abate emissions and to shift to less carbon-
intensive energy sources and products. Moreover, taxes 
and emission trading schemes (in particular schemes 
featuring auctioning) may be a signifi cant source of 
public revenue, which can then be “recycled” to the 
industries that are most aff ected by these pricing 
mechanisms. For instance, the revenue may be used 
to fund programmes that help industries switch to less 
carbon-intensive methods of production or to reduce 
the burden imposed by some other taxes. 
Th e approach taken by a number of countries over 
the last two decades has been to put a price on the 
introduction of CO2 into the atmosphere by imposing 
taxes on the consumption of fossil fuels according to 
their level of carbon content. In contrast, a number of 
other countries opted not to adopt an explicit “carbon 
tax”, but instead have introduced general taxes on the 
consumption of energy, which are aimed at promoting 
energy effi  ciency and energy savings, and which in 
turn have an eff ect on CO2 emissions. Furthermore, 
governments often use a combination of tax on 
CO2 emissions and tax on energy use. 
In theory, in order to be fully effi  cient, a carbon tax 
should be set at a level that internalizes the costs of 
environmental damage, so that prices refl ect the real 
environmental costs of pollution (this is known as a 
“Pigouvian tax”). However, experience shows that 
genuine Pigouvian carbon taxes have rarely been 
used by policy-makers because of the diffi  culties in 
evaluating the cost of damage associated with, in this 
case, greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, countries have 
followed a more pragmatic “Baumol-Oates” approach, 
in which the tax is set at a rate which should infl uence 
taxpayers’ behaviour in order to achieve a given 
environmental objective. 
Another approach to setting a carbon price is to fi x a 
cap on total emissions, translate this into allowances to 
cover those emissions, and create a market to trade these 
allowances at a price determined by the market. At the 
national level, the fi rst and most wide-ranging trading 
scheme for greenhouse gas emissions, the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme, was introduced in 2005. A number 
of other mandatory or voluntary emission trading 
schemes have been put in place at state and regional 
levels in developed countries. Currently, important 
proposals for establishing emission trading schemes 
at the national level in several developed countries are 
also being discussed. 
Th e emission trading schemes share a number of design 
characteristics that are important, as they determine 
the costs for participants, and may infl uence the overall 
trade implications of the schemes. Such characteristics 
include: the type of emission target (a general cap on 
the total emissions that regulated sources can emit or 
an emission benchmark for each individual source); 
the number of participants and the range of sectors 
covered; the types of gases covered by the policy; the 
method used by the regulator to distribute emission 
allowances (free allocation or auctioning); the linkages 
with other emission trading schemes; and the existence 
of fl exibility mechanisms, such as banking or borrowing 
of emission allowances.
Whether the regulator chooses a carbon tax or an 
emission trading scheme may be infl uenced by the 
fact that the price of the carbon tax is determined in 
advance, whereas there is uncertainty about the costs 
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of achieving a desired level of emission reduction. A 
carbon tax may therefore be more appropriate than an 
emission trading scheme, especially when there is no 
particular risk of passing a critical threshold level for 
emissions. 
On the other hand, an emission trading scheme may 
be preferable in situations where greater environmental 
certainty is needed, a typical case being when the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
in the longer term is in danger of passing a certain 
threshold beyond which the likelihood of unwanted 
environmental consequences increases to unacceptable 
levels. In such a case, stabilization of emissions below 
this threshold concentration is essential. 
Most of the studies undertaken in the early 1990s on 
carbon taxes show that these have small but positive 
eff ects on CO2 emissions in specifi c sectors, such as 
heating, and in the industrial and housing sectors. 
Existing emission trading schemes have not long 
been in operation, and most schemes, until now, 
have had limited scope and thus limited range for 
curbing emissions. Longer periods of implementation 
are needed to gather the necessary information for 
an environmental evaluation of the eff ectiveness of 
emission trading schemes. 
Th e development of the emission trading scheme 
in Europe, and proposals for the introduction 
of mandatory emission trading schemes in other 
developed economies has given rise to a considerable 
amount of debate on how to design an instrument 
that would impose minimal costs for the economy, 
and yet eff ectively contribute to mitigating climate 
change. Of particular concern has been the extent to 
which the international competitiveness of energy-
intensive industrial sectors will be aff ected by carbon-
constraining domestic policies. 
Related to the potential impact on competitiveness, 
the issue of “carbon leakage” (in other words, the risk 
that energy-intensive industries will simply relocate 
to countries without climate regulations) has also 
recently received a great deal of attention. Indeed, in 
their legislation on emission trading schemes, some 
countries are debating or have already introduced 
criteria – such as the carbon or energy intensity of 
production processes or the trade exposure of the 
industry concerned – to identify sectors that would be 
at risk of carbon leakage. 
It should be noted, however, that studies to date fi nd 
generally that the cost of compliance with an emission 
trading scheme is a relatively minor component of 
a fi rm’s overall costs, which include exchange-rate 
fl uctuations, transportation costs, energy prices and 
diff erences across countries in the cost of labour. Of 
course, the carbon constraint in future emission trading 
schemes (for example, in Phase III of the EU-ETS) is 
expected to be more stringent, with a lower capped 
limit and fewer free allowances. Th is may therefore 
increase the potential impact of carbon costs on the 
competitiveness of a number of industrial sectors.
In this context, a number of emission trading scheme 
design features have been discussed, which may reduce 
the cost of compliance for some energy-intensive and 
trade exposed industries. Th ese design features include 
free allocation of emission allowances, exemptions for 
particularly sensitive industries, or the use of certain 
fl exibility mechanisms, such as borrowing or banking 
of emission allowances. 
However, alleviations and exemptions may not be 
suffi  cient and the question that then arises is whether 
concerns over carbon leakage and competitiveness can 
justify governmental measures that impose similar 
costs on foreign producers, through the use of border 
adjustment measures. Such adjustments could, for 
example, take the form of a requirement for importers 
of a given product to acquire and submit emission 
allowances in cases where carbon leakage is occurring 
in the competing domestic sector. 
Th ere are two main challenges in implementing 
border measures: providing a clear rationale for border 
measures (i.e. accurately assessing carbon leakage and 
competitiveness losses); and determining a “fair” price 
to be imposed on imported products to bring their 
prices into line with the domestic cost of compliance 
with an emission trading scheme. Discussions of such 
measures so far have highlighted the diffi  culty in 
implementing a border adjustment mechanism that 
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responds to the concerns of domestic industries while 
still contributing to the wider goal of global climate 
change mitigation. 
A number of WTO rules may be relevant to carbon 
taxes and cap-and-trade systems and related border 
measures, including core trade disciplines, such as the 
non discrimination principle. Th e provisions of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM) may also be relevant to emission trading schemes, 
for instance if allowances are allocated free of charge. 
Moreover, detailed rules on border tax adjustments 
(BTAs) exist in the General Agreement on Tariff s 
and Trade (GATT) and the WTO SCM Agreement. 
Th ese rules permit, under certain conditions, the use 
of BTAs on imported and exported products. Indeed, 
border adjustments on internal taxes are a commonly 
used measure with respect to domestic indirect taxes on 
the sale and consumption of goods, such as cigarettes 
or alcohol. Th e objective of a border tax adjustment 
is to level the playing fi eld between taxed domestic 
industries and untaxed foreign competition by ensuring 
that internal taxes on products are trade neutral. 
In the context of climate change, the debate has mainly 
focused on two aspects: the extent to which domestic 
carbon/energy taxes (which are imposed on inputs, 
such as energy) are eligible for border tax adjustments; 
and the extent to which BTAs may be limited to 
inputs which are physically incorporated into the fi nal 
products.
Th e general approach under WTO rules has been to 
acknowledge that some degree of trade restriction may 
be necessary to achieve certain policy objectives, as long 
as a number of carefully crafted conditions are respected. 
WTO case law has confi rmed that WTO rules do not 
trump environmental requirements. If, for instance, a 
border measure related to climate change was found to 
be inconsistent with one of the core provisions of the 
GATT, justifi cation might nonetheless be sought under 
the general exceptions to the GATT (i.e. Article XX), 
provided that two key conditions are met. 
First, the measure must fall under at least one of the 
GATT exceptions, and a connection must be established 
between the stated goal of the climate change policy 
and the border measure at issue. It should be noted 
in this regard that WTO members’ autonomy to 
determine their own environmental objectives has been 
reaffi  rmed by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body on a 
number of occasions (for example, in the US - Gasoline 
and the Brazil - Retreaded Tyres cases). Although no 
policies aimed at climate change mitigation have been 
discussed in the dispute settlement system of the WTO, 
it has been argued that policies aimed at reducing 
CO2 emissions could fall under the GATT exceptions, 
as they are intended to protect human beings from 
the negative consequences of climate change; and to 
conserve not only the planet’s climate, but also certain 
plant and animal species that may disappear as a result 
of global warming. 
Second, the manner in which the measure in question 
will be applied is important: in particular, the 
measure must not constitute a “means of arbitrary or 
unjustifi able discrimination” or a “disguised restriction 
on international trade”. GATT case law has shown that 
the implementation of a measure in a way that does 
not amount to arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination 
or to a disguised restriction on international trade has 
often been the most challenging aspect of the use of 
GATT exceptions.
Financial mechanisms to promote 
the development and deployment 
of climate-friendly goods and 
technologies
Government funding to encourage the deployment and 
utilization of new climate-friendly technologies and 
renewable energy is another type of economic incentive 
which is commonly used in climate change mitigation 
policies. Th is Report introduces and gives examples 
of the wide range of governmental policies that are 
being discussed, or are already in place, to facilitate 
innovation or to address the additional costs related to 
the use of climate-friendly goods and technologies, and 
thus encourage their development and deployment. 
Numerous mitigation technologies are currently 
commercially available or are expected to be 
commercialized soon. However, the development and 
deployment of new technologies, including renewable 
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and/or cleaner energy technologies, may be occurring 
at a slower pace than is environmentally desirable, and 
may therefore need support through domestic policies. 
Although the private sector plays the major role in 
the development and diff usion of technology, it is 
generally considered that closer collaboration between 
government and industry can further stimulate the 
development of a broad portfolio of low-carbon 
technologies and reduce their costs.
A number of countries, mainly developed countries, 
have set up funding programmes at the national level 
to support both mitigation and adaptation policies. 
Funding projects are either targeted at consumers or 
at producers. Consumer-based policies are designed 
to increase the demand for mitigation technologies 
by reducing their cost for end-users, and are mainly 
used in the energy, transport and building sectors. 
Producer-based policies aim at providing entrepreneurs 
with incentives to invent, adopt and deploy mitigation 
technologies. Such production support programmes are 
mainly used in the energy sector (especially in renewable 
energy production) and in the transport sector.
Usually, government fi nancing in the context of 
climate change focuses on three areas: (i) increased use 
of renewable and/or cleaner energy; (ii) development 
and deployment of energy-effi  cient and/or low-carbon 
goods and technologies; and (iii) development and 
deployment of carbon sequestration technologies. Th ese 
fi nancial incentives may be applied at diff erent stages 
in the technology innovation process. For example, 
incentives may be aimed at fostering research and 
development of climate-friendly goods and technologies 
(mainly through grants and awards), or at increasing 
the deployment (including fi rst commercialization and 
diff usion) through fi nancial incentives that reduce the 
cost of production or use of climate-friendly goods and 
services. 
Th ere are three types of fi nancial incentives for 
deployment which are currently used or are being 
discussed by governments in the context of climate 
change: fi scal instruments; price support measures, such 
as feed-in tariff s (i.e. a regulated minimum guaranteed 
price); and investment support policies, which aim 
to reduce the capital cost of installing and deploying 
renewable energy technologies. Concrete examples of 
these incentives are provided in Section IV.B.
Governmental fi nancing for the development and 
deployment of renewable energy and low-carbon goods 
and technologies may have an impact on the price and 
production of such goods. From an international trade 
perspective, such policies lower the producers costs, 
leading to lower product prices. In turn, lower prices 
may reduce exporting countries’ access to the market 
of the subsidizing country, or may result in increased 
exports from the subsidizing country. 
Moreover, some countries may provide domestic 
energy-consuming industries with subsidies to off set 
the costs of installing emission-reducing technologies 
and thus maintain their international competitiveness. 
Since the sector of renewable energy and low-carbon 
technologies is signifi cantly open to international 
trade, the WTO rules on subsidies (as contained in 
the SCM Agreement) may become relevant for certain 
fi nancing policies.
Th e SCM Agreement aims at striking a balance 
between the concern that a country’s industries should 
not be put at an unfair disadvantage by competition 
from imported goods that benefi t from government 
subsidies, and the concern that measures taken to off set 
those subsidies should not themselves be obstacles to 
fair trade. Th e rules of the SCM Agreement defi ne the 
concept of “subsidy”, establish the conditions under 
which WTO members may not employ subsidies and 
regulate the countervailing duties that may be taken 
against subsidized imports. 
Th e SCM Agreement also contains surveillance 
provisions, which require each WTO member to 
notify the WTO of all the specifi c subsidies it provides 
and which call for the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures to review these notifi cations.
Technical requirements to promote 
the use of climate-friendly goods 
and technologies
In addition to economic incentives, governments have 
also used traditional regulatory tools in their climate 
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change mitigation strategies. Th e Report reviews the 
range of technical requirements for products and 
production methods aimed at reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and energy consumption, and gives concrete 
examples of these requirements. 
Climate change related technical requirements may 
take the form of maximum levels of emissions or of 
energy consumption, or they may specify standards 
for energy effi  ciency for both products and production 
methods. Such requirements are accompanied by 
implementation and enforcement measures, such 
as labelling requirements and procedures to assess 
conformity. 
Technical requirements to promote energy effi  ciency, 
such as labelling to indicate the energy effi  ciency of 
a product, have been adopted at the national level by 
most developed countries, and by a growing number 
of developing countries. It is estimated that energy-
effi  ciency improvements have resulted in reductions in 
energy consumption of more than 50 per cent over the 
last 30 years. A number of studies show that regulations 
and standards in OECD countries have the potential 
to increase the energy effi  ciency of specifi c products, 
particularly electrical equipment, such as household 
appliances. However, a signifi cant energy-effi  ciency 
potential remains untapped in various sectors, such as 
buildings, transport and industry.
Standards that aim at enhancing energy effi  ciency have 
also been developed internationally. Such international 
standards are often used as a basis for regulations at 
the national level. Currently, examples of areas where 
international standards may assist in the application 
of climate-related regulations include standards on 
measurement and methodology for quantifying energy 
effi  ciency and greenhouse gas emissions, and standards 
related to the development and use of new energy-
effi  cient technologies and renewable energy sources, 
such as solar power. 
Th e type of technical requirement that is chosen depends 
on the desired environmental outcome. Product-related 
requirements may achieve indirect results depending 
on whether consumers choose to purchase energy-
effi  cient products and how they use these products. 
On the other hand, requirements targeting production 
methods may result in direct environmental benefi ts, 
such as a reduction in emissions, during the production 
process. Moreover, standards and regulations, whether 
related to products or to processes, can be based either 
on design characteristics, or in terms of performance. 
Requirements based on design characteristics determine 
the specifi c features of a product, or, with regard to 
production methods, set out the specifi c actions to be 
taken, goods to be used, or technologies to be installed. 
Regulations based on design standards are often used 
when there are few options available to the polluter for 
controlling emissions; in this case, the regulator is able 
to specify the technological steps that a fi rm must take 
to limit pollution. 
In contrast, performance-based requirements prescribe 
the specifi c environmental outcomes which should be 
achieved by products or production methods, without 
defi ning how the outcomes are to be delivered. Such 
requirements may be established, for instance, in terms 
of maximum CO2 emission levels, maximum energy 
consumption levels, minimum fuel economy for cars 
or minimum energy performance standards for lighting 
products. Performance-based requirements often 
provide more fl exibility than design-based requirements, 
and their costs may be lower, as fi rms may decide how 
best to meet the environmental target. 
Energy labelling schemes are intended to provide 
consumers with data on a product’s energy performance 
(such as its energy use, effi  ciency, or energy cost) and/or 
its related greenhouse gas emissions. Labelling schemes 
may also provide information on a product’s entire 
life cycle, including its production, use and disposal. 
Labelling schemes have also been used by some private 
companies to declare the origin of an agricultural 
product, how many “food miles” it has travelled from 
where it was grown to where it will be consumed, and 
the emissions generated during transport.
Labelling schemes, such as energy labelling, help 
consumers make informed decisions that take into 
account the relative energy effi  ciency of a product 
compared to other similar products. Another 
key objective of energy labelling is to encourage 
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manufacturers to develop and market the most effi  cient 
products. By increasing the visibility of energy costs 
and measuring them against an energy benchmark, 
labelling schemes also aim to stimulate innovation in 
energy-effi  cient products, transforming these more 
energy-effi  cient products from “niche markets” to 
market leaders. 
In the context of the climate-related regulations and 
voluntary standards discussed above, assessment 
procedures (e.g. testing and inspection) are often used 
to ensure conformity with the relevant energy-effi  ciency 
and CO2 emission reduction requirements. Conformity 
assessment serves to give consumers confi dence in the 
integrity of products, and add value to manufacturers’ 
marketing claims.
Finally, measures have been taken by governments 
to restrict the sale or prohibit the import of certain 
products which are not energy-effi  cient, or to ban the 
use of certain greenhouse gases in the composition of 
products. It is common for governments to restrict the 
use of certain substances for environmental and health 
reasons. However, since bans and prohibitions have a 
direct impact on trade (by removing or reducing trade 
opportunities), governments commonly seek to apply 
such measures while taking into account such factors 
as the availability of viable alternatives, technical 
feasibility and cost-eff ectiveness.
Th e Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement 
is the key WTO mechanism for governing technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures, including those on climate change 
mitigation objectives, although other GATT rules may 
also be relevant, particularly in cases where the measure 
in question prohibits the import of certain substances 
or products. Th e TBT Agreement applies the core 
non-discrimination principle of the GATT 1994 
to mandatory technical regulations, voluntary 
standards and conformity assessment procedures. 
Th e TBT Agreement also sets out detailed rules on 
avoiding unnecessary barriers to trade, ensuring the 
harmonization of regulations and standards and on 
transparency. 
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Th e scientifi c evidence on climate change and its 
impacts is compelling and continues to evolve. Th e 
Fourth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007a) states that our 
planet’s climate is indisputably warming, and the Stern 
Review (2006) on the economics of climate change 
concludes that climate change presents very serious 
global risks and demands an urgent global response. 
Th is part provides an overview of the current 
knowledge on existing and projected climate change 
and its associated impacts, and discusses the available 
options for responding to the challenges of climate 
change through mitigation and adaptation. While 
specifi c analyses of the linkages between climate 
change and trade are not covered in this part, any 
aspects which are pertinent from a trade perspective 
will, to the extent possible, be highlighted, in order to 
provide a background to, and frame of reference for, 
the subsequent parts.
Part I is structured around two main sections. Th e 
fi rst section covers the current knowledge on climate 
change and its associated impacts. It begins with a brief 
introduction to the linkages between greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate change, followed by a discussion 
on past, current and future trends for the emissions 
of greenhouse gases and how various regions and 
activities contribute to total emissions. Projections of 
greenhouse gas emissions and the associated scenarios 
for future climate change are subsequently addressed, 
including observed and projected temperature and 
precipitation changes, sea level rise and changes in 
snow, ice and frozen ground, as well as changes in 
climate variability and extreme weather events. Th is 
section concludes with an overview and discussion of 
fi ndings related to the projected impacts on various 
sectors (such as agriculture or health) and on specifi c 
regions, introducing issues that are of relevance to 
adapting to climate change. 
Th e two main approaches for responding to climate 
change and climate change impacts – mitigation 
and adaptation – are reviewed in Section I.B. In the 
past few years there has been increasing eff ort from 
both scientists and policy-makers to relate these two 
approaches. Th e characteristics of mitigation and 
adaptation are compared, and the ways and degree to 
which they are related are discussed. Th is is followed by 
a review of mitigation and adaptation opportunities, 
with specifi c emphasis on technology and the 
development of technology know-how given its links 
to trade.
Th e Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), which was set up by the World Meteorological 
Organization and the United Nations Environment 
Programme, is widely recognized as the principal 
authority for objective information on climate 
change, its potential impacts, and possible responses 
to these. Th is part makes frequent reference to IPCC 
reports,1 and uses the IPCC defi nition of climate 
change. According to this defi nition, climate change 
“… refers to a change in the state of the climate that 
can be identifi ed (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes 
in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and 
that persists for an extended period, typically decades 
or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, 
whether due to natural variability or as a result of 
human activity” (IPCC 2007a).2 
Current knowledge on climate A. 
change and its impacts
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 1. 
and climate change 
Greenhouse gases and the climate a) 
system
Since the onset of industrialization, there have 
been large increases in the levels of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions caused by human activities (known 
as “anthropogenic” GHGs), and as a result their 
concentration in the atmosphere has also increased. In 
simplifi ed terms, higher concentrations of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere cause the sun’s heat (which 
would otherwise be radiated back into space) to be 
retained in the earth’s atmosphere, thereby contributing 
to the greenhouse eff ect that causes global warming 
and climate change.3 
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this trend of increasing 
emission levels for the case of carbon dioxide (CO2). 
Figure 1 indicates the increase in global carbon dioxide 
emissions resulting from consumption of fossil fuels 
during the past 250 years, while Figure 2 shows the 
increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere for the past 50 years. 
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 – and of 
greenhouse gases in general – are measured in parts per 
million (ppm), referring to the number of greenhouse 
gas molecules per million molecules of dry air. In 
2005, the global average atmospheric concentration 
for CO2 was 379 ppm, indicating that there were 379 
molecules of CO2 per million molecules of dry air. In 
comparison, pre-industrial levels of CO2 concentration 
in the atmosphere were around 275 ppm (Forster et al., 
2007), indicating that the atmospheric concentration 
of CO2 has increased globally by about 36 per cent over 
the last 250 years. As Figure 2 illustrates, most of the 
increase in the atmospheric concentration of CO2 has 
occurred during the last 50 years.
Besides carbon dioxide, the major anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases are ozone, methane, nitrous oxide, 
halocarbons and other industrial gases (Forster et 
al., 2007). All of these gases occur naturally in the 
atmosphere, with the exception of industrial gases, 
such as halocarbons. Carbon dioxide emissions 
currently account for 77 per cent of the anthropogenic, 
or “enhanced”, greenhouse eff ect4 and mainly result 
from the burning of fossil fuels and from deforestation 
(Baumert et al., 2005). Changes in agriculture and 
land use are the main causes of increased emissions of 
methane and nitrous oxide, with methane emissions 
accounting for 14 per cent of the enhanced greenhouse 
eff ect. Th e remaining approximately 9 per cent consists 
of nitrous oxide emissions, ozone emissions from vehicle 
exhaust fumes and other sources, and emissions of 
halocarbons and other gases from industrial processes.
In the literature on this subject, it is now generally 
agreed that human activities have been a major cause of 
the accelerating pace of climate change (this accelerating 
eff ect is called “anthropogenic forcing”) (IPCC, 2007a). 
Th e general consensus on anthropogenic forcing, and 
an increased scientifi c understanding of climate change, 
are the result of improved analyses of temperature 
records, coupled with the use of new computer models 
to estimate variability and climate system responses 
to both natural and man-made causes. Th is increased 
understanding of climate processes has made it possible 
to incorporate more detailed information (for example 
on sea-ice dynamics, ocean heat transport and water 
vapour) into the climate models, which has resulted 
in a greater certainty that the links observed between 
warming and its impacts are reliable (Levin and Pershing, 
2008, and IPCC, 2007a). Based on an assessment of 
thousands of peer-reviewed scientifi c publications, the 
IPCC (2007a) concluded that the warming of the 
climate system is “unequivocal”, and that there is a very 
high level of confi dence, defi ned as more than 90 per 
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FIGURE 1. Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil 
fuels, 1751-2004
Source: Calculations based on data from http://cdiac.ornl.gov.
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cent likelihood, that the global average net eff ect of 
human activities is climate warming. 
Moreover, the fact that several greenhouse gases remain 
in the atmosphere for very long periods, combined with 
the time lag between the moment of their emission and 
the climate system’s fi nal response and rebalancing, 
means that global warming will continue to aff ect the 
natural systems of the earth for several hundred years, 
even if greenhouse gas emissions were substantially 
reduced or ceased altogether today. In other words, 
global warming is a concentration problem as well 
as an emission problem. Th e World Bank (2008a) 
estimates that, taking account of past GHG emissions, 
a global warming of around 2° C is probably already 
unavoidable. Th e corresponding best estimate from the 
IPCC scenarios is 1.8° C (IPCC, 2007c).
Th us, the remaining uncertainties relate mainly to 
determining the exact response of the climate system 
to any given increase of the levels of greenhouse gases 
emitted and of their concentration in the atmosphere; 
and to the modelling of the complex interactions 
between the various components of the climate 
system. For instance, Webb et al. (2006) fi nd that 
in the General Circulation Models (GCMs), which 
use detailed observations of weather phenomena and 
other factors to study past, present and future climate 
patterns, the manner in which feedback mechanisms 
are specifi ed has much larger implications for the 
range of climate change predictions than diff erences 
in concentrations of various greenhouse gases.5, 6 It is 
important to keep this in mind with respect to the 
global and regional projections of climate change and 
the associated impacts – the subjects of the following 
subsections.
Greenhouse gas emission trends and b) 
structure
Despite national and international eff orts to establish 
measures to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere (discussed further in Part IV), GHG 
emissions continue to grow. Th e IPCC (2007a) notes 
that, between 1970 and 2004, global anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions increased by 70 per cent, 
from 28.7 to 49 Giga tonnes of CO2-equivalent 
(GtCO2-eq).
7 Th e International Energy Agency (IEA) 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) report that global GHG 
emissions have roughly doubled from the beginning of 
the 1970s to 2005 (IEA, 2008 and OECD, 2008). 
As noted above, carbon dioxide is the most prevalent 
greenhouse gas, and has the fastest growing emission 
levels. Carbon dioxide represented 77 per cent of 
total GHG emissions in 2004, its emission levels 
having increased by 80 per cent between 1970 and 
2004 (IPCC, 2007a). Furthermore, the growth rate 
of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use and 
industrial processes increased from 1.1 per cent per 
year during the 1990s to more than 3 per cent per 
year from 2000 to 2004 (EIA, 2008, Raupach et al., 
2007, and the CDIAC 2009). Th ese fi gures indicate 
that, unless there is a signifi cant improvement in 
current climate change mitigation policies and related 
sustainable development practices, global greenhouse 
gas emissions will continue to grow over the coming 
decades (IPCC, 2007a). IEA (2008b) has noted that 
without such a change in policies, i.e. in a “business 
as usual” scenario, GHG emissions could increase 
by more than 70 per cent between 2008 and 2050.8 
Figure 3 shows these trends, and further illustrates 
how the regional structure (i.e. how much each region 
contributes to total emissions) of greenhouse gas 
emissions is expected to change.
Historically, industrialized countries have produced 
large amounts of energy-related emissions of carbon 
dioxide, and their share of responsibility for the 
present atmospheric concentration of GHGs also 
includes their accumulated past emissions (Raupach 
et al., 2007, IEA, 2008, and World Bank, 2008a). 
Th e cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide from 
the consumption of fossil fuels and from cement 
production in industrialized countries have, until now, 
exceeded developing countries’ emissions by a factor of 
roughly three (World Bank, 2008a, and Raupach et al., 
2007). By contrast, agriculture and forestry activities, 
which generate emissions of methane and nitrous 
oxide, and deforestation, which reduces “carbon sinks” 
(i.e. forests that absorb CO2 from the atmosphere) are 
more extensive in developing countries (Nyong, 2008). 
Emissions from these sectors have historically been 
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twice as high in developing countries as in industrialized 
countries (World Bank, 2008a).9 
Since the 1950s, emissions per capita in industrialized 
countries have been, on average, around four times 
higher than in developing countries, and the diff erence 
is even greater between industrialized countries and the 
least developed countries (EIA, 2007). However, the 
CO2 intensity of developing countries (i.e. the tonnes 
of carbon dioxide (equivalent) emitted per unit of gross 
domestic product (GDP), or, in other words, a measure 
of emission levels in relation to production levels) 
exceeds industrialized country CO2 intensity. Th is 
is illustrated in Figure 4. Th e fi gure also reveals that 
the amount of diff erence in CO2 intensities between 
various regions of the world depends signifi cantly 
on whether emissions from land use are included or 
excluded in the estimates. 
Today, however, and as indicated in Figure 3, 
annual energy-related carbon dioxide emissions 
from non-OECD countries surpass emissions from 
OECD countries. In 2005, CO2 emissions from 
non-OECD countries exceeded OECD-country 
emissions by 7 per cent (EIA, 2008). Th e total 
annual amount of greenhouse gas emissions of both 
industrialized countries and developing countries are 
now roughly the same, and of the 20 countries with 
the largest greenhouse gas emission levels, eight are 
developing countries (WRI, 2009).10 In fact, developing 
countries outside the OECD account for roughly two-
thirds of the fl ow of new emissions into the atmosphere 
(EIA, 2008). Th is corresponds quite closely to the 
estimate by Raupach et al. (2007), who note that 73 per 
cent of the growth in emissions in 2004 was attributed 
to developing nations. Th ey also note that the emission 
growth rate refl ects not only developing countries’ 
dependence on fossil fuels, but also their growing use 
of industrial processes. Th e average annual increase in 
emissions for 2005 to 2030 is projected to be 2.5 per 
cent for non-OECD countries, whereas the projected 
average annual increase is 0.5 per cent for OECD 
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of emissions carbon dioxide or emissions of total greenhouse gases. Th e ECA region has the highest energy-related CO2 emission intensity per unit of 
GDP, while the LAC region has the lowest. High-income countries generate by far the largest volume of CO2 emissions. However, if all greenhouse 
gas emissions were taken into account (including those arising from land use, land use change and forestry), the emission intensity levels and the total 
contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions would tend to increase for the SSA, EAP and LAC regions, since land degradation and deforestation 
have been proceeding at a rapid rate in these regions.
SSA refers to Sub-Saharan Africa; EAP to the East Asia and Pacifi c region; LAC to Latin America and the Caribbean region; ECA to Europe and 
Central Asia region; SAR to South Asia region; and MENA to Middle East and North Africa region.
Source: CO2 emissions (emissions from energy use) from EIA website (as of 18 September 2007); GDP, PPP (constant US$) from World Development 
Indicators; GHG emissions from Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 5.0. (World Resources Institute, 2008). Comprehensive emission data 
(for as many countries and as many greenhouse gases as possible) are only available up to 2000.
Source: World Bank, 2008a, Figure A1:2.
countries. Taken together, this means that, unless there 
is a change in greenhouse gas emission policies, non-
OECD carbon emissions will exceed OECD emissions 
by 72 per cent in 2030 (EIA, 2008). 
To summarize, levels of global greenhouse gas emissions 
are increasing, and unless there is a signifi cant change 
in current laws, policies and sustainable development 
practices, they will continue to grow over the next 
decades. Activities in industrialized countries have been 
the main cause of past emissions, and therefore account 
for the current concentration in the atmosphere of 
greenhouse gases due to human activities. 
Today, the total energy-related carbon dioxide emissions 
from developing countries slightly surpass the total 
emissions from industrialized countries, and since the 
annual rate of growth of carbon dioxide emissions is 
fi ve times higher in non-OECD countries than it is 
in OECD countries, the diff erence in total emissions 
between these countries is projected to increase. If no 
new emission reduction policies are brought into force, 
it is likely that non-OECD carbon dioxide emissions 
will be 72 per cent higher than emissions from OECD 
countries by 2030. It should be noted, however, 
that per capita emissions in industrialized countries 
remain four times higher on average than emissions in 
developing countries, and that only around 23 per cent 
of total past emissions can be attributed to developing 
countries (World Bank, 2008a and Raupach et al., 
2007). In addition, it is important to take account of 
the diff erences between developing and industrialized 
countries in terms of carbon dioxide intensity, as such 
diff erences may indicate, for example, where there is 
a potential for increased effi  ciency in reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions.
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Projections of future greenhouse gas c) 
emissions and climate change scenarios
In order to predict future climate change and assess 
its likely impacts, it is necessary to estimate how 
greenhouse gas emissions might increase in the future, 
and what impacts, such as changes in earth-surface 
temperature, will be associated with these emissions. 
Greenhouse gas emission projections are available 
from several sources, but the most commonly used 
and referenced baselines for climate change projections 
are the scenarios provided in the Special Report on 
Emission Scenarios (SRES), published by the IPCC 
in 2000. Based on four diff erent storylines of how 
the future situation might evolve, the SRES scenarios 
provide a wide range of possible future emissions up 
to 2100, which can be used as baselines for modelling 
and analysing climate change.11 As shown in Figure 5, 
each storyline and corresponding scenario has diff erent 
assumptions about which technologies and energy 
sources are used, as well as about the rate of economic 
growth and governance structures.
In the A1 storyline shown in Figure 5, the future world 
is characterized by very rapid economic growth, by 
a population that peaks in mid-century and declines 
thereafter, and by three diff erent assumptions on 
technology development that each have substantially 
diff erent implications for future GHG emissions: the 
highest emission levels are associated with the intensive 
fossil fuel scenario (A1FI); technologies using a 
balanced mix of energy sources (A1B) result in medium 
levels of emissions; while technologies which use non-
fossil fuel energy sources (A1T) result in the lowest 
GHG emissions under the A1 storyline). Under the B1 
storyline, the assumptions on population growth are 
similar to the A1 storyline, but the B1 storyline assumes 
a rapid transition towards cleaner and less carbon-
intensive economic activities based on services and 
information, with a somewhat lower economic growth 
rate compared to the A1 situation. Th e A2 storyline 
describes a future world where population continues 
to increase, economic development trends are regional 
rather than global, and per-capita economic growth and 
technological change are slower and more fragmented, 
i.e. do not penetrate the entire economy. Finally, the 
B2 storyline emphasizes local and regional solutions 
to sustainability, with a slowly but steadily growing 
population and medium economic development.
It is important to note that the SRES scenarios do 
not include additional climate initiatives such as 
international agreements, and thus none of the scenarios 
explicitly assume that the emission targets of the Kyoto 
Protocol (see Section III.A) will be implemented. 
However, as indicated above, some of the scenarios 
assume an increased use of energy-effi  cient technologies 
and decarbonization policies, resulting in lower reliance 
on fossil fuels than at present. Such assumptions have 
the same implications for the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions as emission targets do. In particular, the 
“B1” reference scenario shown in Figure 5 includes 
wide-ranging policies to limit total global warming to 
about 2° C. Th e SRES scenarios have been extensively 
used as the basis for scientifi c climate change modelling 
and for economic analysis of climate change impacts 
and mitigation in diff erent regions and countries 
(IPCC, 2001a, 2007a).
FIGURE 5. Characteristics of the four SRES scenarios
Source: Parry et al., 2007, Figure TS.2.
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Figure 6, from the IPCC (2007a), shows the wide 
range of possible future greenhouse gas emission levels 
based on the SRES scenarios, and the corresponding 
estimates of increases in surface temperature calculated 
using climate models. 
As illustrated in the fi gure, depending on which 
scenario is used, global greenhouse gas emissions, 
measured in Giga tonnes of CO2-equivalent, are 
projected to increase by between 25 and 90 per cent 
in the period 2000-2030. Warming of about 0.2° C 
per decade is projected up to around 2020 for a 
range of SRES emission scenarios. After this point, 
temperature projections increasingly depend on 
which specifi c emission scenario is used, and climate 
models estimate that the global average temperature 
will rise by 1.4 to 6.4° C between 1990 and 2100. 
A comparison of 153 SRES and pre-SRES, i.e. scenarios 
produced before the SRES report, scenarios with 
133 more recent scenarios which, like the SRES 
scenarios, assume no additional emission mitigation 
measures shows projected results that are of a 
comparable range (Fisher et al., 2007).
In the SRES report, all scenarios are assigned equal 
likelihood, but independent analyses which use these 
scenarios may select a particular scenario as being 
more likely or plausible as a baseline. In practice there 
seems to have been a tendency so far to emphasize the 
lower and middle-range GHG emission scenarios (see 
Pachauri, 2007). 
By contrast, some recent studies (including, for 
example, the Garnaut Climate Change Review for 
Australia (Garnaut, 2008)), having made a number of 
observations on the actual levels of emissions and of 
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FIGURE 6. Scenarios for GHG emissions from 2000 to 2100 (assuming no additional climate policies are brought into 
eff ect) and estimates of corresponding surface temperatures
Left panel: Global GHG emissions (in GtCO2-eq per year) in the absence of additional climate policies, showing six illustrative SRES scenarios (coloured 
lines) and the grey shaded area indicating the 80th percentile range of projections of recent scenarios published since SRES (i.e. post-SRES). Dashed 
lines show the full range of post-SRES scenarios. Th e emissions considered include carbon dioxide (CO2  ), methane (CH4  ), nitrous oxide (N2O) and the 
fl uoride gases sulphur hexafl uoride (SF6  ), hydrofl uorocarbons (HFCs), and perfl uorocarbons (PFCs). 
Right panel: Th e solid lines depict the global averages (calculated using several climate models) of surface warming for scenarios A2, A1B and B1, shown 
as continuations of the 20th-century emission levels. Th ese projections also take into account emissions of short-lived GHGs and aerosols. Th e pink line 
is not a scenario, but represents the simulations of the Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model (AOGCM), with atmospheric concentrations held 
constant at year 2000 values. Th e coloured bars at the right of the fi gure indicate the best estimate (shown as a darker band within each bar) within 
the full best-case to worst-case range of likely temperature increases assessed for the six SRES scenarios at 2090-2099. All temperatures are relative to the 
baseline temperature from the period 1980-1999.
Source: IPCC (2007a), fi gure SPM.5.
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economic growth, have focused most intensely on the 
high SRES scenario, i.e. the A1F1 scenario, to estimate 
future impacts. For instance, Garnaut (2008) points out 
that the actual economic growth rates, as well as the 
growth in carbon dioxide emissions since 2000, have 
been signifi cantly larger than was assumed under even 
the highest SRES scenario, i.e. the A1F1 scenario. 
More generally, the SRES scenarios have been criticized 
for being too optimistic in their baseline assumptions 
regarding the progress towards realizing lower 
GHG emissions from economic activities on both 
the demand and the supply side of the energy sector, 
resulting in an underestimation of the challenges as well 
as of the costs of reducing global warming (see Pielke et 
al., 2008). Th is is in line with the key points from the 
previous section on the trends and structure of GHG 
emissions: if the rates of decline in energy intensity and 
carbon intensity per unit of GDP are slowing down – 
or are even being reversed, as indicated by, for example, 
IEA (2008b) and Raupach et al. (2007) – then the 
SRES scenarios that implicitly or explicitly assume the 
opposite may represent overly conservative estimates of 
future climate change and its associated impacts. 
Richels et al. (2008) argue that a more serious constraint 
of the SRES approach is that it fails to incorporate 
the dynamic nature of the decision problem into 
the analysis of climate change policies. Th ey argue 
that an iterative risk management approach where 
uncertain long-term goals are used to develop short-
term emission targets would be more adequate, since 
it focuses on the short-term policy analysis and advice 
that decision-makers need. Based on the latest available 
information, moreover, the analysis should incorporate 
uncertainty and should incorporate new information 
and data as they become available. An additional 
strength of this approach, it is argued, is that it would 
facilitate distinctions between autonomous trends, 
i.e. changes that do not result from deliberate climate 
change policies, and policy-induced developments.
Observed and projected climate 2. 
change and its impacts 
Temperature and precipitationa) 
One of the strongest observed climate change trends 
is the warming of our planet. Time series observations 
(i.e. data collected over successive periods of time) 
for the past 150 years not only show an increase in 
global average temperatures, but also show that the 
rate of change in average temperatures is increasing. 
Between 1906 and 2005, the global average earth-
surface temperature increased by about 0.74° C and 
the warming trend per decade has been almost twice as 
high for the last 50 years compared to the trend for the 
past 100 years (IPCC, 2007a). Furthermore, for the 
30 year period from 1976 to 2007, the rate of 
temperature change was three times higher than the 
rate for the past 100 years, according to the National 
Climate Data Center (NCDC) under National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2007). 
Analyses of measurements from weather balloons and 
satellites indicate that warming rates in the atmospheric 
temperature are similar to those observed in surface 
temperature (Meehl et al., 2007). 
Th e increase in temperature is prevalent all over the 
globe, but there are signifi cant regional variations 
compared to the global average. Observations show 
that temperature increases are greater at higher 
northern latitudes, where average Arctic temperatures, 
for example, have increased at almost twice the average 
global rate in the past 100 years (Meehl et al., 2007). 
In addition, both Asia and Africa have experienced 
warming above the average global temperature 
increase. South America, Australia and New Zealand 
have experienced less warming than the global average, 
whereas the warming experienced in Europe and North 
America is comparable to the global average increase in 
temperature (Trenberth et al., 2007).
Several eff ects of temperature increases on people, plant 
and animal species, and a range of human-managed 
systems have already been verifi ed in the literature. 
Among such eff ects are an increase in mortality due 
to extreme heat in Europe; changes in how infectious 
diseases are transmitted in parts of Europe; and earlier 
10
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and increased seasonal production of allergenic pollen 
in the Northern Hemisphere’s high and mid-latitudes. 
Agricultural and forestry management, particularly in 
the higher latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere, have 
also reportedly been aff ected, mainly through earlier 
spring planting of crops and changes related to fi res 
and pests aff ecting forests. 
In addition, rising temperatures strongly aff ect 
terrestrial biological systems, resulting in, for example, 
earlier leaf-unfolding, bird migration and egg-laying, 
and pole-ward and upward shifts in the ranges of 
plant and animal species (Rosenzweig et al., 2007, 
Rosenzweig et al., 2008). It should be noted, however, 
that particularly for northern Europe, small temperature 
increases are also expected to have benefi cial impacts, 
mainly in relation to agriculture (see later subsection 
on agriculture).
Regional variations in temperature changes are 
expected to persist throughout the century. Figure 7 
shows the projected surface temperature changes for 
the early and late 21st century relative to the surface 
temperatures during the period 1980-1999, based on 
average climate-model projections for the high, middle 
and low SRES scenarios.
Source: IPCC (2007a), Fig. 3-2. Th e panels show the multi-Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model (AOGCM) average projections for the A2 
(top), A1B (middle) and B1 (bottom) SRES scenarios averaged over the decades 2020-2029 (left) and 2090-2099 (right). 
FIGURE 7. Climate model projections of surface warming (early and late 21st century)
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Figure 7 illustrates that average Arctic temperatures are 
projected to continue to rise more than those in other 
regions. Th e Antarctic is also projected to warm, but 
there is less certainty about the extent of this warming 
than there is for other regions. Warming is expected to 
be higher than the global annual average for all seasons 
throughout Africa. Furthermore, warming is likely 
to be signifi cantly above the global average in central 
Asia, the Tibetan Plateau and northern Asia; above 
the global average in eastern Asia and South Asia; 
and similar to the global average in southeast Asia. In 
Central and South America the annual mean warming 
is likely to be larger than the global mean except for 
southern South America, where warming is likely to be 
similar to the global mean warming. Th e annual mean 
warming in North America and in Europe is likely 
to exceed the global mean warming in most areas, 
whereas the warming in Australia and New Zealand 
is likely to be comparable to the global average. Th e 
small island developing states (SIDS) will most likely 
experience less warming than the global annual average 
(Christensen et al., 2007).
Temperature increases are associated with changes in 
precipitation, and the seasonal and regional variability 
is substantially higher for changes in precipitation 
than it is for changes in temperature (Trenberth et al., 
2007). Already, signifi cant increases in precipitation 
have been observed in northern Europe, northern and 
central Asia, as well as in the eastern parts of North and 
South America. By contrast, parts of southern Asia, the 
Mediterranean, the Sahel and southern Africa have 
become drier. 
In the future, substantial increases in annual mean 
precipitation are expected in most high latitude 
regions, as well as in eastern Africa and in central Asia 
(Emori and Brown, 2005, Christensen et al., 2007). 
Substantial decreases are, on the other hand, expected 
in the Mediterranean region (Rowell and Jones, 2006), 
the Caribbean region (Neelin et al., 2006) and in most 
of the sub-tropical regions (Christensen et al., 2007). 
It is not only the changes in annual averages that are 
important. Seasonal changes, as well as changes in the 
frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events, 
are likely to have signifi cant social and economic 
impacts on livelihoods, mortality, production and 
productivity, including management of human and 
natural systems infrastructure, etc. Th ese aspects are 
addressed further in the subsections on extreme events 
and regional and sectoral climate change impacts.
Sea level rise and changes in snow, ice b) 
and frozen ground 
Warming of the climate system has several implications 
for sea level rise. First, consistent with the fi ndings 
on increased global average temperatures, there is a 
consensus in the literature on the subject that ocean 
temperatures have already increased, contributing to 
a rise in sea level through thermal expansion (Levitus 
et al., 2005, Willis et al., 2004). Between 1961 and 
2003, the global average sea level rose at a rate of 
approximately 1.8 millimetres (mm) per year. Th is 
rate was signifi cantly faster, i.e. approximately 3.1 mm 
per year, over the period 1993 to 2003 (IPCC, 2007a, 
Rahmstorf et al., 2007). 
Rising sea levels, combined with human activities 
such as agricultural practices and urban development, 
already contribute to losses of coastal wetlands and 
mangrove swamps, leading to an increase in damage 
from coastal fl ooding in many developing countries 
(IPCC, 2007d)). New evidence further supports the 
theory that the changes which have been observed in 
marine and freshwater biological ecosystems are related 
to changes in the temperatures, salinity, oxygen levels, 
circulation (i.e. how water circulates around the globe) 
and ice cover of the earth’s oceans, seas, lakes and 
rivers.12 
Moreover, the literature points out that decreasing 
snow cover and melting ice caps and glaciers have 
direct implications for rising sea levels (Lemke et al., 
2007). Th e eff ect does not only accrue directly from 
the melting of the snow and/or ice. Ice and snow have 
a bright surface that refl ects the sunlight; when this 
cover melts, darker marine or terrestrial layers with 
less refl ective surfaces appear, resulting in a “feedback 
eff ect” that accelerates the melting. In other words, the 
eff ect of the sun is amplifi ed by the dark surfaces which 
absorb and re-emit the heat. It is complicated to create 
accurate computer models of these processes, and the 
projected rises in sea level have varied in each of the 
12
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four IPCC Assessment Reports published to date, 
primarily due to diverging views on sea ice cover, the 
rate of melting in Greenland and Antarctica, and the 
rate of glacier melt. 
Th us, sea level was projected to rise 0.2 metres 
by 2030 and 0.65 metres by 2100 in the fi rst 
IPCC Assessment Report (IPCC, 1990), whereas the 
Second Assessment Report (IPCC, 1995) projected 
a rise from 0.15 to 0.95 metres from the present to 
2100. In the Th ird Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001a), 
sea level projections were 0.09 to 0.88 metres between 
1990 and 2100, while the Fourth Assessment Report 
(IPCC, 2007a) projects a rise in sea level of 0.18 to 
0.59 metres for 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999. 
Th ere are two main reasons for the more conservative 
estimates in the most recent IPCC report. First, a 
narrower confi dence range, i.e. projections with lower 
degrees of uncertainty, is used in the Fourth Assessment 
Report compared to the Th ird Assessment Report. 
Secondly, uncertainties in the feedbacks of the climate-
carbon cycle are not included in the Fourth Assessment 
Report and the full eff ect of changes in ice sheet fl ows 
is also not included, because at the time of the report 
it was not possible to draw fi rm conclusions based on 
the existing literature on the topic. Although the eff ect 
of increased ice fl ow from Greenland and Antarctica (at 
the rates observed during the period 1993-2003) was 
incorporated in the model used to project sea rise levels 
for the Fourth Assessment Report, it acknowledges 
that the contributions from Greenland and possibly 
Antarctica may be larger than projected in the ice sheet 
models used, and that there is thus a risk of sea level 
rise above the fi gures stated in the report. 
A number of recent scientifi c contributions seem 
to suggest that not only may the climate system be 
responding more quickly than climate models have 
indicated, but that climate impacts are, in fact, escalating 
(Levin and Pershing, 2008). With regard to sea ice, 
glacier and snow melt, and the associated sea level rise, 
several new studies shed more light on the extent of 
the problem and on the dynamic feedback processes 
outlined above that were not fully incorporated in the 
ice sheet models used for the projections in the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report. 
Based on observations using NASA satellite data, 
NASA (2007) concludes that the levels of sea ice were 
at a record low from June to September 2007.13 Th e 
ice melt was found to accelerate during periods with 
warmer temperatures and few clouds, when more solar 
radiation reaches the earth’s surface. Similar fi ndings 
on substantial decreases in sea ice are reported for 
perennial sea ice (i.e. ice which remains year-round, 
and does not melt and re-form with the changing of 
the seasons) for the period 1970-2000, with an increase 
in the rate of loss during 2005-2007 (Ngheim et al., 
2007). As outlined above, when ice or snow melts, 
darker marine or terrestrial surfaces with less refl ective 
surfaces appear, which can produce a warming feedback 
eff ect that accelerates further melting, and which may 
negatively aff ect the re-formation of ice during the 
following cold season. Th is was suggested by Mote 
(2007) as a potential explanation for the dramatic 
increase observed in surface-ice melting for Greenland 
in 2007. 
Mote (2007) fi nds that the observed melting could have 
arisen from previous melting episodes in 2002-2006, 
and that the most plausible explanations are a decrease 
in surface refl ectivity, warmer snow due to higher 
winter temperatures, or changes in the accumulation 
of winter snow due to precipitation changes. 
Th ese fi ndings not only indicate that sea level rise 
may have been underestimated in the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report, but also that it may only be a 
question of years or of a few decades before changes 
in sea ice, particularly in the Arctic, lead to the 
accessibility of new shipping routes – which would 
have signifi cant implications for transport, as well as 
for the exploitation of resources, including fossil fuels. 
For example, in 2007, the Northwest Passage, which is 
the shortest shipping route between the Atlantic and 
the Pacifi c, was free of ice and navigable for the fi rst 
time in recorded history (Cressey, 2007). Th e duration 
of the navigation season for the Northern Sea Route 
is likewise expected to increase in the coming decades 
(ACIA, 2005). Th e potential for new shipping routes 
has already led to discussions on sovereignty over these 
routes, seabed resources and off -shore developments 
(ACIA, 2005). Th e decline in Arctic sea ice and the 
opening of new navigable passages will also have 
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a number of implications on tourism, commercial 
fi shing, and hunting of marine wildlife. 
More generally, the observed increase in the size and 
number of glacial lakes, changes in some ecosystems 
(particularly in the Arctic), and the increasing ground 
instability in permafrost regions due to thawing of the 
frozen surface layer, are clear indicators that natural 
systems related to snow, ice and frozen ground are 
aff ected by climate change (Lemke et al., 2007). Th is 
has a number of additional implications for transport, 
industry and infrastructure. Certain industries, notably 
oil and gas companies, depend heavily on reliable snow 
cover and temperatures, as they use ice roads in the 
Arctic to gain access to oil and gas fi elds. 
In order to protect the tundra ecosystem, before 
a company builds an ice road, certain criteria on 
temperature and snow-depth must be met, and these 
are compromised by climate change (UNEP, 2007a). 
Th e Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) (2005), 
for example, reports that, in the Alaskan tundra, the 
number of travel days on frozen roads of vehicles for 
oil exploration decreased from 220 to 130 per year 
over the period 1971-2003. Th awing of permafrost 
has additional severe impacts for housing and other 
infrastructure (Lemke et al., 2007). 
Another area where recent studies suggest that the 
climate system may be responding more quickly than 
climate models predicted is on the capacity of the oceans 
to absorb carbon dioxide. For instance, although the 
IPCC (2007c) concludes that the capacity of the oceans 
and the terrestrial biosphere to absorb the increasing 
carbon dioxide emissions would decrease over time, 
Canadell et al. (2007) fi nd that the absorptive capacity 
of the oceans has been falling more rapidly than the 
rates predicted by the main models used by the IPCC. 
Th is fi nding is mirrored by Schuster and Watson 
(2007), whose results suggest that the North Atlantic 
uptake of CO2 declined by approximately 50 per cent 
between the mid-1990s and 2002-2005. 
Le Quéré et al. (2007) studied the CO2 “sink” (i.e. the 
capacity for carbon dioxide absorption) in the Southern 
Ocean over the period from 1981 to 2004 and report 
a similar signifi cant weakening of the carbon sink. 
Whereas Schuster and Watson (2007) fi nd that sink 
weakening is attributable to a combination of natural 
variation and human activities, Le Quéré et al. (2007) 
suggest that the decrease is a result of changes caused 
by man (i.e. anthropogenic changes) predominantly in 
wind temperatures, but also in air temperatures. 
Until now, the oceans have been absorbing over 80 per 
cent of the heat being added to the climate system 
(IPCC, 2007a), and sequestered 25-30 per cent of 
the annual global emissions of CO2 (Le Quéré et al., 
2007). However, if the above-mentioned decline in 
the oceans’ capacity to absorb carbon dioxide carries 
on, and that trend continues on a global scale, a 
signifi cantly greater proportion of emitted carbon will 
remain in the atmosphere, and will exacerbate future 
warming trends (Levin and Pershing, 2008). 
Climate variability and extremes c) 
It is reasonable to argue that climate change will be 
experienced most directly through changes in the 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. Such 
weather events are “hidden” in the changes in climatic 
averages and have immediate short-term implications 
for well-being and daily livelihoods (ADB, 2005, and 
IPCC, 2007a).14 
Even with small average temperature increases, the 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events 
are predicted to change, and the type of such weather 
events (such as hurricanes, typhoons, fl oods, droughts, 
and heavy precipitation events) that regions are subject 
to is projected to change (UNFCCC, 2008). A number 
of changes in climate variability and extremes have 
already been observed and reported, including increases 
in the frequency and intensity of heatwaves, increases 
in intense tropical cyclone activity in various regions, 
increases in the number of incidences of extreme high 
sea level, and decreases in the frequency of cold days or 
nights and the occurrence of frost (Meehl et al., 2007). 
One of the most pronounced fi ndings relates to changes 
in the frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation, 
which have increased in most areas, although there are 
strong regional variations. 
14
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In general, incidences of heavy precipitation have 
increased in the regions that have experienced an 
increase in average annual precipitation, i.e. northern 
Europe, northern and central Asia, as well as in the 
eastern parts of North and South America (Trenberth 
et al., 2007). However, increases in the frequency of 
heavy precipitation have been observed even in many 
regions where the general trend is a reduction in total 
precipitation (i.e. most sub-tropical and mid-latitude 
regions). In addition, longer and more intense droughts 
have been observed, especially in the tropics and sub-
tropics, since the 1970s (Trenberth et al., 2007).
As will be seen below, most of the changes which have 
been observed are expected to become more widespread 
and to intensify in the future. However, it should be 
noted that there are a number of diffi  culties in assessing 
long-term changes in extreme events. First, extremes, 
by defi nition, refer to events that occur rarely, which 
means that the number of observations on which to 
base statistical analyses is limited. Th e more infrequent 
an event is, the more diffi  cult it is to identify long-
term trends (Frei and Schär, 2001, and Klein Tank and 
Können, 2003). 
Lack of data, statistical limitations and the diversity of 
climate monitoring practices have, in general, limited 
the types of extreme events that could be assessed, and 
the degree of accuracy of conclusions reached in the 
past (Trenberth et al., 2007). Many of these issues 
have been addressed over the past fi ve to ten years, 
and substantial progress has been made in terms of 
generating improved data in the form of daily regional 
and continental data sets. In addition, the systematic 
use and exchange between scientists of standards and 
common defi nitions, has allowed the generation of 
an unprecedented global picture of changes in daily 
extremes of temperature and precipitation (Alexander 
et al., 2006, and Trenberth et al., 2007). 
Th e most notable improvements in the reliability of 
model analyses of extremes relate to the improvement 
of regional information concerning heatwaves, heavy 
precipitation and droughts. It should be noted, 
however, that for some regions, model analyses are 
still scarce. Th is is the case for extreme events in the 
tropics, in particular, where the projections are still 
surrounded by uncertainty. Information is improving, 
however. For instance, Allan and Soden (2008) used 
satellite observations and computer model simulations 
to examine the response of tropical precipitation to 
changes due to natural causes in surface temperature 
and atmospheric moisture content. Th eir results 
indicate that there is a distinct link between temperature 
and extremes in rainfall, with warm periods associated 
with increases in heavy rain and cold periods associated 
with decreasing incidences of heavy rain. Th e observed 
increase of rainfall extremes was found to be greater 
than predicted by models, which implies (as they 
pointed out) that current projections on future changes 
in rainfall extremes may be under-estimations. 
Based on current knowledge, Table 1 provides an 
overview of the major impacts that changes in climate 
variability and extremes are projected to have on 
various sectors.
Table 1 illustrates the considerable range of likely 
impacts arising from changes in climate variability and 
extremes. It illustrates that although a few of the impacts 
are positive – most notably increases in agricultural 
yields in mid to high latitudes and reductions in 
mortality from reduced exposure to cold – the impacts 
of most changes will be adverse. 
In addition, the table illustrates that most changes will 
be associated with a number of direct as well as indirect 
consequences across various sectors. Th us, the impacts 
of heavy precipitation may not be limited to direct 
impacts (such as damage to agricultural crops, buildings, 
roads, bridges and other infrastructure, or injuries and 
deaths), but may also have an indirect negative impact 
on trade (through disruption to infrastructure, or as 
a result of damage to agricultural outputs), which in 
turn may also have detrimental eff ects on nutrition. 
Vector-borne diseases (i.e. diseases carried by insects 
or parasites) may also rise if climatic conditions favour 
increases in insect populations through for example 
rising mean temperatures and changes in precipitation 
patterns, and if water supplies are contaminated (which 
may occur as a result of fl oodings, etc.) increases in 
diarrheal diseases and cholera epidemics may follow 
incidences of heavy precipitation.
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PHENOMENON AND 
DIRECTION OF TREND 
EXAMPLES OF MAJOR PROJECTED IMPACTS BY SECTOR 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
ecosystems 
Water resources Human health Industry, settlement and society 
Over most land 
areas, warmer 
and fewer cold 
days and nights; 
warmer and more 
frequent hot days 
and nights
Increased 
yields in colder 
environments; 
decreased yields 
in warmer 
environments; 
increased insect 
outbreaks
Eff ects on water 
resources relying on 
snow melt; eff ects 
on some water 
supplies
Reduced human 
mortality from 
decreased cold 
exposure
Reduced energy demand for 
heating; increased energy 
demand for cooling; declining 
air quality in cities; reduced 
disruption to transport due 
to snow, ice; eff ects on winter 
tourism
Warm spells/
heatwaves. 
Frequency 
increases over 
most land areas 
Reduced yields in 
warmer regions 
due to heat stress; 
increased danger of 
wildfi re 
Increased water 
demand; water 
quality problems, 
e.g. algal blooms 
Increased risk 
of heat-related 
mortality, 
especially for the 
elderly, chronically 
sick, very young 
and socially 
isolated 
Reduction in quality of life for 
people in warm areas without 
appropriate housing; impacts 
on the elderly, the very young 
and the poor 
Heavy 
precipitation. 
Frequency 
increases over 
most areas 
Damage to crops; 
soil erosion; inability 
to cultivate land due 
to waterlogging of 
soils 
Adverse eff ects on 
quality of surface 
and groundwater; 
contamination of 
water supplies; water 
scarcity may be 
relieved 
Increased risk of 
deaths, injuries, 
and infectious 
respiratory and 
skin diseases 
Disruption of settlements, 
commerce, transport and 
societies due to fl ooding; 
pressures on urban and rural 
infrastructures; loss of property 
Area affected by 
droughts 
Land degradation; 
lower yields/crop 
damage and failure; 
increased livestock 
deaths; increased 
risk of wildfi re
More widespread 
water stress
Increased risk 
of food and 
water shortage; 
increased risk of 
malnutrition; 
increased risk of 
water- and food-
borne diseases
Water shortage for settlements, 
industry and societies; reduced 
hydropower generation 
potentials; potential for 
population migration
Increases in 
intense tropical 
cyclone activity 
Damage to crops; 
wind throw 
(uprooting) of trees; 
damage to coral reefs
Power outages 
causing disruption 
to public water 
supply
Increased risk of 
deaths, injuries, 
water- and food-
borne diseases; 
post-traumatic 
stress disorders
Disruption by fl ood and high 
winds; withdrawal of risk 
coverage in vulnerable areas by 
private insurers; potential for 
population migrations; loss of 
property
Increased 
incidence of 
extreme high sea 
level (excludes 
tsunamis)
Salinization of 
irrigation water, 
estuaries and fresh-
water systems 
Decreased fresh-
water availability 
due to saltwater 
intrusion 
Increased risk of 
deaths and injuries 
by drowning in 
fl oods; migration-
related health 
eff ects 
Costs of coastal protection 
versus costs of land use 
relocation; potential for 
movement of populations and 
infrastructure; see also tropical 
cyclones above 
TABLE 1. Potential impacts of climate change due to changes in extreme weather and climate events, based on 
projections to the mid- to late 21st century.
Source: Adapted from IPCC 2007a, table SPM 3. Note that changes or developments in the capacity to adapt to climate change are not taken into 
account in the table.
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Th e examples in Table 1 point to an implicit aspect of 
climate change impacts: the magnitude of such impacts 
will be location-specifi c and will depend on pre-existing 
underlying stresses, development characteristics and 
ongoing processes. For example, the consequences of 
an incidence of extreme rainfall will be less severe for 
a population in an area where building construction is 
of a high standard; roads, railways, etc., have suffi  cient 
drainage; water supply and quality are assured; and 
only a small percentage of the population relies directly 
on the natural resource base for sustaining their 
livelihoods. 
In other words, the magnitude of the consequences of 
climate change impacts depends on the vulnerability 
of a given human or natural system. Vulnerability 
refers to the degree to which a human or natural 
system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, the 
adverse eff ects of climate change, including climate 
variability and extremes (IPCC, 2007d). In this way, 
it is a function not only of the character, variation, 
magnitude and rate of climate change to which a 
system is exposed, but also of its sensitivity and its 
adaptive capacity (IPCC, 2007d). Th e sensitivity and 
adaptive capacity of the systems or societies is, in 
turn, infl uenced by the development characteristics, 
including economic development and distribution 
of resources, pre-existing stresses on humans and 
ecosystems, and the functioning and characteristics 
of social and governmental institutions (Adger et al., 
2007, Turner et al., 2003, Smit and Wandel, 2006, and 
Yohe and Tol, 2002). Th e following subsections will 
address these and related aspects in more detail.
Projected regional and sectoral 3. 
impacts of climate change
Th e regional and sectoral impacts of climate change are 
analysed extensively in the existing literature on this 
subject (see UNFCCC, 2007a, Nyong, 2008, Boko et 
al., 2007, Cline, 2007, Cruz et al., 2007, Hennessy et 
al., 2007, Alcamo et al., 2007, Magrin et al., 2007, 
Anisimov et al., 2007, Field et al., 2007, Mimura et al., 
2007, and IPCC, 2007d). Drawing on these and other 
sources, the current subsection provides a brief overview 
of the key projected regional and sectoral impacts of 
climate change. Rather than attempting to cover all the 
fi ndings of the literature on climate change impacts 
at the regional and sectoral level, the emphasis of this 
subsection is on results that are particularly relevant 
for trade, productive resources and human livelihoods, 
and thus not all impacts are covered.15 
General fi ndings on sectoral and a) 
regional impacts
Future global, regional and sectoral climate change 
impacts will depend on the extent of the increase 
in global average temperatures, as indicated in the 
section on greenhouse gas emission projections 
and climate change scenarios. Figure 8, from the 
IPCC (2007d), further illustrates the relationship 
between global average annual temperature change 
and the key impacts on diff erent sectors, and relates 
these changes to the diff erent SRES emission scenario 
projections discussed earlier. As the fi gure shows, the 
impacts of climate change increase with increasing 
average temperatures in all cases, and in most situations 
negative impacts arise even with small increases in 
global average temperatures. An immediate observation 
can be made that mitigation is required to avoid the 
impacts associated with large temperature increases, 
and adaptation is necessary to address the impacts that 
are unavoidable. 
Figure 8 illustrates that vulnerability is a function of 
the character, magnitude and rate of climate change. 
In addition, it gives an initial indication of the areas, 
sectors and population groups that will be aff ected 
the most by climate change. Agriculture is highly 
vulnerable both directly through temperature increases 
and, as shown in the previous subsection, through 
incidences of extreme climate events, and indirectly 
through the changes to the hydrological cycle (i.e. the 
cycle of water between the earth and the atmosphere, 
through evaporation, precipitation, runoff , etc.) which 
accompany temperature increases, such as changes 
related to glacial and snow melt and to water supply, 
including changes in precipitation patterns. Low-
lying coastal areas and their populations, economic 
activities and infrastructure are similarly vulnerable 
to global warming. Water availability poses another 
key impact area, with hundreds of millions of people 
predicted to be exposed to increased water scarcity and 
Part I: Climate Change: The Current State of Knowledge
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declining water quality. Ecosystems and species will be 
signifi cantly aff ected depending on the extent of global 
warming, and additional – potentially severe – risks to 
health will be imposed by climate change. 
Figure 8 gives an indication that low latitudes will 
be hit the hardest. Th e picture becomes clearer 
when a specifi c regional dimension is added. Table 2 
summarizes some of the key projected climate change 
impacts by region. While the impacts will depend on 
the rate of temperature change, as indicated in Figure 8, 
and will vary according to the extent of adaptation, and 
socio-economic development pathways, several general 
observations can be made. 
First, it can be observed from Table 2 that issues related 
to the hydrological cycle, such as increased glacial and 
snow melt, changes in precipitation patterns, erosion 
from runoff , etc., are pertinent in all regions and that 
coastal areas and mega-deltas around the world will 
be negatively aff ected. Second, the most signifi cant 
adverse impacts on agricultural production are 
projected for Africa, for the mega-deltas in Asia, and 
for Latin America, although agricultural production 
is also projected to decrease in parts of Australia and 
New Zealand and in southern Europe. Furthermore, 
the climate change impacts within regions vary 
signifi cantly. And last, the stresses induced by climate 
change will accentuate existing development challenges 
for developing regions of the world.
In the next subsection, the most signifi cant projected 
regional climate impacts are summarized for key sectors 
and issues.
Global mean annual temperature change relative to 1980-1999 (°C)
0 1 2  3   4 
Decreasing water availability and increasing drought in mid-latitudes and semi-arid low latitudes
Complex, localized negative impacts on smallholders, subsistence farmers and fishers
Increased damage from floods and storms
Millions more people could experience
coastal flooding each year
About 30% of
global coastal
wetlands lost**
Tendencies for cereal productivity
to decrease in low latitudes
Tendencies for some cereal productivity 
to increase at mid-to high latitudes
Productivity of all cereals
decreases in low latitudes
Cereal productivity to
decrease in some regions
Increased water availability in moist tropics and high latitudes
Increasing burden from malnutrition, diarrhoeal, cardio-respiratory, and infectious diseases
Increased morbidity and mortality from heatwaves, floods, and droughts
Changed distribution of some disease vectors
Substantial burden on health services
Hundreds of millions of people exposed to increased water stress
Up to 30% of species at
increasing risk of extinction
Terrestrial biosphere tends toward a net carbon source as:
~15% ~40% of ecosystems affected
Increased coral bleaching
Increasing species ranges shifts and wildfire risk
Ecosystem changes due to weakening of the meridional
overtuning circulation
Most corals bleached Widespread coral mortality
Significant* extinctions
around the globe
3.4.1, 3.4.3
3.ES, 3.4.1, 3.4.3
3.5.1, T3.3, 20.6.2,
TS.B5
4.ES, 4.4.11
T4.1, F4.4, B4.4,
6.4.1, 6.6.5, B6.1
4.ES, T4.1, F4.2,
F4.4
4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.4,
4.4.5, 4.4.6, 4.4.10,
B4.5
19.3.5
0 1 2   3   4 
WATER
ECOSYSTEMS
FOOD
COASTS
HEALTH
5.ES, 5.4.7
5.ES, 5.4.2, F5.2
5.ES, 5.4.2, F5.2
6.ES, 6.3.2, 6.4.1,
6.4.2
6.4.1
T6.6, F6.8, TS.B5
8.ED, 4.4.1, 8.7,
T8.2, T8.4
8.ES, 8.2.2, 8.2.3,
8.4.1, 8.4.2, 8.7,
T8.3, F8.3
8.ES, 8.2.8, 8.7,
B8.4
8.6.1
Global mean annual temperature change relative to 1980-1999 (°C)
*Significant is defined here as more than 40%
**Based on average rate of sea level rise of 4.2mm/year from 2000 to 2080
5°C
5°C
FIGURE 8. Key climate change impacts as a function of increasing global average temperature change
Source: IPCC 2007d, Figure SPM.2.
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Africa 
By 2020, between 75 and 250 million people are projected to be aff ected by water shortages due to climate 
change. 
By 2020, in some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50 per cent. 
Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries is projected to be severely 
compromised. Th is would have a further adverse eff ect on the supply of food and would exacerbate 
malnutrition. 
Towards the end of the 21st century, projected sea level rise will aff ect low-lying coastal areas with large 
populations. Th e cost of adaptation could amount to at least 5 to 10 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). 
By 2080, an increase of 5 to 8 per cent of arid and semi-arid land in Africa is projected under a range of 
climate scenarios. 
Asia 
By the 2050s, freshwater availability, particularly in large river basins, in central, south, east and southeast Asia 
is projected to decrease. 
Coastal areas, especially heavily populated mega-delta regions, in south, east and southeast Asia, will be at 
greatest risk due to increased fl ooding from the sea and, in some mega-deltas, fl ooding from the rivers. 
Climate change is projected to compound existing pressures on natural resources and the environment 
resulting from rapid urbanization, industrialization and economic development. 
Endemic morbidity and mortality due to diarrhoeal diseases primarily associated with fl oods and droughts are 
expected to rise in east, south and southeast Asia due to projected changes in the hydrological cycle. 
Australia 
and New 
Zealand 
By 2020, signifi cant loss of biodiversity is projected to occur in some ecologically rich sites, including the 
Great Barrier Reef and the Queensland Wet Tropics. 
By 2030, water security problems are projected to intensify in southern and eastern Australia and, in New 
Zealand, in Northland and some eastern regions. 
By 2030, production from agriculture and forestry is projected to decline over much of southern and eastern 
Australia, and over parts of eastern New Zealand, due to increased drought and fi re. However, in New 
Zealand, initial benefi ts are projected in some other regions. 
By 2050, ongoing coastal development and population growth in some areas of Australia and New Zealand 
are projected to exacerbate risks from sea level rise and increases in the severity and frequency of storms and 
coastal fl ooding. 
Europe 
Climate change is expected to magnify regional diff erences in Europe’s natural resources and assets. Negative 
impacts will include increased risk of inland fl ash fl oods and more frequent coastal fl ooding and increased 
coastal erosion (due to storms and sea level rise). 
Mountainous areas will face glacier retreat, reduced snow cover and diminished winter tourism, and extensive 
species losses (up to 60 per cent by 2080 in some areas under high emission scenarios). 
In southern Europe, climate change is projected to worsen conditions (high temperatures and drought) in 
a region already vulnerable to climate variability, and to reduce water availability, hydropower potential, 
summer tourism and, in general, crop productivity. 
Climate change is also projected to increase the health risks due to heatwaves and the frequency of wildfi res. 
Latin 
America 
By mid-century, increases in temperature and associated decreases in soil water are projected to lead to gradual 
replacement of tropical forest by savannah in eastern Amazonia. Semi-arid vegetation will tend to be replaced 
by arid-land vegetation. 
Th ere is a risk of signifi cant biodiversity loss through species extinction in many areas of tropical Latin America. 
Productivity of some important crops is projected to decrease and livestock productivity to decline, with 
adverse consequences for food security. In temperate zones, soybean yields are projected to increase. Overall, 
the number of people at risk of hunger is projected to increase. 
Changes in precipitation patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are projected to signifi cantly aff ect water 
availability for human consumption, agriculture and energy generation. 
North 
America 
Warming in the western mountains is projected to cause decreased snowpack, more winter fl ooding and 
reduced summer fl ows, exacerbating competition for over-allocated water resources. 
In the early decades of the century, moderate climate change is projected to increase aggregate yields of 
rain-fed agriculture by 5 to 20 per cent, but with important variability among regions. Major challenges are 
projected for crops that are near the warm end of their suitable range, or which depend on highly utilized 
water resources. 
Cities that currently experience heatwaves are expected to be further challenged by an increased number, 
intensity and duration of heatwaves during the course of the century, with potential for adverse health impacts. 
Coastal communities and habitats will be increasingly stressed by climate change impacts interacting with 
development and pollution. 
TABLE 2. Examples of projected regional impacts of climate change
Source: IPCCa 2007, Table SPM.2
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Projected sectoral impacts of climate b) 
change at the regional level
Agriculture and food securityi) 
Agriculture is highlighted as the sector which is most 
vulnerable to climate change throughout the literature 
on this issue (see Cline, 2007, Nyong, 2008, or IPCC, 
2007d). As indicated in Figure 7, local temperature 
increases of between 1° C and 3° C and the associated 
changes in average precipitation levels, are likely to 
have benefi cial impacts on agricultural outputs in mid- 
to high-latitude regions. Th ese changes would aff ect 
the main cereal crops grown in these areas, including 
rice, wheat and maize (IPCC, 2007d). If warming 
rises beyond the 1 to 3° C range, however, increasingly 
negative impacts will be likely, and will aff ect all regions 
of the world. 
In low-latitude regions, where most developing 
countries are located, the picture is diff erent, even for 
small temperature increases. In these regions, moderate 
local temperature increases of around 1° C are projected 
to result in a 5 to 10 per cent decline in yields for major 
cereal crops (World Bank, 2008a, Nyong, 2008). In 
considerable areas of semi-arid and dry sub-humid 
zones in Africa, the duration of the growing period is 
expected to fall by 5 to 20 per cent by 2050 (World 
Bank, 2008a). 
According to Boko et al. (2007), crop yield in some 
African countries has been projected to drop by up to 
50 per cent as early as by 2020, and net crop revenues 
could fall by as much as 90 per cent by 2100, with small-
scale farmers being the worst aff ected. Fischer et al. 
(2005) estimate that some countries, including Sudan, 
Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Chad, 
could lose their cereal-production potential by 2080. 
In South Asia, cereal yields are projected to decrease by 
up to 30 per cent by 2050 (Cruz et al., 2007), while 
generalized reductions in rice yields are projected by the 
2020s in Latin America (Nyong, 2008).
Th e fact that temperatures in developing countries 
are already near or above certain thresholds – beyond 
which further warming will decrease rather than 
increase agricultural productivity – provides part of 
the explanation for such substantial projected impacts 
in response to even small temperature increases 
(Cline, 2007). Combined with socio-economic and 
technological challenges such as low income and 
educational levels, lack of irrigation infrastructure and 
lack of access to fi nancing, the projected decreases 
in precipitation in these already dry areas and the 
predominance of “rainfed agriculture” (i.e. crops 
which are not irrigated, but rely on precipitation or on 
subsurface water) in many developing countries and 
regions, mean that small increases in temperatures have 
signifi cant implications for yields. 
Rainfed agriculture is highly vulnerable to changes 
in precipitation patterns, indicating that reduced 
rainfall or changes in the seasonal timing and intensity 
of rainfall will have direct implications for farmers’ 
income and livelihoods, and thus for agricultural GDP. 
Indeed, studies of semi-arid economies, particularly 
in Africa and south Asia, show that agricultural 
GDP and farmers’ incomes closely mirror rainfall 
variations (World Bank, 2008a). 
As previously noted, in addition to the changes in 
local average temperatures and precipitation, climate 
change is likely to include a higher frequency of 
extreme weather, such as fl oods and droughts. Such 
incidences may cause direct damage to crops at specifi c 
developmental stages. Moreover, heavy rainfall could 
increase soil erosion, resulting in loss of agricultural 
land.
Droughts have also been shown to aff ect rates of livestock 
death, particularly in Africa, where several studies have 
established a direct relationship between drought and 
animal death (Nyong, 2008). Furthermore, higher 
temperatures and longer growing seasons have led to 
increased pest and insect populations in several regions 
of the world. 
Th e magnitude of the projected impacts reported 
above depends on the climate change scenario chosen 
for the modelling exercises. In addition, the scale of 
the impacts projected depends to a considerable extent 
on whether the benefi cial eff ects of carbon fertilization 
on agricultural yields16 are included in the analyses and 
on the extent to which they materialize in practice. 
In an extensive analysis of the impacts of climate 
change on agriculture at the country level by 2080, 
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Cline (2007) provides further evidence on the 
concentration of agricultural losses in developing 
countries. Figure 9 provides an overview of his fi ndings 
on the projected regional changes in agricultural 
productivity as a result of climate change by 2080. 
Th e projections mirror the fi ndings reported above. In 
addition, benefi cial eff ects of carbon fertilization are 
included in the projections shown in the fi gure, and 
thus the projected impacts are likely to lie in the lower, 
more conservative range of estimated outcomes.
Th e projections discussed above indicate that 
issues of access to and availability of food, as well 
as food utilization, will be an increasing challenge 
in the future, particularly for the poorest and most 
vulnerable population groups within developing 
countries (Boko et al., 2007). Fischer et al. (2005) 
estimate that approximately 768 million people will be 
undernourished by 2080, and that undernourishment 
will be particularly severe in Sub-Saharan Africa and in 
southern Asia. Nyong (2008) reports that a projected 
2 to 3 per cent reduction in African cereal production 
by 2030 would be enough to increase the risk of 
hunger for an additional 10 million people, and that 
by 2080 the total populations of the 80 countries with 
insecure food supplies are projected to increase from 
approximately 4.2 billion to 6.8 billion.
From a trade perspective, changes in productivity and 
in agricultural outputs may lead to an increase in trade, 
with most developing countries depending increasingly 
on food imports (Easterling et al., 2007). However, 
as pointed out by Cline (2007), among others, the 
scope for adapting to the impacts of climate change 
by increasing the levels of trade would be constrained 
by the limited purchasing power of those developing 
countries needing to increase their food imports in 
response to adverse climate impacts. Th is argument 
is reinforced by the projections on future purchasing 
power with respect to food: these projections suggest 
that, although purchasing power would initially 
increase in response to declining agricultural “real 
prices” (i.e. prices that are adjusted to refl ect the 
relative exchange ratio between real goods) as global 
agricultural output increases in the period up to 2050, 
it would diminish from 2050 onwards, when global 
agricultural output is expected to decrease and cause 
real prices for food to rise (Nyong, 2008).
n.a.
<-25
-25 to -15
-15 to -5
>25
-5 to 0
0 to 5
5 to 15
15 to 25
FIGURE 9. Projected changes in per cent in agricultural productivity by 2080 due to climate change
Source: Adapted from Cline, 2007. Note that the eff ects of carbon fertilization are incorporated.
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Hydrology and water resourcesii) 
Figure 8 and Table 2 above gave a general illustration 
of the importance of climate change impacts on 
hydrology17 and on water resources at both sectoral and 
regional levels. Many of the climate change impacts 
related to hydrology and water resources are addressed 
in the subsections on sectoral climate change impacts 
at the regional level, and will thus not be repeated 
here. Th e following fi ndings are not, however, directly 
mentioned in other subsections. 
Climate change is projected to have an impact on access 
to water, availability of and demand for water, and on 
water quality, and in many areas these impacts could 
be exacerbated by population increase and by weak 
infrastructure (Kundzewicz et al., 2007, Nyong, 2008). 
In Africa, for example, between 75 and 250 million 
people are projected to be exposed to increased water 
stress due to climate change by 2020; and this fi gure is 
expected to rise to between 350 and 600 million people 
by 2050 (IPCC, 2007a). A rise in temperature of 3° C 
could lead to an additional 0.4 to 1.8 billion people 
being exposed to the risk of water stress in Africa. 
Globally, it is projected that between 120 million and 
1.2 billion people will experience increased water stress 
by the 2020s, rising to 185 to 981 million people by 
the 2050s (Arnell, 2004).
Th e loss of glacial meltwater sources for irrigated 
agriculture and other uses in the Andes, central Asian 
lowlands, and parts of south Asia, represents a serious 
long-term climate risk (World Bank, 2008a). Th ese 
regions, as well as other regions facing projected 
decreases in average precipitation, will most likely 
need to reconsider and optimize how their water 
resources are distributed among diff erent sectors, 
particularly in the case of agriculture, which accounts 
for approximately three-quarters of total water use 
in developing countries. For example, the decline in 
annual fl ow of the Red River in Asia by 13 to 19 per 
cent and that of the Mekong River by 16 to 24 per 
cent by the end of the 21st century will contribute to 
increasing water shortages (ADB, 1995).
It is estimated that the ice caps on Mount Kilimanjaro 
could disappear by 2020 (Th ompson et al., 2002) and 
glacial melting, in general, together with the associated 
risks of glacial melt outburst fl oods (GLOF), created 
when water dammed by a glacier or a moraine is 
released, are projected to have signifi cant adverse eff ects 
in some regions. 
In the small island states, the wet and dry cycles 
associated with El Niño/Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO)18 episodes will have serious impacts on water 
supply (Nyong, 2008). In Asia, ENSO events have also 
contributed to intensifying water shortages, while a 6 
to 10 per cent increase in water demand for agricultural 
irrigation is expected to occur in response to a 1° C rise 
in surface air temperature by the 2020s (Cruz et al., 
2007), further exacerbating water shortages. 
In addition to its eff ect on water availability and 
demand, climate change will also aff ect water quality: 
over-exploitation of groundwater (the reserves of water 
below the earth’s surface) in many coastal countries 
has resulted in a drop in its level, leading to “saltwater 
intrusion” (i.e. seepage of salt water from the oceans into 
the groundwater, making the sub-surface water saline). 
As a direct impact of global warming, the coastal regions 
of Africa, India, China and Bangladesh, as well as small 
island developing states, are especially susceptible to 
increasing salinity of both their groundwater and their 
surface water resources due to increases in sea level. 
In Latin America, the increase in arid zones resulting 
from climate change, coupled with inappropriate 
agricultural practices (such as deforestation, farming 
methods which lead to soil erosion, and the excessive 
use of agrochemicals) are projected to diminish the 
quantity and quality of surface water and groundwater, 
and will further aggravate the situation in areas which 
have already deteriorated (UNEP, 2007b).
Coastal areas, settlements and iii) 
infrastructure
All coastal areas, including those situated in 
industrialized countries, are vulnerable to future climate 
change impacts. In North America, for example, 
climate change impacts, interacting with economic 
development and pollution, will pose increasing 
stresses on coastal communities and habitats (Field et 
al., 2007). In Australia, where more than 80 per cent of 
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the population lives in coastal zones, there are potential 
risks from large storm surges and long-term sea level 
rise (Hennessy et al., 2007). 
Developing countries, however, are found to be most 
vulnerable to the impacts of increased frequency and 
intensity of tropical storms, storm surges and sea 
level rise (World Bank, 2008a). Large sections of the 
populations in developing countries are clustered in 
low-lying areas, and much or most of the physical 
development and infrastructure in these regions are 
therefore concentrated close to the coasts (Nyong, 
2008). 
In general, south, southeast and east Asia, Africa, and 
the small island developing states are projected to be 
most vulnerable to coastal climate change impacts 
(Nicholls et al., 2007), although the coastal areas 
of Latin America are also expected to experience 
signifi cant impacts by 2050 to 2080 (Magrin et al., 
2007). As noted by the World Bank (World Bank, 
2008a), rising sea levels over time present the greatest 
threat to the world’s most vulnerable regions. As Cruz 
et al. (2007) point out, a 40 cm increase in sea level by 
the end of the century (which is probably a conservative 
estimate), is projected to increase the number of coastal 
inhabitants at risk of annual fl ooding from 13 million 
to 94 million. 
Th e expected changes in sea level, weather, and climatic 
variability and extremes are very likely to result in 
signifi cant economic losses, as well as other detrimental 
eff ects on human well-being (Wilbanks et al., 2007a, 
and Nyong, 2008). A long list of projected impacts 
can be compiled, based on a review of the current 
literature on this topic. Impacts on infrastructure will 
include damage to buildings, roads, railways, airports, 
bridges, and to port facilities due to storm surges, 
fl ooding and landslides. Th e potential economic losses 
directly associated with infrastructure damages are 
relatively easy to assess; however, the resulting impacts 
would also have a knock-on eff ect on other key sectors 
and services, including health and delivery of health 
services, tourism, agriculture, access to and availability 
of safe water, local trade and delivery of supplies, 
and food security. Moreover, population growth and 
migration of people to large cities in coastal areas put 
additional pressure on coastal settlements that would 
add to the challenges to be faced. 
A wide range of other climate change impacts are 
projected for coastal areas and settlements. For example, 
projected sea level rise may exacerbate fl ooding, and 
increase the salinity of rivers, bays, and aquifers (the 
water-containing layers under the earth’s surface), in 
addition to eroding beaches and inundating coastal 
marshes and wetlands. Other impacts reported relate 
to population displacement; increased erosion and 
changing coastlines; disruption of access to fi shing 
grounds; negative impacts on biodiversity, including 
mangrove swamps; over-exploitation of water resources, 
including groundwater; and pollution and sea-water 
acidifi cation in marine and coastal environments 
(Magrin et al., 2007).
Healthiv) 
Already today, climate change poses a number of threats 
to health and, as noted in the previous subsections, 
the majority of the health threats and impacts are 
concentrated in developing countries, with Africa 
being disproportionately aff ected. Figure 10 illustrates 
this by giving an overview, by region, of the actual 
(in 2000) mortality rates which are estimated to have 
resulted from climate change. As seen from the fi gure, 
the African continent is deemed to have experienced 
the largest health-related burden of climate change 
impacts, followed by the eastern Asia and Pacifi c 
region. Latin America and the Caribbean and China 
are also projected to be exposed to a signifi cant increase 
in mortality attributable to climate change.
For developed countries, the main health impacts, 
both present and predicted, resulting from climate 
change are reductions in the death rate as a result 
of less exposure to the cold, an increase in the death 
rate during heatwaves, and other deaths arising from 
extreme climate events. Furthermore, alterations in 
the seasonal distribution of some allergenic pollen 
species have been observed and are expected to have 
negative impacts on health in the future (Confalonieri 
et al., 2007). In Australia, projected increased risks of 
forest and bush fi res may cause result in an increased 
risk of respiratory diseases and breathing problems, as 
Part I: Climate Change: The Current State of Knowledge
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well as the danger of burns or of death (World Health 
Organization, 2000). 
For developing countries too, the projected health 
impacts related to climate change include increases 
in the number of people dying or suff ering from 
diseases or injuries brought about by extreme climate 
events, such as heatwaves, fl oods, storms, fi res and 
droughts. In addition, these countries are likely to 
witness increased levels of malnutrition arising both 
directly from climate change impacts, and indirectly 
from the impacts on agriculture and water resources, as 
described in previous subsections (Confalonieri et al., 
2007). In both cases, existing development challenges 
exacerbate the negative health impacts resulting from 
climate change.
Projected trends in climate change-related health 
impacts in developing countries also include increased 
instances of malaria, dengue fever, cholera, diarrhoeal 
diseases and other food- and water-borne diseases that 
have been shown to be linked to changes in temperatures, 
precipitation and extreme events (Confalonieri et al., 
2007, and Menne and Ebi, 2006).
The natural resource base: ecosystems v) 
and biodiversity
Biodiversity and ecosystems are important for all people 
and societies, but particularly so for the large parts of 
the populations in many developing countries, whose 
livelihoods depend directly upon the natural resource 
base and the ecosystems for food, shelter, energy needs, 
etc. Analyses in Africa, Asia and Latin America carried 
out under the Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations 
to Climate Change (AIACC) project (AIACC, 
2003-2007), for example, show that marginalized 
populations which are dependent on natural resources 
are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, 
especially if their natural resource base is severely 
degraded by overuse, as is often the case. 
A number of potentially signifi cant climate change 
impacts on both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems have 
Mortality per Million
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Data source:
McMichael, J.J., Campbell-Lendrum D., Kovats R.S., et al. Global Climate Change. In comparative Quantification of Health Risks: Global and Regional 
Burden of Disease due to Selected Major Risk factors. M.Ezzati, Lopez, AD. Rogers A., Murray GJL. Geneva, World Health Organisation, 2004
FIGURE 10. Estimated climate change related deaths in 2000 by sub-region
Source: Patz et al., 2005.
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also been identifi ed in recent assessments. Th e risk of 
species extinction due to climate change impacts is 
projected to be particularly high in Central and Latin 
America – where seven out of the 25 most critical 
ecosystems with high concentrations of endemic species 
(i.e. species which are found only in a specifi c area) are 
located – and in Asia, where up to 50 per cent of the 
region’s total plant and animal species is projected to 
be at risk due to climate change (Th omas et al., 2004, 
Nyong, 2008, Cruz et al., 2007, and Magrin et al., 
2007).
As a result of temperature changes, non-indigenous 
invasive species including insects, mites, nematodes 
(i.e. “roundworms”), and various plants are projected to 
become a problem in the middle and high-latitude and 
in small island states, and changes in forest structure 
and composition, are projected in most developing 
regions of the world, including Africa, Latin America 
and Asia (UNEP, 2007b, Cruz et al., 2007, and Nyong, 
2008). Furthermore, it is expected that the combined 
eff ect of climate change impacts and changes in land 
use in Latin America will result in the loss of forests, 
and their replacement by savannas (Th omas et al., 
2004, and Magrin et al., 2007). 
By the end of this century, the natural grassland 
coverage and the grass yield in Asia are projected to 
decline by around 10 to 30 per cent as a consequence 
of climate change, with consequent negative impacts 
on livestock production in the region (Nyong, 2008). 
Grasslands in Africa are also projected to be impacted 
by climate change and this could, among other issues, 
negatively aff ect the availability of migration routes for 
both cattle and wild animals (Th uiller et al., 2006).
Major impacts on coastal ecosystems which have been 
reported in various regions include coral bleaching 
and the disappearance of low-lying corals, as well 
as the possible extinction of endangered species 
associated with these ecosystems (such as manatees 
and marine turtles), and losses of migratory birds and 
of biodiversity in general. As noted by Nyong (2008), 
all of these impacts will also have negative eff ects on 
fi sheries and tourism.
Responding to climate B. 
change: mitigation and adaptation
Mitigation and adaptation are the two major approaches 
for dealing with climate change and its associated 
impacts. Mitigation refers to policies and options for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and/or enhancing 
carbon sinks (such as forests or oceans). Adaptation, on 
the other hand, refers to responses aimed at attenuating 
the negative impacts of climate change or exploiting its 
potential benefi cial eff ects. 
In this section, the concepts of mitigation and 
adaptation and how they are related are examined, 
and current knowledge on the potentials, practices and 
technologies available for mitigation and adaptation 
are reviewed. Th is section builds on subjects covered in 
previous sections and focuses, particularly with reference 
to mitigation, on options related to technology. Th e 
fi nal part examines key issues regarding the role of 
technology and technology transfer, specifi cally in the 
context of mitigation and adaptation. 
Mitigation and adaptation: 1. 
defi ning, comparing and relating 
the concepts
Th e projections of future climate change and of its 
impacts, which were discussed in the previous section, 
amply illustrate the necessity of reducing current 
and future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and of 
intensifying strategies for dealing with the impacts 
of climate change that are unavoidable due to past 
emissions. Th ere is now general recognition that both 
adaptation and mitigation are necessary elements of 
any comprehensive strategy to manage the risks and 
to respond to the impacts of climate change (see, for 
example, IPCC, 2007f, McKibben and Wilcoxen, 
2004, IPCC, 2001b, and Wilbanks et al., 2003). 
Mitigation is defi ned by the IPCC (2007b) as 
“technological change and substitution that reduce 
resource inputs and emissions per unit of output”. 
In the context of climate change, mitigation thus 
means implementing policies to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and/or enhance carbon sinks. Adaptation, 
on the other hand, refers to responses to the impacts 
Part I: Climate Change: The Current State of Knowledge
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of climate change, and is defi ned by the IPCC (2007b) 
as “adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
eff ects, which moderates harm or exploits benefi cial 
opportunities”. 
In other words, mitigation reduces the rate and 
magnitude of climate change and its associated impacts, 
whereas adaptation increases the ability of people or 
natural systems to cope with the consequences of the 
impacts of climatic changes, including increased climate 
variability and the occurrence of extreme weather (Jones 
and Preston, 2006, and Wilbanks et al., 2007b). Th us, 
mitigation and adaptation deal with diff erent aspects of 
the risks imposed by climate change and are, to a large 
extent, targeted at managing risks at opposite ends of 
the range of projections on climate change. 
Adaptation is, in many ways, best suited to dealing with 
the impacts of climate variability and change that are 
already being experienced as a result of historical GHG 
emissions, or that have a high probability of occurring 
within a relatively short time-frame. Mitigation is aimed 
at reducing the volume of accumulated emissions in the 
future, thereby reducing or avoiding the “worst-case” 
climate change scenarios, for instance among the SRES 
scenarios described in previous subsections. By reducing 
the volume of accumulated emissions, mitigation also 
increases the chances that the remaining climate risks can 
be successfully managed through adaptation (McKibben 
and Wilcoxen, 2004, and Wilbanks et al., 2003).
In addition to managing diff erent parts of the risks 
imposed by climate change, mitigation and adaptation 
diff er in terms of time and geographical scales. In this way, 
although the costs of emission reductions are location-
specifi c, the benefi ts of mitigation are global, since 
emission reductions contribute equally to decreasing 
overall atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, 
regardless of the geographical location of the emission-
reduction activities. Moreover, mitigation benefi ts are 
long-term because of the long atmospheric lifetimes 
of most greenhouse gases and the resulting time lapse 
between the moment of emission and the response by the 
climate system. Adaptation, by contrast, is characterized 
by benefi ts in the short to medium term, and both 
adaptation costs and benefi ts are primarily local (IPCC, 
2007a, and Jones and Preston, 2006). 
Based on the diff erences outlined above, mitigation and 
adaptation have followed separate paths in scientifi c 
studies, as well as in national and international climate 
change response eff orts, and until recently such eff orts 
have been characterized by a major focus on mitigation 
(Burton, Diringer and Smith, 2006). Th e emphasis on 
mitigation refl ects a belief, widely held until the end of 
the 1990s, that an internationally coordinated eff ort 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would be suffi  cient 
to avoid climate change impacts on a signifi cant scale 
(Burton, Diringer and Smith, 2006, and Wilbanks et 
al., 2007b), and a related belief that climate change 
was an emission problem (i.e. that it was related to 
the volume of emissions) rather than a concentration 
problem, resulting from GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere. 
As discussed earlier, it is now undisputed that climate 
change is taking place, and that some climate change 
impacts are unavoidable. Th is realization, and the 
gradually increasing evidence on the magnitude of the 
adaptation eff ort which will be necessary to manage 
the impacts of climate change, are refl ected in the 
fi ndings on climate change risks and impacts, and the 
increasing confi dence in the accuracy of these fi ndings 
throughout the four IPCC Assessment Reports 
(IPCC, 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007a).
In many ways, the focus on mitigation resulted in a 
relative lack of emphasis on the potential synergies 
between climate change and development. In addition, 
it focused attention away from development needs and 
priorities which could provide a less polarized way of 
addressing climate change challenges in a global context. 
To give an example, in many developing countries, 
energy initiatives and other climate favouring activities 
have emerged as side-benefi ts of sound development 
programmes. Price reform, agricultural soil protection, 
sustainable forestry initiatives, and energy sector 
restructuring are all examples of policies and initiatives 
that can have substantial eff ects on the growth rates 
of greenhouse gas emissions, although they are often 
undertaken without any reference to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. Th is observation suggests 
that in many cases it is possible to build environmental 
and climate policy upon development priorities that 
are vitally important to national decision-makers 
in developing countries. It opens the potential that 
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climate change policies may be seen not as a burden 
to be avoided but as a side-benefi t of sound and 
internationally supported development. By introducing 
specifi c requirements for sustainable development, the 
Clean Development Mechanism (one of the three 
fl exibility mechanisms introduced under the Kyoto 
Protocol), can be seen as one of the fi rst steps towards 
recognizing the need for an integrated approach to 
development and climate issues.
Following the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 
(IPCC, 2007a) and the Stern Review (Stern, 2006), 
there appears to be an increased focus on building 
on the potential synergies between adaptation and 
mitigation eff orts, while at the same time making 
sure that they also contribute to achieving broader 
development goals. More generally, with the growing 
body of evidence on the magnitude of the burden that 
climate change adaptation may impose on the poorest 
and most vulnerable countries and populations, there 
has been increasing recognition of the need to take 
climate change into consideration during development 
planning and policy-making. 
In the subsections below, options for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation will be addressed. Th e 
area of mitigation is generally well defi ned and there 
is considerable knowledge on the opportunities, 
technologies, and costs of achieving a given reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Adaptation, vulnerability and adaptive capacity are, on 
the other hand, more diffi  cult to defi ne and measure. 
Adaptation is, as previously noted, intrinsically linked 
to existing development contexts such as income 
and educational levels, structure of the economy and 
governance structures. Since the end results of changes 
in adaptation, vulnerability and adaptive capacity 
are location, context, and development specifi c, it is 
diffi  cult to attribute such outcomes or end results to any 
single intervention. Furthermore, adaptation – unlike 
mitigation, where it is possible to assess the outcome in 
terms of changes in CO2 equivalent emissions – cannot 
be evaluated by the use of a single, unambiguous 
indicator. Finally, there is still limited evidence on the 
costs of adaptation and on the insurance aspects related 
to it: for example, how much are we willing to pay for 
a given reduction in the risk of a given climate change 
impact or event?
Mitigation: potential, practices 2. 
and technologies
Mitigation sectorsa) 
In the section on greenhouse gas emission trends and 
structure, it was noted that, between 1970 and 2004, 
global greenhouse gas emissions caused by human 
activity increased by 70 per cent from 28.7 to 49 Giga 
tonnes of CO2-equivalent (see note 7 for a defi nition). 
It was also noted that carbon dioxide is the principal 
greenhouse gas and its emission levels are increasing 
the fastest. Th ere is broad agreement – as refl ected by 
the IPCC (2007a), the Stern Review (Stern, 2006), and 
the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2006a) – that 
GHG emissions must be dramatically reduced to limit 
the severity of climate change impacts on developing 
and developed countries alike. Th e data outlined in 
the previous subsections off er further support to this 
conclusion. As illustrated in the subsections on observed 
and projected climate change impacts and on projected 
regional and sectoral impacts, signifi cant impacts will 
accompany even small increases in temperature and for 
larger temperature increases, the impacts are potentially 
calamitous. 
Greenhouse gas emissions arise from almost all 
economic activities and aspects of society, indicating 
that the range of practices and technologies potentially 
available for achieving greenhouse gas emission 
reductions is broad and diverse. Figure 11 illustrates 
this by showing the global fl ow of greenhouse gas 
emissions by sector and end-use. 
By volume, the largest contribution to greenhouse 
gas emissions is accounted for by power generation 
(electricity and heat production and transformation), 
followed by industry and fuel combustion. Land-use 
change, through deforestation and forest degradation, 
is estimated to account for more emissions globally 
than the entire transport sector, and emissions arising 
from agriculture are roughly the same as emissions 
from transportation.
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FIGURE 11. Global fl ow of greenhouse gas emissions by sector and end-use activity
Source: Baumert et al. (2005). 
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Th e fi gure also indicates that, in order to achieve 
signifi cant emission reductions, mitigation potentials 
in all of the sectors above will need to come into play, 
and this will involve a broad range of technologies. Th e 
literature on this topic consequently focuses on the 
following seven major sectors for mitigation: buildings, 
transport, industry, energy supply, agriculture, forestry, 
and waste (IPCC, 2007f ). 
Th e information on the fl ow of greenhouse gas 
emissions given in Figure 11 also gives a fi rst indication 
on the key options for climate change mitigation: using 
energy more effi  ciently to reduce the emissions from 
fossil fuel use; switching to zero- or low-carbon energy 
technologies; reducing deforestation; and introducing 
better farming practices and waste treatment. Th ere 
seems to be general agreement on these options and 
their importance in the literature on the topic (IPCC, 
2007e, IEA, 2006c, 2008, and Pacala and Socolow, 
2004).
Key technologies and practices in the b) 
mitigation sectors
A wide variety of options in the form of technologies 
and practices are available for the achievement of 
greenhouse gas emission reductions, and several studies 
conclude that even ambitious emission targets can be 
achieved through employment of existing technologies 
and practices (IPCC, 2007e).
For instance, a study from IEA (2008a) demonstrates 
how employing technologies that already exist or that 
are under development could reduce global energy-
related CO2 emissions to their 2005 levels by 2050.
19 
Similarly, Pacala and Socolow (2004) illustrate how 
emissions may be stabilized until 2050, and how 
global reductions after that date could stabilize CO2 
concentrations at levels of around 500 ppm in CO2 
equivalent, based on technologies which have already 
been deployed in various places on a commercial scale, 
and without assumptions of further fundamental 
technological breakthroughs. Th eir analysis is based 
on rapid expansion in the deployment of seven so-
called “wedges” of alternate technologies, including 
improved fuel economy in cars, reduced reliance on 
cars, more energy-effi  cient buildings, improved power 
plant effi  ciency, substituting coal with national gas, 
and carbon capture and storage in power and hydrogen 
plants respectively (Pacala and Socolow, 2004). Each of 
these technology wedges would displace approximately 
1 GtCO2-eq per year by 2054.
20 Figure 12 illustrates 
this approach.
In addition, many studies around the world have 
demonstrated that there is signifi cant potential for low-
cost or even negative cost (i.e. net benefi t) mitigation 
opportunities. Examples of low-cost mitigation actions 
include increased use of renewable energy sources, 
energy effi  ciency improvement, reduced deforestation 
and land degradation, and improved land and forestry 
management (Smith et al., 2007, and IPCC, 2007e). 
Th e often-mentioned examples of negative mitigation 
options – which include many improvements in 
energy effi  ciency and energy conservation actions, 
such as replacing incandescent light bulbs or compact 
fl uorescent lamps or buying fuel effi  cient cars or energy 
effi  cient refrigerators – can allow the users to save 
money, because the energy costs saved is more than the 
cost diff erences between the energy effi  cient choices 
and the less energy effi  cient ones. 
Table 3 provides an overview of the key technologies 
and practices that are currently commercially available 
– as well as other technologies which are projected to 
be commercialized before 2030 – in the seven major 
“mitigation sectors”.21 Th ese seven mitigation sectors 
FIGURE 12. Stabilization through technology wedges
Source: Pacala and Socolow, 2004
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and the key technologies and practices that can be 
expected to deliver GHG emission reductions before 
2030 are shown in Table 3. 
As mentioned above, there is broad agreement 
in the related literature on the key categories of 
technologies that are currently available for application 
in the various “mitigation sectors” (IPCC, 2007e, 
IEA, 2006c, 2008, and Pacala and Socolow, 2004). 
Th ese technologies and practices for the mitigation 
sectors are described further below. 
As Table 3 shows, for the energy sector, these 
technologies and practices can be classifi ed into three 
SECTOR Key mitigation technologies and practices 
currently commercially available 
Key mitigation technologies and practices 
projected to be commercialized before 2030 
Energy supply Improved supply and distribution effi  ciency; 
fuel-switching from coal to gas; nuclear power; 
renewable heat and power sources (hydropower, 
solar, wind, geothermal and bioenergy); combined 
heat and power; early applications of Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS, e.g. storage of CO2 
removed from natural gas). 
CCS for gas, biomass and coal-fi red electricity 
generating facilities; advanced nuclear power; 
advanced renewable energy, including tidal 
and wave energy, concentrating solar, and solar 
photovoltaics (PV). 
Transport More fuel-effi  cient vehicles; hybrid vehicles; cleaner 
diesel vehicles; biofuels; shifts from road transport 
to rail and public transport systems; non-motorized 
transport (cycling, walking); land use and transport 
planning. 
Second-generation biofuels; higher effi  ciency 
aircraft; advanced electric and hybrid vehicles with 
more powerful and reliable batteries.
Buildings Effi  cient lighting and day-lighting; more effi  cient 
electrical appliances and heating and cooling 
devices; improved cooking stoves; improved 
insulation; passive and active solar design for 
heating and cooling; alternative refrigeration fl uids; 
recovery and recycle of fl uorinated gases. 
Integrated design of commercial buildings 
technologies, such as intelligent meters that provide 
feedback and control; solar PV integrated in 
buildings. 
Industry More effi  cient end-use electrical equipment; 
heat and power recovery; material recycling and 
substitution; control of non-CO2 gas emissions; 
and a wide array of process-specifi c technologies. 
Advanced energy effi  ciency; CCS for cement, 
ammonia, and iron manufacture; inert electrodes 
for aluminium manufacture. 
Agriculture Improved crop and grazing land management 
to increase soil carbon storage; restoration of 
cultivated peaty soils and degraded lands; improved 
rice cultivation techniques and livestock and 
manure management to reduce CH4 emissions; 
improved nitrogen fertilizer application techniques 
to reduce N2O emissions; dedicated energy 
crops to replace fossil fuel use; improved energy 
effi  ciency. 
Improvements of crop yields. 
Forestry/
forests 
Aff orestation; reforestation; forest management; 
reduced deforestation; harvested wood product 
management; use of forestry products for bioenergy 
to replace fossil fuel use. 
Tree species improvement to increase biomass 
productivity and carbon sequestration. Improved 
remote sensing technologies for analysis of 
vegetation/soil carbon sequestration potential and 
mapping land-use change.
Waste 
management 
Landfi ll methane recovery; waste incineration with 
energy recovery; composting of organic waste; 
controlled waste-water treatment; recycling and 
waste minimization. 
Biocovers and biofi lters to optimize CH4 oxidation. 
TABLE 3. Technologies and practices for the mitigation sectors
Source: IPCC, 2007f.
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groups: the fi rst group involves technologies for 
improving the effi  ciency of energy supply, including 
“co-generation” (the generation of heat and power at 
the same time). Th e second group includes the low- or 
zero-emission technologies, such as renewable energy, 
nuclear energy, and replacing coal with natural gas. 
Th e third group is focused on using fossil fuels without 
greenhouse gas emissions, mainly through carbon 
capture and storage technologies.22 
A large number of low-carbon energy supply 
technologies are currently commercially available and 
are expected to be developed further in the coming 
decades. Th e demand for a range of renewable energy 
technologies, such as wind power, hydropower, solar 
power, bioenergy and geothermal power, is expected to 
increase. Within energy supply, this range of renewable 
energy sources has the largest mitigation potential 
and its use could almost double from 18 per cent of 
electricity supply in 2005 to 30-35 per cent by 2030. 
Th e potential increase in nuclear energy is less 
signifi cant, with a small increase from 16 per cent to 
18 per cent projected within the same time-frame. 
Other technologies and measures also play a role in 
energy supply-related mitigation, including supply 
effi  ciency, combined heat and power, switching boilers 
from coal to gas, and early applications of carbon capture 
and storage technologies. Energy investments up to 
2030 are expected to total more than US$ 20 trillion, 
and will accordingly have a major impact on global 
investment and trade.
Th e transportation, buildings, and industry sectors 
are major end-users of energy, and the mitigation 
technologies in these sectors can be grouped into three 
categories: end-use energy-effi  ciency improvement; 
switching to zero-carbon or less carbon-intensive 
sources of energy; and reducing the demand for energy 
needs, for example by eliminating day-lighting, by 
increasing use of public transport or of bicycles, and by 
material recycling. 
Th e transport sector also has a potential for mitigation 
through technologies such as fuel-effi  cient and hybrid 
motorized vehicles, rail and public transport systems 
and biofuels. However, the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions through the use of fuel-effi  cient 
vehicles and greater fuel effi  ciency in aviation may 
be counteracted by growth in transportation. Th e 
potential emission reductions will also depend on the 
development of second-generation biofuels23 as well as 
on the development of electric vehicles. From a trade 
perspective, trade in alternative fuels will potentially 
show signifi cant growth, as is the case with vehicle-
related technologies. 
Th e residential, commercial and institutional buildings 
sector is the area with the most important projected 
potential for greenhouse gas emission reductions 
(IPCC, 2007e). Since most emissions from this sector 
are a result of heavy use of energy for heating/cooling, 
lighting and various electrical appliances, the emission 
reduction potential can be attained largely through 
energy-effi  ciency improvements. Some of the key 
technologies and products for this purpose are building 
insulation, effi  cient lighting options, more effi  cient 
heating and cooling systems and effi  cient electrical 
appliances (Levine et al., 2007). 
Demand-side energy effi  ciency often proves to be the 
most cost-eff ective route to climate change mitigation, 
and it is expected that, by 2030, close to one-third 
(30 per cent) of emissions in the buildings sector can 
be off set with net economic benefi ts rather than costs 
(Levine et al., 2007). To some extent these effi  ciency 
measures can be integrated in existing residential, 
commercial and institutional buildings, and for new 
buildings there is even a higher potential through 
integrated design and inclusion of solar photovoltaic 
technology. Building codes and standards are potentially 
an important means of infl uencing the adoption of 
energy-effi  ciency measures (Levine et al., 2007). 
Energy effi  ciency and energy recovery in the industrial 
sector can signifi cantly contribute to the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Th is is especially true for 
the carbon-intensive and energy-intensive industries 
(such as iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, cement and 
glass, among others), that accounted for approximately 
85 per cent of the industrial sector’s energy use in 
2004 (Bernstein et al., 2007). Th ere is signifi cant 
potential for effi  cient industrial motors, other electrical 
equipment and process technologies. But there is also 
a potential for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 
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using co-generation technologies to recover waste heat 
and gas for energy production. 
Based on the available studies, the largest mitigation 
potential is found to be in the steel, cement, and pulp 
and paper industries and in the reduction of non-CO2 
gases. In addition, much of the potential is available 
at a relatively low cost (i.e. less than US$ 50 per 
tonne of CO2-eq). In the medium and longer term, 
the application of carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technologies off ers another large potential for reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions, although it is associated 
with higher costs (Bernstein et al., 2007).
In the forestry and agricultural sectors, the mitigation 
technologies mainly involve increased carbon sinks to 
remove CO2 from the atmosphere through enlarging 
the forest areas and eliminating land degradation; 
supplying biomass (i.e. organic matter) as a renewable 
source of energy; and reducing the emissions of 
methane and nitrous oxide from agricultural activities 
through improved management practices.
Improvements in techniques and practices, rather 
than the deployment of actual technologies (“hard” 
technologies), are expected to play a signifi cant 
part in emission reductions in agriculture. Th ere is 
considerable potential for reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions through the restoration of degraded lands, 
soil carbon sequestration and storage, energy effi  ciency, 
and combustion of agricultural residues. 
As shown in Figure 11, agriculture also has a potential 
for mitigation of emissions of non-CO2 gases, such as 
methane and nitrous oxide through the use of manure 
management technologies and fertilizer applications. 
Soil carbon sequestration is estimated to account for 
89 per cent of the potential for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions through the use of technology in agriculture, 
whereas mitigation of methane and nitrous oxide 
emissions from soils account for 9 and 2 per cent of the 
technical potential, respectively (Smith et al., 2007). 
Technology has great scope for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions in the agricultural sector, but development 
and transfer of these technologies is found to be a 
key requirement for these mitigation potentials to 
be achieved. For example, while some studies of 
technology change in Europe show that technological 
improvement will be a key factor in greenhouse gas 
mitigation in the future (Smith et al., 2005, and 
Rounsevell et al., 2006), other studies indicate that, 
although effi  ciency improvements (for example, in the 
use of nitrogen) occur in industrialized countries, this 
is not the case for many developing countries, because 
various barriers, such as costs, lack of knowledge and 
incentives for the farmers, prevent the transfer of these 
technologies (IFA, 2007).
Th e mitigation potential in forestry is embodied 
principally in forestry management practices (such 
as aff orestation and reforestation) to enhance carbon 
sinks. Also, importantly, the prevention of further 
deforestation can contribute to emission reductions, 
and this accounts for about half the forestry mitigation 
potential. 
Finally, the main types of mitigation technologies in 
the waste sector include reducing the quantities of 
waste generation, and recycling the usable parts of 
waste; waste management to avoid methane emissions 
during the decay of waste; and using waste as a source 
for energy production. Although waste management is 
expected to have the smallest potential for greenhouse 
gas emission reduction of the various mitigation sectors 
by 2030, it is associated with a number of important 
technologies: these include the capture of methane gas 
from landfi lls for either fl aring (i.e. burning without 
economic purpose) or power generation; burning of 
waste, such as municipal solid waste, for electricity 
generation; composting of organic waste; and methane 
recovery from waste water systems. 
Mitigation targets, potential and c) 
associated cost estimates
Stabilization scenarios and targets i) 
and associated cost estimates at the 
macroeconomic level
International negotiations will determine stabilization 
target(s) at the global level and will thus determine 
the extent of the greenhouse gas emission reductions 
which must be achieved. Th e targets under discussion 
are, however, infl uenced by scientifi c knowledge on the 
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extent of climate change and the impacts associated 
with diff erent levels of concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere, and on the costs of achieving 
stabilization targets which correspond to these levels. 
In Table 4, the characteristics of diff erent stabilization 
scenarios are given. Th e table provides an overview 
of the relationship between various targets aimed at 
stabilizing greenhouse gas concentration levels, their 
implications in terms of global warming, as well as 
the reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions that 
would be needed to achieve the stabilization target. 
Th e two stabilization targets that have been most widely 
discussed by scientists and policy-makers fall within 
the concentration ranges of 445-490 parts per million 
(ppm) and 535-590 ppm CO2-eq. Th e fi rst target 
has been backed primarily by the European Union, 
which advocates limiting global warming to a 2° C 
increase in temperature, in order to avoid dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
Th e second target, more specifi cally of 550 ppm CO2-
equivalent (CO2-eq), which would correspond to a 
temperature increase of around 3° C, has been more 
extensively studied in science, including by the IPCC. 
Th e main motivation for using 550 ppm as a 
benchmark for analyses is that it corresponds roughly 
to a scenario where CO2 levels in the atmosphere would 
be stabilized at around twice the pre-industrial level 
(see Section I.A) – a level which has been suggested by 
the IPCC as an upper threshold for avoiding dangerous 
human interference with the climate system. As seen 
from Table 4, the two targets have quite diff erent 
implications for the amount of reduction in global 
greenhouse gas emissions that would be required to 
achieve them, and in the peaking year of emissions: 
global CO2-eq emissions would have to be decreased 
by 50-85 per cent (relative to emission levels in 2000) 
by the year 2050 in order to confi ne global warming to 
TABLE 4. Characteristics of stabilization scenarios a)
Source: IPCC, 2007f, Table SPM.5.
Notes: a) Th e understanding of the climate system response to radiative forcing as well as feedbacks is assessed in detail in the AR4 WGI Report. Feedbacks 
between the carbon cycle and climate change aff ect the required mitigation for a particular stabilization level of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. 
Th ese feedbacks are expected to increase the fraction of anthropogenic emissions that remains in the atmosphere as the climate system warms. Th erefore, the 
emission reductions to meet a particular stabilization level reported in the mitigation studies assessed here might be underestimated.
b) Th e best estimate of climate sensitivity is 3º C (see IPCC, WG 1 SPM).
c) Note that global mean temperature at equilibrium is diff erent from expected global mean temperature at the time of stabilization of GHG concentrations 
due to the inertia of the climate system. For the majority of scenarios assessed, stabilisation of GHG concentrations occurs between 2100 and 2150.
d) Ranges correspond to the 15th to 85th percentile of the post-TAR scenario distribution. CO2 emissions are shown so multi-gas scenarios can be 
compared with CO2-only scenarios. 
CATEGORY
RADIATIVE 
FORCING 
(W/m2)
CO2 
CONCENTRATION c) 
(ppm)
CO2 -EQ 
CONCENTRATION c)
(ppm)
GLOBAL MEAN 
TEMPERATURE INCREASE 
ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL 
AT EQUILIBRIUM, USING 
“BEST ESTIMATE” 
CLIMATE SENSITIVITY b), c) 
(°C)
PEAKING 
YEAR FOR 
CO2 
EMISSIONS d)
CHANGE IN 
GLOBAL CO2 
EMISSIONS IN 
2050 
(% of 2000 
emissions) d)
NO. OF 
ASSESSED 
SCENARIOS
I 2.5-3.0 350-400 445-490 2.0-2.4 2000-2015 -85 to -50 6
II 3.0-3.5 400-440 490-535 2.4-2.8 2000-2020 -60 to -30 18
III 3.5-4.0 440-485 535-590 2.8-3.2 210-2030 -30 to +5 21
IV 4.0-5.0 485-570 590-710 3.2-4.0 2020-2060 +10 to +60 118
V 5.0-6.0 570-660 710-855 4.0-4.9 2050-2080 +25 to +85 9
VI 6.0-7.5 660-790 855-1130 4.9-6.1 2060-2090 +90 to +140 5
TOTAL 177
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2.0-2.4° C; whereas confi ning temperature increases to 
between 2.8 and 3.2° C by 2050, would only require 
global emissions to be between 30 per cent lower to 
5 per cent higher than emission levels in 2000 (see the 
7th column of Table 4).
In addition, the diff erent stabilization targets have very 
diff erent implications for the estimated macroeconomic 
costs at a global level, as shown in Table 5. Th e higher 
stabilization target of around 550 ppm CO2-eq is 
estimated by the IPCC to result in an annual reduction 
of global gross domestic product (GDP) of 0.2-2.5 per 
cent, whereas the lower stabilization target would imply 
an annual reduction in global GDP of more than 3 per 
cent. For comparison, the Stern Review (Stern, 2006) 
concludes that the costs of stabilizing emissions at 
550 ppm CO2-eq would be, on average, 1 per cent of 
global GDP, which would correspond to approximately 
US$ 134 billion in 2015 or US$ 930 billion in 2050.
Th e results shown in the table are based on studies 
using various baselines. Th ese studies also diff er in 
terms of the point in time at which stabilization is 
expected to be achieved – generally this point is in 
2100 or later. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
for any given stabilization level, GDP reductions 
would increase over time after 2030 in most models. 
Th us, the long-term cost ranges (in terms of reduction 
in GDP) corresponding to the estimates in Table 
4 above are respectively −1 to 2 per cent for the 
590-710 ppm CO2-eq stabilization level, from just 
below zero to around 4 per cent for the 535-590 ppm 
CO2-eq stabilization level, and more than 5.5 per cent 
reduction in GDP for the 445-535 ppm CO2-eq 
stabilization level (IPCC, 2007f ). Costs in the long 
term are, however, associated with higher uncertainty.
In order to address stabilization targets and emission 
reductions from the individual sectoral and 
technological angles, it is convenient to view the costs 
from an incentive perspective, i.e. in terms of carbon 
prices. Th is implies that, rather than studying the 
emission reduction requirements for reaching a given 
stabilization target, the analyses are structured around 
a “bottom-up” viewpoint: What would be the eff ects 
on greenhouse gas emission reductions of introducing 
a given price on carbon? 
In order to be cost-eff ective, the “marginal cost” 
of CO2 emission reductions must be equal for all 
sources of emissions; otherwise, it would be possible 
to lower the overall costs by redistributing emission 
reductions between sources. Th e most eff ective tool 
for achieving this is to put a price on (CO2-equivalent) 
greenhouse gas emission reductions (known as 
“carbon pricing”), measured as the price per tonne of 
CO2-equivalent emissions reduced. In addition, “carbon 
pricing” creates incentives to undertake research and 
development (R&D) and to innovate energy-saving 
and climate-friendly technologies (OECD, 2008). Th e 
following subsection reviews the potential for emission 
reductions at the sectoral level, considered in terms of 
carbon prices.
Potential for emission reductions at the ii) 
sectoral level as a function of carbon prices
Table 6 shows the global mitigation potential as a 
function of carbon prices in 2030, based on a review 
of available studies.24 It should be noted that since this 
table does not refer to the same stabilization levels as 
in Tables 4 and 5, and since, furthermore, Table 4 uses 
2050 as the point of reference for changes in emissions, 
Table 6 cannot be directly compared to those tables. 
However, a 550 ppm CO2-eq stabilization level is 
reported to correspond to an emission reduction of 
26 Gt CO2-eq/year, whereas an emission reduction 
of 33 Gt CO2-eq/year would be required to achieve 
a stabilization level of 490 ppm CO2-eq, and a 
reduction in emissions of 18 Gt CO2-eq/year would 
lead to a stabilization level of around 700 ppm 
CO2-eq (Enkvist, Nauclér and Rosander, 2007). 
In addition, since global greenhouse gas emissions in 
2000 were 43 Gt CO2-eq (IPCC, 2007f ), the emission 
reduction potential of 16 to 31 Gt CO2-eq/year would 
be equivalent to an emission reduction by 2030 of 36 
to 70 per cent relative to 2000 levels of emissions. Th is 
indicates that a carbon price of US$ 100 per tonne 
of CO2-eq, as suggested in the studies reviewed by 
the IPCC, could be suffi  cient for achieving the lower 
stabilization targets illustrated in Table 4. 
Table 6 illustrates a point raised earlier, regarding 
the existence of mitigation options associated with 
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negative net costs, i.e. where the benefi ts of the options 
are larger than the costs. According to the table, such 
options have the potential to reduce global emissions 
by around 6 Gt CO2-eq/year by 2030, equivalent to 
a reduction by 2030 of around 14 per cent relative to 
2000 emissions with associated net benefi ts. 
In Figure 13 and the associated Table 7, the results on 
mitigation potential as illustrated in Table 6 are broken 
down by sector and region. Th e ranges for global 
economic potentials as assessed in each sector are 
shown by vertical lines in each of the coloured bands, 
and Table 7 reports these ranges for the mitigation 
potential by sector of less than US$ 100/t CO2-eq. 
Th e fi gure and table show that, of the seven mitigation 
sectors, the buildings sector holds the greatest potential 
for achievement of greenhouse gas emission level 
reductions in terms of quantity, as was noted earlier, and 
that a very large share of this potential can be achieved 
at low carbon prices. Based on a review of more than 
80 recent studies from 36 countries worldwide, Levine 
et al. (2007) estimate that, by 2030, about 30 per 
cent of the projected greenhouse gas emissions in the 
buildings sector could be avoided, with net economic 
benefi t, and that the same potential exists in all regions 
of the world. 
Th e potential refl ects the scope for improvements in 
low-cost energy effi  ciency options for the buildings 
TABLE 5. Estimated global macroeconomic costs in 2030a) for lowest-cost means of achieving diff erent long-term 
stabilization b), c) 
Source: IPCC, 2007f, Table SPM.4. 
Notes: a) For a given stabilization level, GDP reduction would increase over time in most models after 2030. Long-term costs also become more 
uncertain. 
b) Results based on studies using various baselines.
c) Studies vary in terms of the point in time stabilization is achieved; generally this is in 2100 or later.
d) Th is is global GDP based market exchange rates.
e) Th e median and the 10th and 90th percentile range of the analyzed data are given.
f ) Th e calculation of the reduction of the annual growth rate is based on the average reduction during the period till 2030 that would result in the 
indicated GDP decrease in 2030.
g) Th e number of studies that report GDP results is relatively small and they generally use low baselines.
STABILIZATION LEVELS
(ppm CO2-eq)
MEDIAN GDP REDUCTION d)
(%)
RANGE OF GDP 
REDUCTIONS d), e)
(%)
REDUCTION OF AVERAGE 
ANNUAL GDP GROWTH 
RATES d),  f )
(percentage points)
590-710 0.2 -0.6-1.2 <0.06
535-590 0.6 0.2-2.5 <0.1
445-535g) not available <3 <0.12
TABLE 6. Global mitigation potential in 2030 for diff erent carbon prices 
Source: IPCC, 2007f, Table SPM.1.
CARBON PRICE
(US$/tCO2-eq)
ECONOMIC POTENTIAL
(GtCO2-eq/year)
REDUCTION RELATIVE TO SRES 
A1 B
(68 GtCO2-eq/year)
(%)
REDUCTION RELATIVE TO SRES 
B2
(49 GtCO2-eq/year)
(%)
0 5-7 7-10 10-14
20 9-17 14-25 19-35
50 13-26 20-38 27-52
100 16-31 23-46 32-63
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SECTORS ENERGY SUPPLY TRANSPORT BUILDINGS INDUSTRY AGRICULTURE FORESTRY WASTE TOTAL
REDUCTION 
RELATIVE 
TO THE BASELINE OF 
6 GT CO2-EQ/YEAR
MITIGATION 
POTENTIAL 
(GT CO2-EQ/
YEAR)
2.4-4.7 1.6-2.5 5.3-6.7 2.5-5.5 2.3-6.4 1.3-4.2 0.4-1 15.8-30.1 23%-46%
TABLE 7. Mitigation potential in diff erent sectors at a carbon price  of less than US$ 100/tCO2-eq
FIGURE 13. Estimated economic potential for global mitigation by sector for diff erent regions
Source for Figure 13 and Table 7: IPCC, 2007f, Figure and Table SPM.6. 
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US$/tCO2-eq
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Notes: a) Th e ranges for global economic potentials as assessed in each sector are shown by vertical lines. Th e ranges are based on end-use allocations of 
emissions, meaning that emissions of electricity use are counted towards the end-use sectors and not to the energy supply sector.
b) Th e estimated potentials have been constrained by the availability of studies particularly at high carbon price levels.
c) Sectors used diff erent baselines. For industry the SRES B2 baseline was taken, for energy supply and transport the WEO 2004 baseline was used; the 
building sector is based on a baseline in between SRES B2 and A1B; for waste, SRES A1B driving forces were used to construct a waste speciﬁc baseline, 
agriculture and forestry used baselines that mostly used B2 driving forces.
d) Only global totals for transport are shown because international aviation is included [5.4].
e) Categories excluded are: non-CO2 emissions in buildings and transport, part of material efﬁciency options, heat production and cogeneration in energy 
supply, heavy duty vehicles, shipping and high-occupancy passenger transport, most high-cost options for buildings, wastewater treatment, emission 
reduction from coal mines and gas pipelines, ﬂuorinated gases from energy supply and transport. Th e underestimation of the total economic potential 
from these emissions is of the order of 10-15%.
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sector. It also refl ects the availability of well-developed 
energy-effi  ciency technologies that exist already and 
that have been used with success, such as improved 
insulation and district heating in the colder climates, 
and effi  ciency measures related to space conditioning 
in the warmer climates, along with cooking stoves 
in developing countries (Levine et al., 2007). Other 
measures that rank high in terms of potential energy 
and emission savings include solar water heating, 
effi  cient lighting and appliances, and building energy 
management systems (Levine et al., 2007).
At carbon prices below US$ 20 per tonne of emission 
reduction in CO2-eq, the energy supply sector has the 
second-largest mitigation potential. Th is potential 
increases considerably for carbon prices up to 
US$ 50 per tonne of CO2-eq reduced, refl ecting 
the relatively higher costs associated with the 
implementation of some of the technologies available 
for emission reductions in the energy sector, as well as 
the considerable investment requirements. An increase 
in the carbon price from US$ 50 to US$ 100 per tonne 
of CO2-eq does not result in a large increase in the 
mitigation potential for the energy sector, indicating 
that the scope for deploying additional technologies is 
not enhanced substantially by such levels of increase in 
the price of carbon. 
For the industrial sector, the diff erence in mitigation 
potential for carbon prices up to US$ 20 and US$ 50 per 
tonne of CO2-eq, respectively, is even more signifi cant, 
with the mitigation potential being approximately 
three times larger for a carbon price of US$ 50 per 
tonne of CO2-eq. An increase in the carbon price up to 
US$ 100 per tonne of CO2-eq increases the mitigation 
potential by around 0.5 GtCO2-eq/year, illustrating the 
potential for carbon capture and storage technologies 
in the industry sector (Bernstein et al., 2007). 
For the agricultural sector, the increase in mitigation 
potential is signifi cant over all three levels of carbon 
prices. Th e same is the case, although to a lesser extent, 
for the forestry sector. Th e mitigation potential in 
agriculture at carbon prices up to US$ 100 per tonne 
of CO2-eq is the second highest of the seven mitigation 
sectors. Furthermore, in both these sectors the higher 
carbon prices infl uence the mitigation potential not 
only in OECD countries, but also in economies in 
transition and in developing countries (non-OECD 
countries/economies in transition). 
In the transport and waste sector, increases in 
carbon prices do not lead to a signifi cant increase 
of the mitigation potential, although an increase in 
the carbon price from below US$ 50 per tonne of 
CO2-eq to below US$ 100 per tonne of CO2-eq has 
some eff ect. 
A further illustration of estimated costs of global 
mitigation for various technologies is provided in 
Figure 14. Th e estimates are from a study on the 
potentials and costs of measures to reduce global 
greenhouse gas emissions (McKinsey, 2009), and the 
fi gure provides a good overview of the relative costs 
estimated for various mitigation technologies by sector. 
Note that the costs are given in euros/tonne of CO2-
eq/yr.
Th e estimated mitigation potential at negative net costs 
is comparable in range to the potential mitigation shown 
in Table 6. Th e fi gure supports the fi ndings discussed 
above, and gives further details on the estimated costs 
for diff erent technology options. 
Based on the cost curve in Figure 14, a carbon price 
of approximately 40 euros/tonne CO2-eq/year would 
be required by 2030 in order to achieve stabilization 
at 550 ppm CO2-eq. IPCC (2007e) estimates that 
carbon prices of US$ 20-80/tonne CO2-eq would be 
required by 2030 to aim at achieving stabilization at 
around 550 ppm CO2-eq by 2100. Th ese costs are 
thus comparable in range, and diff erences mainly 
refl ect variations in the underlying assumptions, such 
as economic development, costs of technologies and 
technological progress, energy demand and supply, 
energy prices, etc., as well as diff erences in the studies 
included as a basis for analysis. 
It should be noted, however, that estimations of 
potential greenhouse gas emission reductions at 
diff erent cost levels are associated with considerable 
uncertainty, not least because of their diff ering 
assumptions regarding technological progress, the rate 
of deployment of emission reduction technologies, 
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FIGURE 14. Strategic options for climate change mitigation global cost curve for greenhouse gas abatement measures
Source: McKinsey, 2009.
38
Trade and Climate Change
and assumptions regarding technology transfer. Some 
studies estimate that the costs of global mitigation 
will be or could be signifi cantly higher than the 
fi gures reported in this subsection. For example, the 
IEA (2008b) points out that to reach the target 
of 50 per cent reduction in global greenhouse gas 
emissions from the current level by 2050, the marginal 
cost would have to be at least US$ 200 per tonne of 
CO2-eq reduced, and could be as high as US$ 500 per 
tonne of CO2-eq if the progress of key technologies 
does not live up to expectations. 
Nonetheless, this subsection has illustrated that there is 
a substantial potential for global greenhouse emission 
reductions, and that a considerable portion of this 
potential, based on estimates in the available literature, 
is likely to be associated with relatively low costs. 
Adaptation: potential, practices 3. 
and technologies
It was noted above that adaptation refers to responses 
to moderate the negative impacts of climate change 
or to exploit potential benefi cial eff ects of climate 
change. Th e potential for adaptation, in turn, depends 
on adaptive capacity, i.e. the ability or potential of a 
system to respond successfully to climate variability 
and change (Adger et al., 2007). In this subsection, we 
will focus on how people adapt, leaving out adaptation 
by ecosystems. As there are signifi cantly fewer concrete 
results on costs and technologies available in the 
literature on adaptation than there are on mitigation, 
this subsection will be briefer than the previous one.
Studies on vulnerability to climate change have, to a 
large extent, infl uenced the understanding of adaptive 
capacity, since the indicators selected in studies of 
vulnerability often provide insights on the factors, 
processes and structures that determine adaptive 
capacity (Eriksen and Kelly, 2007). As noted previously, 
vulnerability refers to the degree to which a human or 
natural system is susceptible to, and unable to cope 
with, the adverse eff ects of climate change, including 
climate variability and extremes, and is a function 
not only of the character, variation, magnitude and 
rate of climate change to which a system is exposed, 
but also of its sensitivity and its adaptive capacity 
(IPCC, 2007d). 
Important indicators for determining both vulnerability 
and adaptive capacity include education, health status, 
knowledge, technology, institutions and income level. 
Adaptive capacity is, however, also infl uenced by the 
character, variation, magnitude and rate of the climate 
change impacts that the system is exposed to, as well as 
by the distribution of resources and by the existence of 
prior stresses (Turner et al., 2003, Smit and Wandel, 
2006, and Yohe and Tol, 2002).
Although adaptive capacity will generally be inversely 
related to vulnerability (i.e. the greater the adaptive 
capacity the lower the vulnerability, and vice versa), this 
may not always be the case. For some types of climate-
related impacts, notably those associated with extreme 
weather and abrupt climate changes, the consequences 
may be severe even if the adaptive capacity of the 
system is high (an often-quoted example of this is the 
impacts of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 on the southern 
coast of the United States).25 In addition, and as 
noted by Adger et al. (2007), high adaptive capacity 
does not necessarily always translate into actions 
that reduce vulnerability: taking the example of heat 
stress, they note that despite high capacity to adapt to 
extreme temperatures at relatively low cost, residents in 
European cities, for example, continue to experience 
high levels of mortality during heatwaves.
Furthermore, contrary to mitigation, which is 
measured in terms of tonnes of CO2 reduced, progress 
or achievement on adaptation cannot be assessed by 
any one single indicator or measurement standard.
Generally, and as noted in several studies, including 
Brooks and Adger (2005), the strengthening of 
adaptive capacity is a necessary condition for the design 
and implementation of eff ective adaptation strategies 
that reduce both the likelihood and the magnitude of 
negative impacts from climate change.
Part I: Climate Change: The Current State of Knowledge
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Technologies and practices for a) 
adaptation in different sectors
One of the key fi ndings on adaptation is that adaptation 
actions are rarely based solely on a response to climate 
change. In most cases, adaptation measures are and will 
be undertaken as part of larger sectoral and national 
initiatives related to, for example, planning and policy 
development, improvements to the water sector, 
integrated coastal zone management, or as a response to 
current climate variability and extreme circumstances, 
including fl ooding and droughts. In addition, actions 
that enhance the adaptive capacity (such as education 
and poverty reduction) may be unrelated to climate 
issues and considerations.
Table 8 provides examples of adaptation practices and 
technologies reported in the literature on the subject. It 
should be noted, however, that categorization by sector 
only represents one means of diff erentiating adaptation 
measures. Since various aspects of adaptation measures 
will often be interrelated and cross-sectoral, it may be 
more appropriate in certain contexts to use other types 
of categorization, such as:
type of action: physical, technological, regulatory, • 
market-based, or investment oriented
level: local, regional or national level• 
climatic zone: arctic, fl oodplain, mountains, etc.• 
information about those involved: individuals, • 
private sector, local government, international 
donors, etc. 
development or income level: specifi c vulnerable • 
groups, least-developed countries, middle-income or 
industrialized countries, etc. 
In addition, it may be appropriate to distinguish and 
analyze adaptation options based on whether they are 
for current or future climate changes and their impacts 
(i.e. a temporal distinction), as is frequently done in 
adaptation studies. From a temporal perspective, there 
are three levels of climate risk adaptation, including:
responses to current variability • 
observed medium and long-term trends in climate • 
anticipatory planning in response to model-based • 
scenarios of long-term climate change. 
As in the case of the types of categorization of 
adaptation mentioned above, the variations across the 
three temporal levels are often intertwined, and may 
even be indistinguishable from each other (i.e. they 
may form a continuous adaptation measure extending 
from the present to the future) (Adger et al., 2007).
Table 8 illustrates that a wide range of adaptive responses 
to climate change are potentially available, covering a 
range of management, behaviour-related, and policy 
options, as well as purely technological options.
Furthermore, a large number of the adaptation practices 
and technologies included in the table are well known, 
and have been adopted and refi ned over centuries to 
cope with climate variability and, more generally, to 
enhance livelihood resilience to external and prevailing 
local socio-economic conditions and stresses. Many of 
these practices represent indigenous expertise, and in 
addition involve management practices, behaviour-
related responses, training, and information and 
warning systems (Adger et al., 2007). Other types 
of technology include, for example, infrastructure 
construction (dykes, sea walls, harbours, railways, etc.) 
and industrial processes, building codes and design, 
as well as recent technologies, such as remote sensing, 
advanced materials science, research, development and 
deployment of drought resistant crops, etc. (Adger et 
al., 2007, and UNFCCC, 2006).
As illustrated in the table, fi nancial mechanisms can 
contribute to climate change adaptation. Property, 
health and crop insurance are examples of risk spreading, 
and may reduce risks for individuals, communities, and 
fi rms. In addition, capital markets have the potential 
for addressing fi nancial constraints through the 
implementation of adaptation. Th e insurance sector 
has, in this regard, been the most active to date. Th is 
is primarily due to an observed increase in insurance 
payments related to extreme weather over the past ten 
years and the expected increase in demand for insurance 
products, accompanied by a realization that climate 
change impacts could reduce insurability and threaten 
insurance schemes (Valverde and Andrews, 2006). 
Th e role of the fi nancial sector in adaptation should 
be assumed to be larger in industrialized countries, 
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SECTOR ADAPTATION TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 
AGRICULTURE Systematic observation and seasonal forecasting; introduction of drought-resistant crops; crop 
management; land management; improved water use and availability including rainwater harvesting; 
leakage reduction; hydroponic farming; building of shelter-belts and wind-breaks to improve resilience 
of rangelands; monitoring of the number of grazing animals and cut trees; national government 
programmes to recreate employment options after drought; capacity building of local authorities; 
assistance to small subsistence farmers to increase crop production; adjustment of planting dates and crop 
variety (e.g. inclusion of drought-resistant plants such as agave and aloe); accumulation of commodity 
stocks as economic reserve; spatially separated plots for cropping and grazing to diversify exposures; 
diversifi cation of income by adding livestock operations.
COASTAL ZONE Dykes, sea-walls, tidal barriers, detached breakwaters; dune or wetland restoration or creation; beach 
nourishment; indigenous options such as walls of wood, stone or coconut leaf; mangrove aff orestation; 
early warning and evacuation systems; hazard insurance; practices such as using salt-resistant crops; 
building codes; improved drainage; desalination systems. 
INFRASTRUCTURE Urban planning to improve the effi  ciency of combined heat and power systems and optimize the use 
of solar energy; minimize paved surfaces and plant trees to moderate the urban heat island eff ects and 
reduce the energy required for air conditioning; limit developments on fl ood plains or potential mud-
slide zones; establish appropriate building codes and standards; provide low-income groups with access 
to property; use physical barriers to protect industrial installations from fl ooding; climate proofi ng 
investments. 
WATER 
RESOURCES AND 
HYDROLOGY
Water transfer; water recycling and conservation (soft technologies to support the preparation of on-
line, searchable fl ood risk maps); water harvesting; increase reservoir capacity; desalination; erection 
of protection dams against avalanches and increased magnitude of potential debris fl ows stemming 
from permafrost thawing; changes in livelihood practices (e.g. by the Inuit), including change of hunt 
locations, diversifi cation of hunted species; use of Global Positioning Systems (GPS) technology; and 
encouragement of food sharing.
TOURISM Artifi cial snow-making; grooming of ski slopes; moving ski areas to higher altitudes and glaciers; use of 
white plastic sheets as protection against glacier melt; diversifi cation of tourism revenues (e.g. all-year 
tourism).
FINANCE Internalize information on climate risks and help transfer adaptation and risk-reduction incentives to 
communities and individuals; capital markets and transfer mechanisms alleviating fi nancial constraints 
to the implementation of adaptation measures, including bank loans (e.g. for purchase of rainwater 
storage tanks, set-up of crop insurance); creation of local fi nancial pools (as alternative to commercial 
crop insurance), set-up of revolving credit funds; fostering risk prevention through: implementing and 
strengthening building standards, planning risk prevention measures and developing best practices, and 
raising awareness of policyholders and public authorities; adopting forward-looking pricing methods in 
order to maintain insurability (not yet implemented).
BIODIVERSITY Supporting implementation of adaptation technologies; modelling movements of species due to climate 
change and the vulnerability of habitat to sea level rise.
HEALTH Vector control; vaccination; impregnated bed-nets; health education; greater care with water storage; 
using appropriate clothing; taking siestas in warm climates; using storm shelters; urban planning to 
reduce heat island eff ects; air conditioning; health education; early warning systems; implementation 
of heat health alert plans including measures such as: opening of designated cooling centres at public 
locations; information to the public through local media; distribution of bottled water to vulnerable 
people; operation of a heat information line to answer heat-related questions; availability of emergency 
medical service vehicles with specially trained staff  and medical equipment; disease monitoring and 
prevention/treatment; access to health services and health alert information.
TABLE 8. Examples of adaptation practices and technologies for diff erent sectors
Source: Based on Adger et al. (2007), UNFCCC (2006), ABI (2004) and SBSTA (2007).
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at least in the shorter term, due to the fragmented 
nature of fi nancial markets in many less-developed and 
developing countries.
Key factors infl uencing adaptationb) 
Common to all of the technologies and practices listed 
in Table 8 is the impossibility, according to the available 
literature, of assessing how eff ective the various options 
are at reducing the risks of climate change impacts 
(Adger et al., 2007). Th is is particularly the case for 
vulnerable groups and in the presence of higher levels 
of warming and related climate impacts. Th e limits 
to adaptation are, therefore, unclear, since eff ective 
options for adaptation depend on specifi c geographical 
and climate risk factors as well as on socio-economic, 
institutional, political and fi nancial constraints (IPCC, 
2007d).
Th us the extent to which adaptation options will be 
implemented and will be eff ective for reducing climate 
change risks and vulnerability depends on a large number 
of factors that are interlocked with development issues. 
Political stability, governance, market development 
and public sector service provision, education, income, 
poverty, and confl icts, are among the key factors. 
Furthermore, there might be critical thresholds for 
the resilience of interlinked socio-ecological systems 
to climate change that may limit the possibilities for 
adaptation to climate change (IPCC, 2007d, Klein et 
al., 2007, and Adger et al., 2007).
Technology and technological limits are also highly 
important. While it is acknowledged that there is a large 
potential for technologies to adapt to climate change 
and for the transfer of such technologies, there may be 
several limitations to the degree to which adaptation can 
be handled though technological options. First of all, 
there may be limits to the extent to which technologies 
can be transferred under specifi c contexts and to various 
groups of people. More specifi cally, adaptation can be 
location-specifi c and is not necessarily eff ective in all 
settings. Tol et al. (2006) also point out that decision-
making in situations of uncertainty may create a barrier 
both to the development and to the adoption of certain 
technologies. Furthermore, even when technological 
options for adaptation are possible, they may not be 
economically feasible or culturally or socially desirable 
(Adger et al., 2007).
Finally, there are important fi nancial barriers to the 
implementation and scale-up of adaptation eff orts and 
options as the following subsection on adaptation costs 
illustrates. 
Adaptation costsc) 
Th ere is broad agreement in the literature dealing with 
this subject that the costs of adaptation will, in almost 
all cases, be smaller than the benefi ts, and that climate 
change impacts and the associated need for adaptation 
will increase the cost of, and potential for, economic 
development in developing countries (see e.g. Agrawala 
and Fankhauser, 2008, and IPCC, 2007d). However, 
very few adaptation cost and benefi t estimates have 
been carried out to date.
Th e literature on the costs and benefi ts of adaptation 
is, however, growing rapidly. Th ese studies have so 
far mostly been carried out at the regional or project 
level for a number of specifi c adaptation options, 
including agriculture, energy demand for heating and 
cooling, sea level rise, water resource management 
and infrastructure. Th ey indicate that a number of 
adaptation options are feasible at low cost and/or with 
high returns. However, comprehensive estimates of 
adaptation costs and benefi ts are currently lacking, 
and a number of studies tend to focus on qualitative 
rather than quantitative assessments. In addition, due 
to the fact that adaptation practices and technologies 
will be location- and context-specifi c and may involve 
diff ering defi nitions, assumptions and indicators, it 
is diffi  cult to compare the costs of specifi c types of 
adaptation measures in diff erent geographical locations 
or in other contexts. 
Th e availability of global adaptation cost fi gures is even 
more limited, and the assumptions about climate change 
impacts and adaptation activities and technologies 
underlying their derivation are much less refi ned 
(Adger et al., 2007). Th e broader macroeconomic and 
economy-wide implications of adaptation on economic 
growth and employment remain largely unknown 
(Aaheim and Schjolden, 2004). 
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A few global sectoral adaptation cost estimates are 
available for energy, heating and cooling, and for 
sea-level rise. Tol (2002) estimates that for a sea-level 
rise of 1 metre the global costs would be around 
US$ 1,055 billion. He also estimates that for global 
warming of 1° C by 2100, the global benefi ts from 
reduced heating would be around US$ 120 billion, 
and global costs resulting from increased cooling 
would be around US$ 75 billion. For a 2° C increase in 
temperature by 2100, Mendelsohn et al. (2000) estimate 
that global energy costs related to heating and cooling 
would increase by US$ 2 billion to US$ 10 billion (at 
1990 values) and by US$ 51 billion to US$ 89 billion 
(at 1990 values) for a 3.5° C increase. 
Currently, no comprehensive multi-sectoral estimates 
of global adaptation costs and benefi ts are available, but 
there are some rough estimates available on the generic 
global adaptation costs in developing countries. Th ese 
are provided in Table 9. 
While their scientifi c basis might be questionable, 
such estimates are useful in underlining the order of 
magnitude of the international funding required to 
address adaptation challenges on a suffi  cient scale in 
developing countries, especially when considering 
that currently the annual fl ow of offi  cial development 
assistance is around US$ 100 billion.
Technology and technology 4. 
transfer in the context of 
climate change mitigation and 
adaptation
It is generally recognized that technological 
innovation, together with the transfer and widespread 
implementation of climate-friendly technologies, will 
be central to global eff orts for handling the many 
challenges associated with climate change (IPCC, 
2000a, and Philibert, 2003). As we have seen, a 
broad spectrum of technological measures will be 
required, covering both greenhouse gas emission 
mitigation technologies and climate change adaptation 
technologies, and will include “soft”’ as well as “hard” 
technologies.26 
Adaptation technologies are applied in a variety of 
projects to assist countries which are adversely aff ected 
by climate change to adapt, and to reduce their 
vulnerability to further changes. Strategic adaptation 
technologies include improved design and construction 
for safer and more resistant buildings, innovative 
agricultural and forestry practices and products, and 
regulation and protection of water supplies and coastal 
zones (UNFCCC, 2006). 
Furthermore, the transfer and deployment of 
greenhouse gas mitigation technologies off ers an 
opportunity to achieve signifi cant and cost-eff ective 
emission reductions on a global basis (Petersen, 2007, 
and Wilkins, 2002). In some cases, for example in 
relation to energy-effi  ciency measures, the transfer and 
implementation of technological mitigation solutions 
may involve very low or even negative reduction costs 
(IPCC, 2000a). 
Th e principal mitigation technologies encompass 
energy generation (including renewable energy), 
energy effi  ciency, switching to cleaner fuels, and 
environmentally-friendly waste management, among 
others. Given the growth in emission levels which 
is expected to occur both on a global level and in 
developing countries, technology transfer between 
industrialized and developing countries will also play 
a key role in fi nding a more climate-friendly route to 
economic development than has been used in the past 
(Th orne, 2008). 
TABLE 9. Estimates of global annual adaptation costs in 
developing countries
Source: Based on data from Bapna and McGray (forthcoming) and 
Agrawala and Frankhauser (2008).
ASSESSMENT ANNUAL COST YEAR
Stern Review, 2006 $4-37 billion present
World Bank, 2006 $9-41 billion present
Oxfam, 2007 $50 billion present
UNFCCC, 2007a $28-67 billion 2030
UNDP, 2007 $86 billion 2015
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Technology and technology transfer a) 
pathways
Th e international transfer of technologies in the context 
of climate change is an area that has been addressed 
extensively both in published academic studies and in 
non-published literature, such as technical reports or 
working papers (Rip and Kemp, 1998, Worrel et al., 
2001, Bennett, 2002, and Th orne, 2008). Scholars and 
practitioners from a variety of academic backgrounds, 
such as economics, political science, international law, 
business and management, engineering, and industrial 
relations have all addressed the subject, marking it out 
as an interdisciplinary fi eld of study (Martinot et al., 
1997, IPCC, 2000b, and Petersen, 2007). 
As a result, a variety of diff erent theoretical and 
analytical perspectives have been applied to study and 
understand technology transfer, and together with 
other factors such as the inherent complexity of the 
subject, this may have contributed to the absence of 
any coherent comprehensive theories of technology 
transfer (Reddy and Zhao, 1990, and Sagafi -Nejad, 
1991). Th e various approaches, for example in relation 
to evaluation of the eff ectiveness and success of 
technology transfer programmes, have each emphasized 
diff erent aspects concerning the actors involved, the 
nature of the processes, the eff ects, indicators, goals, 
and more (Kumar et al., 1999, and Bennett, 2002). A 
fundamental issue concerns the various aspects which 
characterize a technology, since these are refl ected in 
the transfer process. 
Technology transfer may broadly be understood as 
involving two aspects (Bell, 1997, and Andersen et 
al., 2007). Th e fi rst aspect is the transfer of technology 
embodied in tangible physical assets or capital goods, 
such as industrial plant and equipment, machinery, 
components, and devices (Rosenberg, 1982, and 
Ramanathan, 1994). 
Th e second aspect relates to the transfer of the 
knowledge and information inherent in any given 
technology or technological system (Edquist and 
Edquist, 1979, Metcalfe, 1995, and Jacot, 1997). 
Th is information includes the accumulated technical, 
managerial and commercial knowledge; the process 
know-how; engineering design and plant construction; 
organization and operating methods; quality control; 
and market characteristics – and all of this information 
may be fi rm-specifi c: for example, the engineering 
design may be known only to the fi rm which invented 
the technology (Sharif, 1994, Bell, 1997, and Chandra 
and Zulkiefl imansyah, 2003). 
Owing to the often tacit and cumulative nature of 
the knowledge, technology transfer processes imply 
more than the simple purchase of capital goods, and 
therefore entail a complex process of learning (Bijker et 
al., 1989, Kuada, 2003, Bell and Pavitt, 1993, Chen, 
1996, and Levin, 1997). In addition, technology 
may be embodied in manuals, blueprints, technical 
specifi cations, handbooks and patents (Archibugi and 
Coco, 2005, Mytelka, 2007, and Dutrénit, 2004).
As indicated above, it is predominantly private 
companies which retain ownership of various 
technologies, and it is therefore relevant to identify the 
channels or pathways within the private sector that can 
facilitate technology transfer (Hoekman and Javorcik, 
2006). Th ese pathways may involve international trade 
in equipment and in capital goods used for production 
under arm’s length transactions such as purchase of 
industrial machinery and plant components, through 
foreign direct investment (FDI), or through licence 
or royalty agreements, turnkey projects e.g. complete 
delivery of landfi ll gas recovery and utilization systems, 
joint ventures, technical agreements, or other forms 
of cooperation arrangements (Bell, 1997, and Kumar 
et al., 1999). Th ese technology transfer pathways are 
related to the commercial and trade linkages between 
companies. It is key to take them into consideration in 
the broader debate on the role of trade and technology 
transfer in mitigating climate change. 
Th e pathways play a key role in relation to facilitating 
access to the diff erent dimensions of technology and 
thereby the quality and substance of the transfer 
process (Hagedoorn, 1990, and Bell and Pavitt, 1993). 
However, much research still needs to be done in the 
area of climate change related technologies, as studies 
carried out to date have focused mainly on technologies 
relevant for productivity and effi  ciency gains. 
Bilateral and multilateral technical assistance 
programmes can play a key role in the transfer 
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of technology. So far, the most important such 
programme has been the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) under the UNFCCC. Th rough GEF, low-
carbon projects, mainly focused on renewable energy 
and energy effi  ciency, have been fi nanced in a number 
of developing countries. Th e Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) is another example 
of a market-based framework that may result in 
the transfer of technology to the developing world, 
although only about one-third of the projects carried 
out to date claim to involve some aspect of technology 
transfer (see Section III.A). 
Intellectual property rights and b) 
technology transfer 
A continuing debate within political discussions 
and academic forums has focused on whether the 
protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), in 
particular patents, impedes or facilitates the transfer 
of technologies to developing countries (Hutchison, 
2006, Barton, 2007, and Littleton, 2008). 
Th e Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC 
underlined that a wide array of mitigation technologies 
is currently commercially available or expected to be 
commercialized soon (IPCC, 2007a, Table 4.2). A 
recent study found that, for the period 1998-2008, 
some 215,000 patents were registered worldwide for 
several low- or zero-emission energy technologies (such 
as waste and biomass energy; or solar, fuel cell, ocean, 
geothermal and wind power) (Copenhagen Economics 
and IPR Company, 2009 and Dechezleprêtre et al., 
2008). Moreover, the growth rate in patent registrations 
for these technologies has been high in recent years, 
including in several developing countries. 
One key rationale for the protection of intellectual 
property rights, and in particular patents, is to 
encourage innovation (López, 2009): patent protection 
could ensure the innovators’ ability to reap the benefi ts 
(through revenues from commercial exploitation of the 
invention) and recoup the costs of R&D investments. 
It has been argued that strong and enforceable 
intellectual property rights are an essential catalyst 
for the development of climate-friendly goods and 
technologies (Harvey, 2008). Studies have shown that 
stronger protection of patent rights is closely related to 
increased trade fl ows (Maskus, 2005). 
However, it has also been argued that, in some 
cases, stronger protection of IPRs might act as an 
impediment to the acquisition of new technologies and 
innovations in developing countries. Patents, or other 
intellectual property rights, give their holders market 
power by allowing them to limit the availability, use, 
and development of technologies, and this may result 
in higher costs for the acquisition of technologies 
(Hutchison, 2006 and Littleton, 2008). While strong 
patent laws provide the legal security for technology-
related transactions to occur, fi rms in developing 
countries may not have the necessary fi nancial means 
to purchase expensive patented technologies. 
More systematic information is needed on the 
geographic scope of patent protection for key climate 
change technologies, and several initiatives are in 
progress.27 Recent initiatives to create open licensing 
structures for environmentally friendly patented 
technology28 and studies addressing the potential 
role of the patent system in promoting competition 
in the development of mitigation technologies have 
highlighted the need to consider not merely the formal 
legal scope of patents, but also to review the full range 
of licensing mechanisms that should be deployed and 
to consider how patents are deployed in practice in 
the market place, including to construct collaborative 
innovation structures and to leverage technology 
diff usion, in conjunction with measures to encourage 
competition.29
A study on the link between intellectual property 
protection and access to clean technologies such as 
photovoltaic, biomass and wind power generation 
suggests that the most likely patent issues will arise 
from the latest technologies, where it is not excluded 
that extensive patent protection might slow down the 
development of new and more effi  cient or less expensive 
technologies. In photovoltaic power generation, 
for example, it is likely that the newer thin-fi lm 
technologies will be subject to much more extensive 
patenting than the older silicon-slice technology. 
In the fi eld of biomass for fuels, the patents of older 
technologies have long since expired, while there 
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is enormous patenting activity in the new biomass 
technologies (Barton, 2007). 
Finally, the importance of intellectual property rights 
needs to be set in a relevant context. When climate-
friendly technologies are protected by intellectual 
property rights, the most relevant of these rights in 
the context of technology transfer are patents and 
trade secrets, particularly in the case of mitigation 
technologies. In the area of adaptation technologies, 
patents or the protection of plant varieties for climate-
resistant crops could play an important part in the 
transfer of technology. 
However, many of the technologies which are relevant 
to addressing climate change, whether they are “soft” 
technologies (such as better energy management or 
agricultural practices) or “hard” technologies (such as 
building insulation, minor technological components 
or subsystems) may not, in fact, be protected by patents 
or other intellectual property rights (Barton, 2007). 
Moreover, even where technologies and products benefi t 
from intellectual property protection, for instance for 
mitigation, the likelihood of alternative technologies 
and substitute products being available is thought to be 
high (Barton, 2007, Copenhagen Economics and IPR 
Company, 2009). Further studies in this area would 
be useful.
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Endnotes
1  Th e IPCC was initially established by UNEP and the WMO to 
provide decision-makers and other parties interested in climate change 
with an objective source of information. It should be noted that the 
IPCC does not conduct any primary research or monitor climate-
related data. Rather, its role is to assess the latest scientifi c, technical 
and socio-economic literature relevant to climate change, its impacts 
and options for adaptation and mitigation. See IPCC, “About IPCC”, 
http://195.70.10.65/about/index.htm.
2  Note that this defi nition diff ers from the one adopted by the 
UNFCCC, where the focus is on anthropogenic climate change 
(i.e. climate change caused by human activities). 
3  For a detailed description of the interactions between greenhouse gas 
emissions and the climate system, see e.g. Le Treut et al. (2007).
4  Th e enhanced greenhouse eff ect is defi ned as “[a]n increase in 
the natural process of the greenhouse eff ect, brought about by human 
activities, whereby greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, 
chlorofl uorocarbons and nitrous oxide are being released into the 
atmosphere at a far greater rate than would occur through natural 
processes and thus their concentrations are increasing.” (NOVA, 2009).
5  Climate models are applied as a research tool to study and simulate 
the climate system. Th e climate system can be represented by models of 
varying complexity, but common to all climate models is the numerical 
representation of the climate system based on the physical, chemical and 
biological properties of its components, their interactions and feedback 
processes, and accounting for all or some of its known properties. General 
Circulation Models (GCMs) and Coupled Atmosphere-Ocean General 
Circulation Models (AOGCMs) provide a representation of the climate 
system that is near the most comprehensive end of the spectrum currently 
available (IPCC, 2007b).
6  See e.g. Stephens, 2005, or Bony et al., 2006, for a review of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the methods used to diagnose climate 
feedbacks in GCMs.
7  CO2-equivalence refers to equivalent carbon dioxide (CO2) 
concentration. It is a unit of measurement used for aggregating and 
comparing emissions from diff erent greenhouse gases and is defi ned as 
the concentration of carbon dioxide that would cause the same amount 
of radiative forcing as a given mixture of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases. 
8  Th e OECD baseline scenario assumes world economic growth 
averaging just over 3.5 per cent in purchasing-power-parity terms up to 
2050, with a gradual catching-up of the living standards of developing 
countries to those of developed countries. In terms of emissions and 
resulting concentrations, the baseline is quite close to the average of 
other recent studies; some are more optimistic, but others less so. Th e 
fi gures reported are based on these assumptions and on data from OECD 
Environmental Outlook to 2030 (OECD, 2008b) and the OECD ENV-
Linkages model (Burniaux and Château, 2008). 
9  Note that these data do not take account of emissions resulting from 
land clearing prior to 1850 in the now-developed countries (World Bank, 
2008a).
10  World Resources Institute 2009, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool 
(CAIT) Version 6.0. Based on total greenhouse gas emissions in 2005, 
excluding land use change.
11  Th e four SRES scenario “families” contain a total of 40 individual 
scenarios.
12  Th ere is also increasing evidence of climate change impacts on coral 
reefs, but it remains diffi  cult to separate the impacts of climate-related 
stresses from other stresses, such as over-fi shing and pollution.
13  More specifi cally, 38 per cent below average levels and 24 per cent 
below the previous record low from 2005.
14  Th is will be addressed in the section on regional and sectoral climate 
change impacts, as well as in the section on adaptation, but it should 
be noted that the impacts will in turn depend on a number of issues, 
including the vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity of the society 
or natural system in question.
15  For a full and detailed overview of regional and sectoral impacts of 
climate change, please consult the publications referred to above.
16  Carbon fertilization refers to a positive eff ect on agricultural yields 
due to increases in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide 
(Cline, 2007). 
17  Hydrology is defi ned as: “Th e scientifi c study of the waters of the 
earth, especially with relation to the eff ects of precipitation and evaporation 
upon the occurrence and character of water in streams, lakes, and on or 
below the land surface. In terms of the hydrologic cycle, the scope of 
hydrology may be defi ned as that portion of the cycle from precipitation 
to re-evaporation or return to the water of the seas. Applied hydrology 
utilizes scientifi c fi ndings to predict rates and amounts of runoff  (river-
forecasting), estimate required spillway and reservoir capacities, study 
soil-water-plant relationships in agriculture, estimate available water 
supply, and for other applications necessary to the management of water 
resources.” (BioGlossary, 2009).
18  ENSO is a global coupled ocean-atmosphere phenomenon. El Niño 
is a periodic warming of the tropical eastern Pacifi c Ocean associated with 
a fl uctuation in the low latitude pressure system known as the Southern 
Oscillation. Th is atmosphere-ocean interaction is known as ENSO, and 
normally occurs on irregular time-scales of between two to seven years. 
ENSO is associated with fl oods, droughts, and other disturbances in a 
range of locations around the world.
19  For instance, the IEA study notes that strong energy effi  ciency 
gains in the transport, industry and buildings sectors; “decarburization” 
of electricity supply through a shift in power-generation mixes towards 
larger shares in nuclear power, renewable energy sources, natural gas, and 
coal with CO2 capture and storage (CCS); and increased use of biofuels 
for road transport, could together limit CO2 emissions to their 2005 
levels.
20  Please note that Pacala and Socolow (2004) use Giga tonnes of 
carbon equivalent as the unit of measurement. One tonne of carbon 
equivalent is equal to 44/12 tonne of CO2 equivalent, based on the 
weight of respectively a carbon atom and a CO2 molecule.
21  Table 3 and the subsequent discussion mainly draws on the fi ndings 
of IPCC (2000, 2007e).
22  Carbon capture and storage involves the collection of CO2 emissions 
from large point sources such as fossil fuel power plants, transportation 
of the CO2 and its injection it into various deep geological formations 
(including saline formations and exhausted gas fi elds), liquid storage in 
the ocean, and solid storage by reaction of CO2 with metal oxides to 
produce stable carbonates.
23  First generation biofuels are produced by fermenting plant-derived 
sugars to ethanol, using a similar process to that used in beer and wine-
making. Th e large-scale production of fi rst generation biofuel leads to the 
problem of competing land use with food production. Second generation 
biofuel technologies substantially extend the amount of biofuel that can 
be produced by using biomass consisting of the residual non-food parts of 
current crops, such as stems, leaves and husks that are left behind once the 
food crop has been extracted, as well as other crops that are not used for 
food purposes, such as switch grass, jatropha and cereals that bear little 
grain, and also industry waste such as wood chips, skins and pulp from 
fruit pressing, etc.
24  Th e estimates are taken from bottom-up studies. See IPCC (2007e).
25  Th is does not suggest that hurricane Katrina was caused by climate 
change: it is used only as an example of the impacts of an extreme weather 
event on a society characterized by many indicators as having high 
adaptive capacity.
26  Hard technologies, sometimes referred to as capital goods, hardware 
or embodied technologies, include tools, machinery, equipment, and 
entire production systems. Examples of hard adaptation technologies 
include seawalls and irrigation technologies. Soft technologies, 
sometimes referred to as software or disembodied technologies, concerns 
the knowledge of methods and techniques for the production of goods 
and services, or for choosing optimal courses of action. Examples of soft 
technologies include crop rotation, data and information, as well as early 
warning systems.
27  For instance, UNEP, the European Patent Offi  ce and the International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development are currently undertaking 
a patent mapping and licensing analysis of energy generation technologies, 
and there is a proposed review of the International Patent Classifi cation 
(IPC) under consideration by the IPC Union within WIPO, Project 
C456, Environmentally sound technology, available at www.wipo.int/
ipc-ief.
28  For example, World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD), Th e Eco-Patent Commons at www.wbcsd.org.
29  Copenhagen Economics and IPR Company, 2009.
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Trade and Climate Change
Th is part reviews the available economic literature 
on trade and climate change. It deals with questions 
such as: “To what extent do trade activities change 
greenhouse gas emissions?” or “Will trade opening lead 
to more emissions?” 
It focuses on the mechanisms by which trade and 
trade opening can aff ect greenhouse gas emissions. Th e 
evidence which has been gathered so far on the links 
between trade and climate change is then reviewed. 
Th is evidence includes econometric studies, as well 
as environmental assessments of the impact of trade 
agreements. Since there is a close connection between 
trade and transport, it  also looks at some of the available 
data regarding the role trade plays in generating 
transport emissions. Beyond these eff ects, this part 
examines the contributions that international trade 
can make to help societies both mitigate and adapt to 
climate change and its economic consequences. Finally, 
it considers how climate change can, in turn, aff ect the 
pattern and volume of international trade fl ows. 
Th is part will concentrate on the link between trade 
and greenhouse gas emissions rather than examining 
the broader question about how changes in trade policy 
can aff ect economic effi  ciency and social welfare in 
cases where pollution extends beyond national borders 
(transboundary pollution). Th ere are three reasons for 
narrowing this focus: fi rst, there has been only limited 
research1 aimed at analysing the welfare and policy 
consequences of trade when production (or consumption) 
in one sector of the economy is the source of pollution 
in other countries; second, how trade opening aff ects 
greenhouse gas emissions has implications for economic 
welfare; and fi nally, how trade aff ects greenhouse gas 
emissions is, in itself, of interest to policymakers, to 
the general public and also to economists. Th is explains 
the extensive economic literature on the links between 
trade and the environment, a substantial amount of 
which looks precisely at this question of how trade 
aff ects various indicators of environmental quality, from 
pollutants to biodiversity. 
While the focus of this part is on trade opening, it is 
necessary to point out that there are other trade-related 
policy changes – such as reduction of environmentally 
harmful subsidies – which may help to mitigate climate 
change but which are not covered in this discussion. 
Effects of trade and trade A. 
opening on greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Trends in global trade1. 
Th e past half a century has been marked by an 
unprecedented expansion of international trade. In 
terms of volume, world trade is nearly thirty-two times 
greater than it was in 1950.2 By way of comparison, the 
level of world gross domestic product (GDP) increased 
by little more than eight times during the same period. 
As a consequence, the share in world GDP that 
international trade accounts for has risen from 5.5 per 
cent in 1950 to 21 per cent in 2007 (see Figure 1).3 
During this sixty-year period, trade expanded at an 
even faster pace than it did during the fi rst wave of 
globalization in the late 19th to early 20th centuries.4 
Th is dramatic expansion may be one reason why trade 
is increasingly being taken into consideration in climate 
change discussions. 
A number of reasons have been given to explain 
the enormous expansion in world trade. Foremost 
among these reasons is technological change, which 
has dramatically reduced the cost of transportation 
and communications. In the second half of the 
20th century, the introduction of the jet engine and 
the use of containers in the transportation of goods 
(allowing rapid and effi  cient loading, unloading and 
transfer of shipments) have signifi cantly reduced the 
cost of air and maritime transportation (Hummels, 
2007). Th is, in turn, expanded the range and volume 
of goods that could be traded. Th e information and 
communication technology (ICT) revolution led to 
a dramatic reduction in the cost of communications, 
making it easier, for example, to coordinate the 
production of a fi nal good whose parts and components 
may have been produced in several diff erent countries 
(referred to as “unbundling” production). 
A second reason for the expansion in trade is the 
spread of more open trade and investment policies. 
Many countries have liberalized their trade regimes 
through unilateral changes in their national policies, 
through bilateral or regional trade arrangements, or 
through multilateral trade negotiations. Measures that 
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previously taxed, restricted or prohibited trade have 
been either eliminated or reduced signifi cantly. Th ese 
changes in economic policies have increased the number 
of countries participating in global trade expansion. In 
2007, developing countries accounted for 34 per cent 
of world merchandise trade – approximately double 
their share of this trade in the early 1960s.5 
Th us, technological innovations and the opening of 
trade and investment policies have both increased 
participation in trade and, at the same time, made 
it easier to “unbundle” production across a range of 
countries. Th e parts and components that make up a 
fi nal product may be manufactured in diff erent locations 
around the globe. Many of these manufacturing plants 
are located in developing countries that, as a result, 
become increasingly integrated in global supply chains. 
Compared to the past, more trade can be involved in 
the manufacture of a fi nal product, and more countries 
can take part in the process. For example, each of 
the dozens of electronic components that make up a 
personal computer may be manufactured in a diff erent 
country, with each component being produced in the 
country which has the “comparative advantage” in its 
production. 
Scale, composition and technique 2. 
effects
How does trade opening aff ect greenhouse gas 
emissions? Trade economists have developed a 
conceptual framework to examine how trade opening 
may aff ect the environment. Th is framework, fi rst 
used to study the environmental impact of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), breaks 
down the impact of trade opening into three “eff ects”: 
the scale eff ect (i.e. how greenhouse gas emissions may 
increase as a result of increased economic activity); 
the composition eff ect (i.e. the way trade opening, 
and consequent changes in relative prices, may aff ect 
the relative size of the various sectors that make up 
a country’s production); and the technique eff ect 
(i.e. the manner in which technological improvements 
may be adopted to reduce the emission-intensity of 
the production of goods and services) (Grossman and 
Krueger, 1993). 
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Copeland and Taylor (2003) provide a defi nition 
of these eff ects from a general equilibrium model 
of trade and the environment. Some international 
organizations, such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1994), have 
adopted or extended this conceptual framework in 
order to evaluate the environmental impact of trade 
agreements.6 Th is analytic framework can be applied to 
investigate the link between trade and climate change. 
While the scale eff ect may worsen climate change, the 
technique eff ect may help to mitigate it. Th ere is some 
uncertainty, however, about the impact the composition 
eff ect would have on climate change. 
Th e “scale eff ect” refers to the increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions resulting from an expanded level of 
economic activity. According to Copeland and Taylor 
(2004), the scale eff ect can be defi ned as the increase 
in the value of production, measured in world prices 
as they were prior to trade opening.7 If there are 
unemployed resources (labour, capital or land) prior 
to liberalization, trade opening will allow greater 
utilization of these resources and will thus lead to an 
expansion in the level of production.8 Th is increased 
level of economic activity will, in turn, require greater 
energy use and since most countries rely on fossil 
fuels as their primary energy source, the scale eff ect 
will lead to higher levels of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Furthermore, increased trade will give rise to a greater 
use of cross-border transportation services, which will 
increase greenhouse gas emissions even further. 
Th e scale eff ect is conceptually diff erent from 
economic growth, since the latter is a result of capital 
accumulation, population growth and technological 
change.9 Nevertheless, there is a presumption that, in 
theory, greater trade opening will lead to economic 
growth through (indirect) mechanisms that aff ect the 
rate of capital accumulation and improvements in 
productivity.10 Given that economic growth is closely 
linked with energy use, this will magnify the impact on 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Despite this, it has not been easy to demonstrate a 
statistically signifi cant relationship between trade 
barriers, in the form of tariff  and non-tariff  measures, 
and the rate of economic growth (Baldwin, 2000). 
In the 1990s, a number of studies appeared to show 
that “open” economies (with liberal trade policies) 
grew faster than “closed” economies. Dollar (1992), 
for example, estimated that the growth rate of Latin 
American and African economies would increase by 
between 1.5 and 2.1 per cent if they adopted more 
open trade policies. 
A study by Sachs and Warner (1995) fi nds that 
developing countries with more open trade policies 
grew at a rate of 4.5 per cent per year, while closed 
economies grew by only 0.7 per cent per year. 
However, these studies have been criticized for the 
use of measures of openness which are closely linked 
with other indicators of good economic performance, 
such as lack of restrictions on foreign exchange markets 
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999). Th ere is also a problem 
involving the endogeneity of trade and growth 
(Edwards, 1998). Th is refers to the possibility of a two-
way rather than a one-way relationship between trade 
and economic growth. In other words, while more 
trade may have a positive impact on economic growth, 
growth may, in turn, lead to an increase in trade. Th us, 
a positive relationship between trade and growth does 
not automatically tell us that trade is causing higher 
growth. Baldwin’s (2000) survey is careful to point out, 
however, that these problems should not be interpreted 
as indicating that international economic policies in 
general or international trade have only an insignifi cant 
eff ect on economic growth. 
Th e “composition eff ect” refers to the way that trade 
opening changes the share that each sector represents 
in a country’s production in response to changes in 
relative prices, resulting in the expansion of some 
sectors and the contraction of others. Th e consequent 
increase or decrease of greenhouse gas emissions will 
depend on whether the emission-intensive sectors are 
expanding or contracting. Changes in the structure 
of a liberalizing country’s production will depend 
on where the country’s “comparative advantage” (in 
terms of resources and capacity) lies: if its comparative 
advantage is in sectors which are less emission-intensive, 
then trade opening will lead to lower greenhouse gas 
emissions, but if it is in the more emission-intensive 
sectors, then liberalization will lead to greater emissions 
of greenhouse gas. 
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In addition, the “pollution-haven hypothesis”11 implies 
that the composition of production in a liberalizing 
economy will also respond to diff erences between 
countries in environmental regulations. If a country 
has stringent environmental protection measures in 
place, the increased competition brought about by 
trade opening may lead emission-intensive sectors to 
relocate to countries with weaker regulations. In the 
context of greenhouse gas emissions, the eff ect of 
international diff erences in climate change policies 
raises the likelihood of “carbon leakage”. Th is term 
refers to a situation in which the measures taken by 
some countries to limit their carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions at a national level do not ultimately result 
in a global CO2 reduction, because industries emitting 
high levels of CO2 simply relocate to countries which 
do not impose such strong penalties on emissions. Th is 
topic is reviewed in Part IV. 
Changes in the composition of the liberalizing 
country’s production, whether resulting from its 
“comparative advantage” or from the pollution-haven 
hypothesis, will have an eff ect on how the production 
of its trade partners is changed. If trade opening results 
in a country producing fewer emission-intensive 
goods, then they must be procured elsewhere, giving 
rise to an expansion in the production of those goods 
in other parts of the world. Th e pattern of expansion 
and contraction of certain sectors of industry in the 
liberalizing country will be mirrored in reverse in the 
rest of the world. Th is suggests that trade opening can 
lead to some countries “specializing” in more emission-
intensive industries, while other countries concentrate 
on “cleaner” industries. Th e net eff ect on greenhouse 
gas emissions at the global level will depend on the 
relative strengths of these eff ects. 
Finally, the technique eff ect refers to improvements in 
the methods by which goods and services are produced, 
so that the quantity of emissions released during the 
production process declines. Following Grossman 
and Krueger (1993), this reduction in greenhouse gas 
emission may come about in two ways. 
First, more open trade will increase the availability 
and lower the cost of climate-friendly goods and 
services. Th is is particularly important for countries 
which do not have access to climate-friendly goods 
and services, or whose domestic industries do not 
produce such goods and services in suffi  cient amounts 
or at aff ordable prices. Access to the technologies 
used in the production of climate-friendly goods and 
services should reduce the energy required during 
production, and thus reduce emissions. For exporters, 
the prospect of increased market access would provide 
an incentive to develop new goods and services that 
help mitigate climate change. Such potential benefi ts 
of more open trade highlight the importance of the 
current negotiations under the Doha Round, which 
aim to liberalize environmental goods and services (see 
Section III.B). 
Second, the increase in income levels that trade opening 
brings about can lead the general public to demand 
lower greenhouse gas emissions (a cleaner environment 
is a “normal” good).12 Increased incomes or wealth 
gives populations the freedom to be concerned 
about other aspects of their well-being, such as better 
environmental quality. Grossman and Krueger (1993) 
conjecture that this public demand is perhaps the 
most important outcome of the technique eff ect. For 
rising income to lead to environmental improvement, 
however, governments need to respond to the public’s 
demands with the appropriate fi scal and regulatory 
measures. Only if such measures are put in place will 
fi rms adopt cleaner production technologies, so that 
a given level of output can be produced with lower 
greenhouse gas emissions than previously. 
Torras and Boyce (1998), who examined the available 
evidence on international variations in seven indicators 
of air and water quality, fi nd that the degree of inequality 
in incomes, as well as inequalities in levels of literacy, 
political rights and civil liberties, had a substantial 
impact on the quality of environmental protection in 
low-income countries. Countries which had a more 
equitable distribution of income and which achieved 
greater equality in literacy, political rights and civil 
liberties tended to have better environmental quality. 
Th is evidence suggests that increases in income from 
trade opening may not translate into environmental 
improvements if the economic benefi ts are not shared 
more equitably among the population. While trade 
openness does not appear to be a major factor in 
income inequality in developed countries, the evidence 
is more mixed for developing countries.13
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Due to the opposing nature of the scale and technique 
eff ects, Grossman and Krueger’s study suggests that 
the relationship between per capita income and 
environmental quality may be non-linear. For countries 
with low levels of per capita income, increased 
economic growth may initially lead to deterioration 
of environmental quality. Only once a certain income 
threshold has been crossed do further increases in per 
capita income lead to gains in environmental quality. 
Th e “environmental Kuznets curve” (as this inverted 
U-shaped relationship between environmental quality 
and income has been called) has generated a great deal 
of research interest. 
Much of the theoretical literature on this topic has 
attempted to explain the nature and causes of this 
non-linear relationship between per capita income 
and environmental quality. Th e explanations have 
been varied. Some have alluded to indivisibilities 
in technologies, which means that below a certain 
threshold of income only polluting technologies are 
used, while cleaner technologies are used only when 
income rises above that threshold (Stokey, 1998). 
Some attribute the non-linearity between income and 
environmental quality to the fact that pollution is 
generated by consumption while there are increasing 
“returns to scale” in abatement, which implies that 
abatement of pollution becomes more effi  cient as an 
economy becomes richer (Andreoni and Levinson, 
2001). Still other explanations ascribe the environmental 
Kuznets curve to the presence of pollution stock 
externalities, which means that if the stock of pollution 
depreciates quickly the net benefi ts from pollution 
control will rise with income (Kelly, 1997). While 
others, still, have described it as a consequence of 
developed countries exporting their older, more 
pollution-intensive technologies to developing 
countries (Suri and Chapman, 1998). In terms of 
political economy, the presence of advanced collective 
decision-making institutions (such as representative 
democracy) in developed countries and the absence 
of such institutions in some developing countries may 
explain this inverted U-shaped relationship (Jones and 
Manuelli, 1995). 
However, the “environmental Kuznets curve” might 
not be applicable to global pollution. Since greenhouse 
gas emissions are released into the “global commons” 
(the atmosphere), and part of their cost is therefore 
borne by people in other countries, there would not be 
a strong incentive for nations to take action to reduce 
such emissions, even if their citizens’ incomes were 
improving.
Since the scale eff ect and the technique eff ect tend to 
work in opposite directions, and the composition eff ect 
depends on the countries’ “comparative advantage” and 
on the pollution-haven hypothesis, the overall impact 
of trade on greenhouse gas emissions cannot be easily 
determined. Th e answer will depend on the magnitude 
or strength of each of the three eff ects, and determining 
these will require detailed analysis of empirical evidence. 
Finally, although the literature on this subject has not 
touched on the timing of these eff ects, it is possible to 
hazard a few remarks on the issue. 
First, how quickly these eff ects occur will depend on 
how rapidly trade opening measures are implemented 
and how far-reaching they are. Bilateral agreements 
or free trade agreements generally involve deeper 
commitments and more accelerated time-frames than 
multilateral agreements. Despite this, some studies 
have found that most bilateral or free trade agreements 
only manage to liberalize 90 per cent of their tariff 
lines for goods by the tenth year of implementation 
(Estevadeordal et al., forthcoming).14 Th ere may also 
be politically sensitive sectors where these periods 
span more than a decade. Second, the reallocation 
of resources within an economy in response to the 
removal of trade barriers may be subject to adjustment 
costs. Th e extent to which governments reduce these 
adjustment costs through retraining of workers and 
provision of job search assistance will determine how 
smoothly this reallocation of resources takes place. 
Th us, while it is possible that the scale, composition 
and technique eff ects will be discernible in the fi rst 
year of implementation of a trade agreement, it is 
more likely that it may be many years later before they 
become fully apparent. 
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Assessments of the effect of 3. 
trade opening on emissions
Th is section focuses on the available evidence about the 
eff ects of trade and trade opening on greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Much of this literature is recent, and the body of work 
continues to grow. Th e evidence that is assembled in 
this section consists of both econometric studies and 
environmental assessments of trade agreements. Most 
of the econometric studies suggest that more open 
trade would be likely to increase CO2 emissions. It 
would appear that the scale eff ect tends to dominate 
the technique and composition eff ects. Some studies, 
however, suggest that there may be diff erences in 
impact on emissions between developed and developing 
countries, with improvement being observed in OECD 
countries and deterioration in developing countries. 
Although many developed countries now require 
environmental assessments of any trade agreements 
that they enter into, these assessments tend to focus on 
national rather than cross-border or global pollutants. 
A few of these assessments have raised concerns about 
the possible increase in greenhouse gas emissions 
from increased transport activity, although few have 
attempted a detailed quantitative analysis of the eff ects 
on emission levels of increased transportation.
A separate subsection looks at the empirical evidence 
on whether an environmental Kuznets curve exists for 
greenhouse gas emissions. Th is literature has produced 
inconsistent results, although recent studies tend to 
show that no such curve exists for CO2 emissions. 
Studies that diff erentiate between OECD and non-
OECD countries tend to fi nd an environmental 
Kuznets curve for the fi rst group of countries but not 
for the second.
Econometric studies on the scale, a) 
composition and technique effects
Since the pioneering study by Grossman and Krueger 
on the impact of NAFTA on emissions of sulphur 
dioxide, more and more econometric studies have 
examined the environmental impact of trade openness.15 
A study by Antweiller, Copeland and Taylor (2001), 
which estimates the scale, composition and technique 
eff ects using a general equilibrium model of trade and 
environment, also looks at sulphur dioxide emissions.16 
A more recent study by Grether, Mathys and de Melo 
(2007) analyzes the impact of trade on worldwide 
sulphur dioxide emissions.17 For the most part, these 
studies tend to fi nd that the technique eff ect played 
the dominant role: in all three studies, the technique 
eff ect was strong enough that trade opening resulted in 
environmental improvements. None of these studies, 
however, has examined greenhouse gas emissions, 
although this situation has started to change with the 
growing awareness of the problems posed by climate 
change.
In econometric studies, it is often more convenient to 
analyze a cross-section of countries than to study the 
eff ects over time within a single country, since there are 
more observations available for analysis. Th is means, 
however, that countries may be observed at a point 
when no trade opening is taking place. One remedy 
to this problem is to use the degree of trade openness, 
which is usually defi ned as the proportion represented 
by trade (exports plus imports) in GDP, as a stand-in 
for the degree of trade liberalization. Of course, there 
may also be a separate interest in knowing how the 
trade orientation of a country (how open it is relative to 
other countries) aff ects its greenhouse gas emissions. 
Following the approach of Antweiller, Copeland and 
Taylor, a study by Cole and Elliott (2003a) considers 
the eff ect of trade openness on four environmental 
indicators, including carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions. Th e data on CO2 which they used covered 
32 developed and developing countries during the 
period 1975-95. Th ey fi nd that, overall, more trade 
openness would be likely to increase CO2 emissions, 
due to a large scale eff ect and only a small technique 
eff ect (in other words, increased trade openness would 
lead to increased production and therefore increased 
emissions, without a large enough increase in the use 
of emission-reduction technologies to counter such 
growth). For the median country in their sample, 
the composition eff ect was also positive, with a 1 per 
cent increase in trade intensity increasing per capita 
CO2 emissions by 0.04 per cent. 
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Frankel and Rose (2005) examine evidence from 
several countries on the relationship between seven 
indicators of environmental quality (including 
CO2 emissions) and trade openness, for a given level 
of per capita income. In the case of CO2 emissions, 
their data allows them to study nearly 150 countries. 
Th eir paper also takes account of the possible 
“endogeneity” of trade and per capita income through 
the use of instrumental variables techniques.18 Th e 
endogeneity of trade openness and per capita income 
arises because there may be a two-way rather than a 
one-way relationship between trade openness and per 
capita income. In other words, while more openness 
may increase per capita income, the latter may in turn 
lead to increased trade. When this endogeneity is not 
taken into account, the statistical results of their study 
indicate that trade openness would lead to increased 
CO2 emissions. On the other hand, by including the 
possible endogeneity of trade in their calculations, the 
detrimental eff ect of trade openness on CO2 emissions 
becomes statistically insignifi cant. 
Nevertheless, Frankel and Rose conclude that the 
main instance where trade and growth might have a 
detrimental eff ect is on the amount of CO2 emissions. 
Th ey recognize that this is due to the global nature 
of the externality (emissions are released into the 
global commons and the costs of the pollution are 
partly borne by foreigners) and that, as a result, 
CO2 emissions are unlikely to be addressed by national 
environmental regulations. 
McCarney and Adamowicz (2005) use “panel data” 19 
for 143 countries, spanning the period 1976 to 2000, 
to examine the link between trade openness and 
CO2 emissions. Th eir results indicate that more 
open trade signifi cantly increases emissions of CO2, 
although they are not able to give a breakdown of the 
overall outcome into the individual contributions of 
the scale, composition and technique eff ects. Th e fact 
that the data covered diff erences between countries 
over diff erent periods of time allowed heterogeneity 
across countries to be taken into account, so that 
comparisons could be drawn about how diff erent 
national characteristics infl uence the environmental 
impact of more open trade. One such diff erence 
among the countries that they examined is the eff ect 
of democratic governance, as compared to autocratic 
governance. Interestingly, they fi nd that greater 
democracy may be linked to increased levels of 
CO2 emissions. In their view, this may be the result 
of an indirect eff ect of governance on environmental 
quality, whereby the lack of good governance reduces 
prosperity, thus reducing per capita income levels and, 
in consequence, emissions. 
Managi (2005) uses data for 63 developed and 
developing countries over the period 1960 to 1999 to 
examine the link between trade openness and levels of 
CO2 emissions. As in the case of the study by Frankel 
and Rose, the possibility of endogeneity between trade 
openness and income was taken into account in the 
estimation. Th e results of the study suggest that further 
trade opening would result in increased emissions with 
an estimated elasticity (a measure of the responsiveness 
of CO2 emissions to trade openness) of 0.579, with a 
greater contribution from the scale eff ect than from the 
technique eff ect. 
However, a later study by Managi et al. (2008) suggests 
that the impact of trade openness on CO2 emissions 
may diff er between developed countries (OECD 
members) and developing countries. Th ey estimate the 
overall impact of trade openness on emission levels of 
carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide, and on levels of 
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) – a measure of 
the amount of oxygen used by micro-organisms while 
breaking down organic matter in water, which is used 
as an indicator of pollution levels. Th ey use panel data 
on CO2 and SO2 emissions of 88 countries from 1973 
to 2000 and the BOD levels of 83 countries from 1980 
to 2000. Th e econometric analysis they employed 
allows them to correct for the endogeneity of income 
and trade and enabled them to distinguish between the 
short-term and long-term relationships between trade 
and CO2 emissions.
20 Th ey fi nd that trade openness 
reduces CO2 emissions in OECD countries because the 
technique eff ect dominates the scale and composition 
eff ects, but that it has a detrimental eff ect on carbon 
dioxide emissions in non-OECD countries, where the 
scale and composition eff ects prevail over the technique 
eff ect. Th ey also fi nd that the long-term impact of trade 
on CO2 emission levels is large, although it is small in 
the short term. 
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The “environmental Kuznets curve” b) 
and greenhouse gas emissions
From the evidence that has been gathered to date, 
studies on whether or not there is an environmental 
Kuznets curve for greenhouse gas emissions have 
produced confl icting results, as Huang et al. (2008) 
note. 
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) examined data on 
130 countries for the years 1951 to 1986, with 
complete sets of data for 108 of these countries. Th ey 
are able to estimate an environmental Kuznets curve 
for CO2 emissions, but fi nd that it diff ers from the 
curve for local pollutants (pollutants that are confi ned 
within local or national borders) in that the turning 
point – at which further income growth leads to lower 
emissions – occurs only at very high income levels. 
Roberts and Grimes (1997) looked at a larger sample 
of countries (147 countries) and a longer time period 
(1962-91). Th ey fi nd that the relationship between 
CO2 emissions per unit of GDP and level of economic 
development has changed from essentially linear in 
1962 (i.e. each change in GDP and in level of economic 
development gave rise to a constant amount of change 
in CO2 emission levels), to strongly curvilinear in 1991 
(in other words, the amount of change in emission 
levels became larger and larger in response to each 
change in GDP and economic development level). 
Th ey also fi nd that, during a brief period in the early 
1970s, and increasingly since 1982, the environmental 
Kuznets curve reached statistical signifi cance. Th ey 
conclude, however, that this is not the result of groups 
of countries passing through stages of development, 
but is due to improvements in production effi  ciency 
in a small number of developed countries, combined 
with reduced effi  ciency in low and middle-income 
countries. 
Th e study by McCarney and Adamowicz (2005) which 
was discussed above also estimates an environmental 
Kuznets curve for CO2 emissions, with the turning 
point being found at lower levels of per capita income 
in autocratic countries as compared to democratic 
ones. Th is result suggests that emissions would begin 
declining at lower levels of income in autocratic 
countries compared to more democratic countries. 
Other empirical studies fi nd no environmental Kuznets 
curve for greenhouse gas emissions. Th e World Bank 
(1992) fi nds that per capita CO2 emissions always 
increase with income. Th e study by Shafi k (1994) shows 
that although some environmental indicators (such as 
water and sanitation) improve with rising incomes, 
others (such as particulates and sulphur oxides) initially 
deteriorate before eventually improving, while others 
become steadily worse (carbon dioxide emissions, 
dissolved oxygen in rivers and municipal solid wastes, 
for example). 
Moomaw and Unruh (1997) identify 16 countries (a 
subset of OECD members) that demonstrate sustained 
income growth with stable or decreasing levels of 
CO2 emissions per capita. Using these 16 countries, they 
then compare two models – an environmental Kuznets 
curve and what they term a structural transition model 
of per capita CO2 emissions and per capita GDP – to 
see which model best matches the experience of these 
16 countries. Th e structural transition model attempts 
to fi nd a sudden change in the pattern of the data and 
relate it to some precipitating event. Th ey fi nd that 
improvements in levels of CO2 emissions per capita are 
not correlated with income levels, but are closely linked 
with historic events related to the oil-price shocks of the 
1970s and to the policies that followed. Th ey conclude 
that an environmental Kuznets curve for CO2 emissions 
and income does not provide a reliable indication of 
future behaviour. 
Using more recent data from the period 1990 to 
2003, Huang et al. (2008) test for the existence of 
an environmental Kuznets curve for greenhouse 
gas emissions in transition economies and (Kyoto 
Protocol) Annex II countries. Th ey conclude that the 
evidence for most of these countries does not support 
the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis. Th e 
Frankel and Rose (2005) study discussed earlier is also 
unable to fi nd an environmental Kuznets curve for 
CO2 emissions. 
Th ere is also within-country studies. Aldy (2005) 
analyzes state-level CO2 emissions in the United 
States from 1960 to 1999, and is able to estimate 
production-based CO2 environmental Kuznets 
curves and consumption-based CO2 environmental 
Kuznets curves. But in testing the robustness of these 
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relationships, he fi nds that estimated environmental 
Kuznets curves appear to vary by state. Furthermore, in 
some states with non-stationary income and emissions 
data (data whose statistical properties vary with time), 
he concludes that the estimated relationship between 
income and emission levels does not accurately refl ect 
the true situation. 
Environmental assessments of trade c) 
agreements 
Th e environmental assessments of trade agreements 
that have been undertaken by countries engaged 
in negotiating multilateral and bilateral free trade 
agreements are another possible source of information 
on the expected impact of trade on greenhouse gas 
emissions. Negotiations under the Doha Round are 
still ongoing, but a large number of other free trade 
agreements have been negotiated and come into force 
over the past two decades. Th e WTO has been notifi ed 
of 243 regional trade agreements (RTAs) which are 
currently in force.21 
A signifi cant number of the agreements that were 
concluded during the current decade have been 
the subject of formal environmental assessments. 
Among WTO members, Canada,22 the European 
Communities23 and the United States24 have required 
environmental assessments of the trade agreements that 
they have entered into. A WTO report (2007) provides 
an inventory of the environmental assessments that 
have been notifi ed to the WTO’s Committee on Trade 
and Environment. 
Before examining the results of these assessments, 
it may be helpful to consider their limitations. First, 
nearly all of these assessments involve an analysis of 
the likely economic, environmental, and frequently 
also social, impacts of the trade agreements. As such, 
the conclusions reached by the studies, if any, are 
about the anticipated rather than actual impacts of the 
trade agreements. Only a few of the environmental 
assessments analyze climate change impacts; most deal 
with local or domestic environmental impacts. Th is 
may be because a study of climate change impacts 
was not included in the scope of the assessment, 
or because the impact the trade agreement would 
have on greenhouse gas emissions was considered 
to be negligible. Furthermore, although some of the 
assessments apply the scale, composition and technique 
eff ect framework, few are able to provide quantitative 
estimates of the impact each of these eff ects would have 
as a result of the trade agreement. 
Despite their limitations, these studies nonetheless 
off er some insights into the issues that have been of 
concern to trade negotiators and civil society groups 
as they examine specifi c trade agreements for their 
likely environmental impacts. Of the environmental 
assessments, those for the Australia-US Free Trade 
Agreement, the EU-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 
the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement, the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement consider their consequences on 
climate change. 
Both Australia and the United States conducted their 
own environmental assessments of the Australia-
US Free Trade Agreement. While the United States’ 
environmental review did not look at climate change, 
the Australian study concluded that the free trade 
agreement would entail a signifi cant increase in 
domestic and international transportation, which 
would result in an increase in greenhouse gas emissions, 
as well as in other pollution (Cebon, 2003). 
NAFTA is probably the trade agreement that has 
received the most intensive scrutiny. Th e North 
American Commission on Environmental Cooperation, 
an institution which was established by NAFTA, 
has produced or commissioned a large number of 
environmental studies. Several of these have discussed 
the eff ects of NAFTA on greenhouse gas emissions. Th e 
North American Symposium on Assessing the Linkages 
between Trade and Environment is a collection of 13 
studies on the environmental eff ects of NAFTA. One 
of the papers, “NAFTA Transportation Corridors: 
Approaches to Assessing Environmental Impacts and 
Alternatives”, has managed to assess, in some detail, 
the greenhouse gas emissions arising from trucking 
and rail freight of trade within the NAFTA region 
(CEC, 2002). 
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North American goods move by a variety of means – 
highways, railways, waterways, air and pipeline – but 
trucking and rail freight were judged to produce the 
most greenhouse gas emissions and to pose the greatest 
risk to air quality. Several of the main transport routes 
(or “transport corridors”) for NAFTA trade were 
selected for the analysis: Vancouver-Seattle, Winnipeg-
Fargo, Toronto-Detroit, San Antonio-Monterrey and 
Tucson-Hermosillo. Th e study determined the current 
and anticipated future commodity fl ows, freight-
vehicle traffi  c volumes, and levels of emissions for each 
of these transport corridors. A range of air pollution 
emissions, including greenhouse gas emissions, were 
also examined. 
Th e study’s main conclusion is that trade-related 
emissions of greenhouse gases are expected to rise 
substantially by 2020. Using estimated growth by the 
year 2020 as a basis for comparison, it was calculated 
that the carbon dioxide emissions from NAFTA trade 
would increase by 2.4 to 4 times over their current 
levels in the fi ve corridors. However, the study points 
to opportunities to achieve lower levels of trade-related 
emissions through the implementation of mitigation 
strategies. For example, reducing empty-vehicle mileage 
(by ensuring that vehicles carrying goods from one 
point to another made their return journey carrying 
a diff erent cargo) would lower all pollutant emissions 
from trade. 
Based on the analysis of the Toronto-Detroit corridor, 
reducing the fraction of empty trucks from 15 per cent 
to 10 per cent would eliminate over 0.5 metric tonnes 
of nitrogen oxide and 600 metric tonnes of carbon 
dioxide per day by 2020 (5 per cent of the trade-
related truck total). Th e study suggests that the main 
US-Mexico transport corridors have the potential for 
even larger reductions through the implementation of 
a similar mitigation strategy.
Several studies completed in 1999 also discuss 
greenhouse gas emissions from various sectors where 
NAFTA was expected to have a signifi cant impact 
(CEC, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d). A study of “feedlot” 
cattle (i.e. cattle being fattened for consumption) 
identifi ed methane emissions from cattle as being an 
environmental concern. It concludes that although 
methane emissions remain a challenge, increased 
effi  ciency in beef-feeding, combined with genetic 
selection of the beef herd, could reduce total methane 
emission levels. 
A second study focused on the electricity-generation 
sector in NAFTA countries, but also included the 
industries further up the supply chain that provide 
the major fuel sources used for electricity generation 
(notably coal, natural gas and hydroelectric installations) 
in its analysis. It concludes that the environmental 
pressures arising from increased demand for and 
trade in electricity in Canada, Mexico and the United 
States will depend on two key factors: the domestic 
environmental regulations imposed on the operation 
of existing power plants; and the impact of new 
electricity-generation technologies on fuel production. 
Th e EU’s environmental assessment of the EU-Chile 
Free Trade Agreement did not address this agreement’s 
overall impact on greenhouse gas emissions. However, 
it did examine the eff ect of the agreement on the 
forestry sector, where commercial operation has 
been increasingly based on forest plantations. Th e 
assessment anticipated that growth in demand for 
forest products would be met by products obtained 
from plantations. It concluded that these plantations 
could slow down climate change by capturing carbon 
dioxide, thus contributing to the reduction of carbon 
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere. 
With regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade 
Agreement, the EU assessment indicated an overall 
adverse impact on climate change, due both to the 
increase in greenhouse gas emissions from increased 
transport and to changes in consumption patterns in 
the Mediterranean partner countries. It noted that the 
scale eff ect – which arises from increased trade and 
subsequent increases in production and consumption 
– can, in principle, be countered by technology or by 
regulation. However, it did not analyse any measures 
to strengthen the positive eff ects so as to counteract 
the adverse ones. Th e assessment did, however, indicate 
that the free trade agreement would give rise to an 
overall economic gain, a part of which, it suggested, 
could be directed towards measures to mitigate the 
expected climate change impacts.
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As part of its sustainability impact assessment of trade 
agreements, the EU examined the likely impact of an 
EU-Mercosur Association Agreement (University of 
Manchester, 2007), and concluded that the impacts 
of the proposed trade agreement on climate change 
are mixed.25 Th ere would be a small reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions from the reallocation of 
production between Mercosur and the EU. A free 
trade agreement could lead to less energy consumption 
during production because the energy-intensive parts of 
the manufacturing sector would be largely transferred 
to Europe where, in general, fi rms are more energy-
effi  cient than their Mercosur counterparts. 
Th e lower energy consumption and increased use of 
natural gas would lead to a small downturn in the 
total carbon dioxide emissions from production in 
both Mercosur countries and in the EU. However, 
the study concluded that this would be countered by 
a larger increase in carbon dioxide emissions arising 
from the increase in international transport. Overall, 
the association agreement could lead to an increase 
in global CO2 emissions of about 0.15 per cent as a 
result of the full liberalization of agriculture and of 
manufactured goods. 
Other approachesd) 
Instead of calculating the impact of trade opening on 
greenhouse gas emissions, some studies have tried to 
account for the contribution of international trade to 
CO2 emissions. Peters and Hertwich (2008a, 2008b), 
for example, have suggested that 21.5 per cent of 
global CO2 emissions are a result of international trade. 
Similar studies have been undertaken by the Stockholm 
Environment Institute and the University of Sydney to 
estimate the CO2 emissions associated with UK trade 
(Wiedmann et al., 2007).26 What these studies have 
in common is that they calculate emissions associated 
with consumption rather than those resulting from 
production. 
Since consumption, by defi nition, involves trade 
(consumption = production + imports – exports), it is 
necessary to estimate the CO2 emissions “embodied” 
in trade.27 (In practice, the studies use emissions from 
the production of these traded goods to calculate 
the emissions “embodied” in trade.) However these 
estimates do not imply that halting international 
trade would eliminate 21.5 per cent of greenhouse 
gas emissions, since domestic products would take the 
place of imported products. Th ese would in themselves 
be a source of emissions. 
Studies employing the same approach, but applied to 
specifi c countries or pairs of trade partners, have also 
been undertaken by McGregor et al. (2008), who 
estimate the amount of CO2 emissions contained in 
trade between Scotland and the rest of the United 
Kingdom; by Shui and Harriss (2006), who focus on 
the CO2 emissions embodied in US-China trade; and 
by Sanchez-Choliz and Duarte (2004), who examine 
the CO2 emissions embodied in Spain’s international 
trade.
Trade and transport4. 
One important issue concerning trade’s role in 
greenhouse gas emissions is its link to transportation 
services. International trade involves countries 
specializing in the production and export of goods 
where they have a comparative advantage and importing 
other goods from their trade partners where they 
have no such advantage. Th is process of international 
exchange requires that goods be transported from the 
country of production to the country of consumption, 
and consequently an expansion in international trade 
is likely to lead to increased use of transportation 
services. 
Merchandise trade can be transported by air, road, 
rail and water, or via pipelines in the case of oil. In 
most instances, international trade in merchandise will 
involve more than one mode of transport, since even 
goods that are carried by air or by water must often 
make an overland journey to the seaport or airport, and 
are generally transported by land on the fi nal stretch of 
their journey to the ultimate consumer. 
At a global level, maritime transport accounts for the 
bulk of international trade transport by volume, and 
for a signifi cant share by value. Excluding intra-EU 
trade, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (2007b) reported that, in 
2006, seaborne cargo accounted for 89.6 per cent of 
world trade transport by volume; overland and other 
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modes of transport (including pipelines) accounted for 
another 10.2 per cent; while airborne cargo accounted 
for the remaining 0.27 per cent (see Figure 2). By 
value, seaborne trade made up 70.1 per cent of global 
trade transport, airborne cargo accounted for 14.1 per 
cent, and land and other modes of transport for the 
remaining 15.8 per cent.28 Since 2000, the share by 
volume of each of these modes of transport appears to 
have changed very little, with the share of maritime 
transport remaining almost invariable at 89 per cent. 
Th e share by value, however, has been more subject 
to change, with maritime transport’s share varying 
between 64 and 70 per cent. 
Th e inclusion of trade within the EU changes the 
picture somewhat. Lloyd’s Maritime Intelligence 
Unit (MIU) estimated that seaborne trade accounted 
for 76.5 per cent of international trade transport by 
volume and air transport for 0.3 per cent, while the 
share of overland transport was 15.9 per cent and that 
of pipelines was 7.3 per cent. By value, the share of 
seaborne cargo represented 58 per cent of the total, 
air cargo 11 per cent, overland cargo 39 per cent and 
transport via pipelines accounted for 2 per cent.29 Th e 
apparent reduction in the share of maritime transport 
can be explained by the fact that only a small proportion 
– 18.1 per cent (by volume) – of trade within the EU 
is transported by sea although 71.7 per cent of its trade 
with the rest of the world is by sea (OECD, 2006a).
At the regional level, there is of course considerable 
variation in the importance of the various modes 
of transport. Countries that share a land border 
will have a greater share of trade being transported 
by land. Hummels (2007) estimates that in North 
America, nearly 25 to 35 per cent of trade by value 
is transported by land. Th e OECD (2006a) estimates 
that, in 2004, 31.1 per cent of trade within the EU 
was transported by road, another 6.1 per cent by rail 
and 7.7 per cent by pipeline. Th e role of international 
trade in increasing greenhouse gas emissions caused by 
road transport has been highlighted in a number of 
environmental assessments of regional trade agreements 
such as NAFTA (these assessments were reviewed in 
the previous subsection). By contrast, for countries in 
Africa, the Middle East and Asia, only between 1 and 
5 per cent of trade by value is with neighbouring 
countries, and thus the bulk of trade is carried by sea 
or by air. 
While the greater part of international trade is 
transported by sea, the volume of goods shipped by air 
(tonnes/kilometre) has been growing rapidly: between 
1951 and 2004, it grew at 11.7 per cent annually – 
about twice the rate of other modes of world trade 
transport.30 Th is comparatively faster increase in the 
use of air transport for the shipment of goods can be 
explained by technological improvements (e.g. the 
invention and widespread use of the jet engine) 
which have resulted in a sharp decline in the cost of 
air shipping; by a fall in the value-to-weight ratio of 
manufactured goods; and by the growing importance 
of speed in international trade (Hummels, 2007). 
FIGURE 2: Modes of transportation of international trade, 
2006
[(A) BY VOLUME]
Airborne  0.3%
Seaborne  89.6%
Overland and Other  10.2%
[(B) BY VALUE]
Airborne  14%
Seaborne  70%
Overland and Other  16%
Source: UNCTAD (2007b). 
Note: Th e data used exclude intra-EU trade.
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With the exception of diesel motor vehicles, however, 
aviation is the most polluting mode of transport for the 
movement of both passengers and freight (Chapman, 
2007), and this may pose an increasingly important 
challenge, since the use of aviation services to convey 
internationally traded goods is likely to grow faster 
than the use of other modes of transport. 
Petroleum supplies 95 per cent of the total energy 
used by world transport, so the transport sector is a 
signifi cant source of greenhouse gas emissions.31 Th ere 
are signifi cant diff erences, however, in the contribution 
of the various modes of transport to energy-related 
greenhouse gas emissions. A recent report by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
(Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2007) estimated that about 
74 per cent of the energy-related CO2 emissions of the 
transport sector, including the carriage of both goods 
and people, was produced from road transport, with 
another 12 per cent from air transport.32 It should 
be noted that, since only emissions that arise from 
international trade are being considered here, these 
numbers will overestimate the contribution of these 
two modes of transport, as they include emissions 
produced during the transport of people. 
In the case of maritime transport, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) has recently completed 
its study of CO2 emissions of ships (IMO, 2008).
33 
Th e report covers several elements: (i) an inventory of 
current emissions of CO2 from international shipping 
(defi ned as merchant ships above 100 gross tonnes 
(GT)34 in size); (ii) a comparison of the CO2 emissions 
from various types of ships with the CO2 emissions from 
other sources in the transport sector; and (iii) estimates 
of future emissions of CO2 from international shipping. 
For 2007, the IMO study estimates the CO2 emissions 
from international shipping to be about 843 million 
tonnes of CO2, which is 2.7 per cent of the total world 
CO2 emissions generated by human activity. 
Th e IMO study also compares the “carbon emission 
effi  ciency” index (which the IMO defi ned as CO2 
effi  ciency = CO2/tonne-kilometre) of ships with that 
of other modes of transport. Th e lower this index, the 
more carbon-emission effi  cient a mode of transport is. 
It found that shipping has the lowest value of the index 
among the diff erent modes of transport. Th e study 
also compares the share of each mode of transport in 
the sector’s total CO2 emissions and arrives at fi gures 
similar to those given by the IPCC report (Kahn 
Ribeiro et al., 2007): road transport accounted for the 
biggest share of emissions, with 72.6 per cent, followed 
by international shipping with 11.8 per cent, then 
aviation with 11.2 per cent and fi nally rail transport, 
which accounted for 2 per cent.35
Finally, the study used the scenarios in the IPCC’s Special 
Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) to estimate 
future CO2 emissions from international shipping. 
Th e IMO base scenario predicts that emissions from 
international shipping will increase from current levels 
by between 125.7 per cent and 218 per cent by the year 
2050.36 Th e base scenario also predicts that increases 
over the next decade (to 2020) will range from a low 
of 9.7 per cent to a high of 25.5 per cent above current 
emission levels.37 
Th e major part of international trade is transported 
by sea (90 per cent when calculated by weight and 
70 per cent when calculated by value). Th is proportion 
appears to have remained steady, at least since 2000, 
despite the rapid growth in the use of air transport. 
Among the diff erent modes of transport, shipping 
is also the most effi  cient in terms of carbon dioxide 
emissions. It is important to take this into account 
when assessing the contribution of trade to transport-
related emissions. However, it should not be taken as 
a cause for complacency since there are warning signs 
that, without signifi cant policy or regulatory changes, 
CO2 emissions from international shipping will rise by 
signifi cant amounts in the next four decades. 
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Contribution of trade and B. 
trade opening to mitigation and 
adaptation efforts
As discussed in the previous section, the technique 
eff ect can be a major mechanism through which trade 
opening can lead to mitigation of climate change. 
More open trade can increase the availability of 
goods and services that are more energy effi  cient. Th e 
increased income made possible through trade opening 
can lead to greater demand for better environmental 
quality and thus to reduced greenhouse gas emissions. 
Related to this, trade (or trade opening) encourages the 
spread from one country to another of technological 
innovations that are benefi cial in mitigating climate 
change. Furthermore, allowing international markets 
to remain open could help countries adapt to supply 
disruptions that may be triggered by climate change, 
such as a shortage in food supplies. 
Technological spillovers from trade1. 
International trade can serve as a means for diff using 
new technologies and know-how (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991). International technology diff usion is 
important because of the highly skewed distribution of 
spending on research and development (R&D) around 
the world. Coe, Helpman and Hoff maister (1997) 
estimate that 96 per cent of global expenditure on 
R&D is undertaken by only a handful of industrialized 
countries. Th e distribution of expenditure on R&D 
is even more skewed than the distribution of world 
income. Keller (2004) notes that the G-7 countries (the 
world’s leading industrialized countries) accounted for 
84 per cent of global spending on R&D in 1995, but 
represented only 64 per cent of global gross domestic 
product (GDP). Since Solow (1956), economists have 
understood the importance of technological change 
in raising productivity and underpinning economic 
growth. Th e greater a country’s exposure to the 
international economy, the more it gains from R&D 
activities in other countries (Helpman, 1997). 
Th is suggests a similar role for trade in diff using 
technologies that mitigate climate change. Th e available 
information indicates that 90 per cent of what is 
termed the environmental goods and services industry 
is located in member countries of the OECD.38 Since 
many OECD countries were among the fi rst to adopt 
climate change mitigation measures, the already 
lopsided distribution of technological know-how may 
become more distorted as the adoption of mitigation 
measures leads to further innovation in environmental 
technologies in OECD countries. Porter and van 
der Linde (1995) have argued that domestic fi rms’ 
compliance with environmental regulations can trigger 
technological innovations, since such inventions will 
lower fi rms’ cost of compliance.39 Th e existence of 
spillovers in climate change technology (i.e. transfers of 
technological know-how from one country to another) 
provides one mechanism by which developing countries’ 
own eff orts to combat climate change can benefi t 
from innovations in OECD countries. Section III.B 
provides information on trade opening in goods that 
may mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. 
Th ere are several channels by which technological 
dissemination through trade can occur (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Helpman, 1997). As explained in 
Section I.B.4(a), one channel is through the importation 
of innovations embodied in both intermediate goods 
(i.e. manufactured or processed goods which are used 
in further production processes) and capital goods (e.g. 
machinery or equipment used in the production of 
other goods and services) which a country could not 
have produced on its own. A second channel is through 
the transfer of knowledge about new production 
methods and design from developed countries. 
Th ird, international trade can increase the available 
opportunities for adapting foreign technologies to meet 
local conditions. Lastly, the learning opportunities 
arising from international economic relations will 
reduce the cost of future innovation and imitation, 
making them more accessible to developing countries. 
Th e literature examining evidence of the link between 
international trade and the dissemination of technology 
has looked at both trade in intermediate goods 
(Coe and Helpman, 1995) and trade in capital goods 
(Xu and Wang, 1999; Eaton and Kortum, 2001). 
Th ere is also some work based on patent applications 
that examines how foreign technology is acquired by 
fi rms. It shows that contacts with foreigners in the 
form of trade and foreign direct investment facilitate 
62
Trade and Climate Change
the transfer of foreign technology (Globerman et al., 
2000). A survey by Keller (2004) and Acharya and 
Keller (2007) of the literature on this subject concludes 
that imports play a signifi cant role in the international 
dissemination of technology. 
Sijm et al. (2004) surveyed the literature on the ways 
that technological know-how is transferred from one 
country to another. Th ey argue that the technological 
know-how in Kyoto Protocol Annex I countries has a 
positive impact on non-Annex I countries, given that 
technology and know-how are transferred through 
foreign trade and through education. However, the 
authors also point out that this has not been quantifi ed 
in a reliable manner. Th is suggests a fruitful avenue 
for future research: empirical studies that document 
the extent of such spillovers and the role that trade 
plays in the international diff usion of climate change 
technologies. 
Trade as a means of economic 2. 
adaptation to climate change
Climate change threatens to disrupt the conditions 
under which a wide range of goods and services that 
are important to economic well-being are produced 
and consumed. Trade may increase the vulnerability to 
climate change of some countries because it leads them 
to specialize in the production of products in which 
they have a comparative advantage, while relying on 
imports to meet their requirements for other goods 
and services. Th ese countries may become vulnerable if 
climate change leads to an interruption in their supply 
of imported goods and services. However, trade can also 
provide a means to bridge the diff erences in demand 
and supply conditions, so that if climate change leads 
to a scarcity of certain goods and services in a country, 
it will nonetheless be able to obtain what it needs from 
countries where these goods and services continue to 
be available. Th us, beyond mitigation, trade can play 
a valuable role in helping humankind adapt to the 
consequences of a warmer future. 
As discussed in Part I, climate change is likely to 
signifi cantly aff ect agricultural production. Without 
trade, countries facing changed climatic conditions 
and lower crop yields will confront huge challenges in 
providing adequate supplies of food and agricultural 
raw materials to their populations. International trade 
allows the world to cushion the severity of climate change 
impacts on global agriculture by making it possible for 
a country to draw upon its trade partners’ supplies to 
meet part of the demand for food and agricultural raw 
materials. But the extent to which international trade 
can play this buff ering role depends on how economic 
scarcity or abundance are transmitted in terms of 
changes in prices across markets (i.e. agricultural prices 
rising in response to scarcity or falling in situations of 
abundance). 
Where prices are distorted by the use of certain trade 
measures, the contribution that trade can make in 
helping countries to adapt to climate change may be 
signifi cantly reduced. If, as mentioned earlier, a country 
becomes vulnerable to climate change impacts because 
it has specialized in certain sectors of production (in 
the case, for example, of a country which specializes in 
mining, or in the manufacture of automobile parts, but 
which has a very small agricultural sector), matters will 
only deteriorate if its partners restrict trade to safeguard 
their own supplies.
A number of economic studies have simulated how 
trade might help reduce the cost of adapting to climate 
change in the agricultural or food sectors. 
Reilly and Hohmann (1993) used the SWOPSIM 
(Static World Policy Simulation Model) of world food 
markets to simulate the eff ect of a range of climate 
change scenarios while allowing countries to partly 
adjust to these impacts through trade. Th eir scenarios 
assumed reductions in yield of between 10 and 50 per 
cent in the US, Canada and the European Communities, 
and assumed either increases or no change in yield in 
high-latitude regions (former Soviet Union, Northern 
Europe, China, Japan, Australia, Argentina, Brazil) and 
the rest of the world. Th ey fi nd that, even under the 
assumption of large reductions in food yields, the losses 
in economic welfare are small relative to GDP (a few 
hundredths to a few tenths of a per cent) for all the 
countries identifi ed in the study. Th e study also fi nds 
that Australia and China would experience large net 
gains (between 2 and 6 per cent of their GDP). Th eir 
results illustrate the importance of international trade 
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in promoting interregional adjustments in production 
and consumption and hence in lowering the costs from 
climate change.
Th e study by Rosenzweig et al. (1993) considers the 
eff ect that further liberalization in agricultural trade 
would have on the world’s ability to adapt to climate 
change. Th e potential variations due to climate change 
in the yield of some major crops (wheat, rice, maize, 
and soybeans) were estimated. A number of climate 
change scenarios were considered in estimating these 
changes in yields, based on the assumption of a 
doubling in CO2 levels (to 555 parts per million) by 
2060. Th ree general circulation models (GCMs) – 
sophisticated computer models incorporating detailed 
observations of various weather phenomena and other 
factors, which are used to study past, present and 
future climate patterns – were employed to obtain a 
range of these climate change scenarios. Th e GCMs 
employed were from the Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies, the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory 
and the United Kingdom Meteorological Offi  ce. Th ese 
projected changes in yields were then fed into a world 
food trade computer model – the Basic Linked System 
(BLS) – and projections of the world food market up 
to 2060 were generated. Th e study fi nds that, with 
trade opening, global impacts due to climate change 
would be slightly reduced. Price increases would be 
slightly less than those that would occur without full 
trade opening, and the number of people at risk from 
hunger would be reduced by about 100 million (from 
the reference case of about 640 million in 2060).
Th e study by Hertel and Randhir (2000) continues 
this focus on trade policies in the agricultural sector 
and how they may aff ect adaptation to climate change. 
Th e study underscores the importance of reducing or 
eliminating trade-distorting measures, such as subsidies, 
so as to make international trade a more eff ective 
tool for adapting to climate change. Scenarios where 
international trade helps a country to adapt to climate 
change all result in net increases in economic welfare 
at the global level. But international trade contributes 
more effi  ciently as a tool for economic adaptation 
when agricultural subsidies are eliminated. Th e global 
economic welfare gains are nearly six times greater 
when subsidies are completely eliminated, because 
large subsidies to agriculture exacerbate ineffi  ciencies 
in the global agricultural system.40 
However, other studies demonstrating that agricultural 
trade opening can increase greenhouse gas emissions 
should not be discounted. A recent paper by Verburg 
et al. (2008), for example, employs the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) computable general 
equilibrium model, together with the Integrated 
Model to Assess the Global Environment (IMAGE), 
to simulate the long-term consequences on global 
emission levels of removing all trade barriers in 
agriculture, particularly in the milk-livestock sector. 
Th e study fi rst establishes a baseline: the “business as 
usual” scenario. According to this baseline, by 2050, 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane and nitrous oxide 
(N2O) emissions will be 63 per cent, 33 per cent and 
20 per cent higher, respectively, than their levels in 2000. 
Th e authors simulate various trade opening scenarios. 
Full agricultural trade opening would add an extra 
50 per cent of CO2 emissions to the baseline scenario 
by 2015. Th is initial increase in emissions would, 
however, decrease over time, so that CO2 emissions 
in 2050 would be 30 per cent lower compared to the 
baseline. Full liberalization would lead to an additional 
1.7 per cent of N2O emissions by 2015, but this would 
later fall, so that by 2050 N2O emissions would be 
equal to the baseline. Methane is the only emission 
which would have increased, by an extra 5 per cent over 
the baseline level, in 2050. Despite these complicated 
evolutions over time, the authors suggest that the full 
liberalization scenario would lead to a small overall 
increase in greenhouse gases by 2050.41 
Given the uncertainties about the impact of climate 
change on yields across regions and the long time-
scales involved in these simulations, the results of these 
studies should not by any means be seen as forecasts 
or predictions. Nevertheless, they serve to underline 
the means by which international trade can assist 
economies to adjust to changes which may occur in 
the inter-regional location of agricultural production 
as a result of climate change. 
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Possible impact of climate C. 
change on trade
So far, the discussion has been about how trade can 
aff ect greenhouse gas emissions, help mitigate climate 
change, or assist countries in adapting to future 
warming. But the link between trade and climate 
change is not only in one direction, since the physical 
processes associated with climate change can also aff ect 
the pattern and volume of international trade fl ows. 
Th is discussion will be short, given that few studies 
have considered this specifi c linkage to trade and more 
detailed information on the eff ects of climate change is 
contained in Section I.A.
Th ere appear to be two likely eff ects of climate change 
on international trade. First, climate change may alter 
countries’ comparative advantages and lead to shifts 
in the pattern of international trade. Th is eff ect will 
be stronger on those countries whose comparative 
advantage stems from climatic or geophysical reasons. 
Countries or regions that are more reliant on agriculture 
may experience a reduction in exports if future warming 
and more frequent extreme weather events result in a 
reduction in crop yields. 
Warming need not always produce negative impacts on 
exports, since it may succeed in increasing agricultural 
yields in other regions. Th ese climate change eff ects 
will not necessarily be confi ned to trade in merchandise 
goods but might extend to trade in services as well. 
Many tourist destinations rely on natural assets – 
beaches, clear seas, tropical climate, or abundant 
snowfall, for example – to attract holiday-makers. A 
rise in sea levels or changes in weather patterns might 
deprive countries of these natural assets. It could be 
argued, of course, that comparative advantage is 
never permanent. Technological breakthroughs, shifts 
in consumer preferences and changes in economic 
policies constantly buff et economies and alter the 
relative economic strengths of nations and overall 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, to the extent that climate 
change impacts may occur abruptly or that countries 
may be inadequately prepared, these adjustments can 
prove costly. In this context, international trade may 
become an important means of adapation.
Second, climate change may increase the vulnerability 
of the supply, transport and distribution chains 
upon which international trade depends. Th e Fourth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC refers to some 
of these vulnerabilities (Wilbanks et al., 2007a). 
Extreme weather events (such as hurricanes) may 
temporarily close ports or transport routes and damage 
infrastructure critical to trade. Transportation routes 
in permafrost zones may be negatively aff ected by 
higher temperatures, which would shorten the length 
of time that roads would be passable during winters. 
Coastal infrastructure and distribution facilities are 
vulnerable to fl ood damage. Transportation of bulk 
freight by inland waterways, such as the Rhine, could 
be disrupted during droughts. Disruptions to the 
supply, transport and distribution chains would raise 
the costs of undertaking international trade. While an 
increase in trade costs would be bad for trade in general, 
many developing countries whose integration into the 
global economy has depended on their participation 
in international production chains may be more 
vulnerable than developed countries. 
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Endnotes
1  See, for instance, Markusen (1975a and 1975b), Bui (1993 and 
1998), Barrett (1997) and Nordhaus (1997). 
2  See Table A1 of WTO (2008b).
3  Based on calculations using Table A1 of WTO (2008b) and Table F-5 
in Maddison (2001).
4  WTO (2008c), p. 15.
5  WTO Press/520/Rev.1.
6  Th ere are other assessment approaches or methodologies that have 
been employed to study the environmental impact of trade agreements. 
See, for example, UNEP (2001), the Commission on Environmental 
Cooperation (CEC, 1999a, 1999e), and the European Communities’ 
sustainability impact assessment (Kirkpatrick et al, 2002). Some of 
the results of these methodologies will be discussed in the section on 
environmental assessment of trade agreements. 
7 Th e economy’s scale (SA) prior to liberalization can be defi ned as: 
SA = Σi
Npi
Axi
A where pi
A is the world price and xi
A is the volume of 
production of product i before liberalization. Th e summation is to be 
taken over all N goods produced in the economy. Th e economy’s scale 
after liberalization is SF = Σi
Npi
Axi
F  where xi
F is the volume of production 
of product i after liberalization. Th e scale eff ect is represented by 
the percentage change in S following liberalization with the 
pre-liberalization world prices pi
A being used to value the new level 
of domestic production. Th us, the scale eff ect is equal to 
100*[(SF / SA) - 1] = 100*{[Σi
N (pi
Axi
F) / Σi
N (pi
Axi
A)]-1}.
8  In the standard textbook treatment of trade liberalization, it is often 
assumed that all factors of production are fully employed. In this case, the 
scale eff ect will refl ect changes to the composition of output in response 
to trade opening. 
9  Th is insight follows from both the traditional growth theory (Solow, 
1956) and the new growth theory (Romer, 1986; 1990). While the 
traditional growth theory does not explain how technological progress 
comes about, the new theory makes the acquisition of technological 
know-how, through R&D for example, an integral part of the growth 
model.
10  Th is literature includes, among others, Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
(1991), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Peretto (2003) and Aghion et 
al. (2005). 
11  Copeland and Taylor (2004) distinguish between the pollution-haven 
eff ect and the pollution-haven hypothesis. Th e pollution-haven eff ect states 
that diff erences in environmental regulations among countries aff ect 
trade fl ows and production-plant location decisions. Th e pollution-haven 
hypothesis predicts that countries with weaker environmental regulations 
will specialize in the polluting industries. Th us, the pollution-haven 
hypothesis is a stronger form of the pollution-haven eff ect, since the latter 
allows for specialization to continue to be determined by comparative 
advantage.
12  In economics, normal goods are any goods for which demand 
increases when income increases.
13  Although there is evidence of rising income inequality in industrial 
countries, this does not appear to be linked to greater trade openness 
(Borjas et al., 1997; Feenstra and Hanson, 1999; Acemoglu, 2002): a 
far bigger role is played by skill-biased technological change (Bound and 
Johnson, 1992; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Haskel and Slaughter, 
2002; Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008). Skill-biased technological change 
refers to technological change that increases the demand for skilled workers 
relative to unskilled workers. In developing countries, the evidence of 
trade leading to greater income inequality is less clear. In some regions 
(east Asia), trade openness appeared to have resulted in signifi cant income 
gains and reductions in inequality (Wood, 1999). In other regions (Latin 
America), evidence suggests that trade liberalization has coincided with 
an increase in both income inequality and wage inequality between high- 
and low-skilled workers (Harrison and Hanson, 1999; Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2007). 
14  Trade-weighted measures of the depth of liberalization yield similar 
results.
15  Th e Grossman and Krueger study concludes that NAFTA was not 
likely to worsen air pollution in Mexico. Mexico had already reached 
the income threshold of the environmental Kuznets curve, which they 
calculate at US$ 5,000; thus, the technique eff ect suggested that demand 
for better environmental quality would increase. Th ey used a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the composition and 
scale eff ects of NAFTA for Mexico. Although NAFTA was expected to 
increase Mexico’s welfare in the order of between 0.9 and 1.6 per cent 
of gross domestic product (GDP), the composition eff ect would result 
in the expansion of Mexico’s labour-intensive industries (which were less 
polluting) relative to its capital-intensive sectors. Overall, it was predicted 
that the composition and technique eff ects would off set the scale eff ect.
16  Th e Antweiller, Copeland and Taylor study of sulphur dioxide 
emissions uses a far larger sample of 40 developed and developing 
countries. Th ey estimate an elasticity of between 0.25 and 0.5 for the 
scale eff ect and an elasticity of between −1.25 and −1.5 for the technique 
eff ect (in other words, a 1 per cent increase in GDP would increase 
emissions by between 0.25 to 0.5 per cent for an average country in 
their sample, but the accompanying 1 per cent increase in income would 
reduce emissions by between 1.25 and 1.5 per cent. As expected, the 
composition eff ect varies from country to country, according to each 
country’s relative income and resources. For an average country in their 
sample, however, the composition eff ect is negative.
17  Th is study breaks down world-wide sulphur dioxide emissions for 
the period 1990-2000 into the scale, composition and technique eff ects. 
It fi nds that the scale eff ects are dominated by technique eff ects (in 
other words, a large enough increase in the use of emission-reduction 
technologies counters increased emissions from expanded production) 
which helps explain the global fall in sulphur dioxide emissions.
18  Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation assumes that the explanatory 
variables in a regression are uncorrelated (not statistically related) to the 
error term. However, this would not be the case if trade openness is 
determined simultaneously with income and environmental outcomes. 
In this case, OLS estimates will yield-biased and inconsistent estimates of 
the coeffi  cient on the explanatory variable, e.g. the wrong conclusion may 
be drawn about the relationship between openness and CO2 emissions. 
Th e instrumental variable (IV) technique introduces another variable 
(the instrument), which is directly related to the explanatory variable 
(openness) but not to the error term. Th e use of this technique will 
produce unbiased and consistent estimates of the coeffi  cient on openness, 
thus enabling the correct interpretation to be made about the relationship 
between trade and CO2 emissions.
19  Panel data refer to data which varies across several dimensions – in 
this case over time and across countries. McCarney and Adamowicz also 
test the relationship between trade liberalization and biochemical oxygen 
demand (BOD) but, since this is not a greenhouse gas, their results for 
this environmental indicator are not discussed.
20  Managi et al use a dynamic Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) 
approach for their study. Th e GMM estimator is often used in lieu of 
Instrumental Variables if the error terms are heteroskedastic (the variance 
of the error term is not constant). For a description of GMM estimators, 
see for instance Hayashi (2000), pp. 186-322. 
21  Th is total is as of February 2009. It is broken down as follows: a) 178 
RTAs in force have been notifi ed to the WTO under either Article XXIV 
of the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (GATT) 1994 or the 
Enabling Clause of 1979 and b) 65 RTAs in force have been notifi ed 
under Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
22  In 1999, the Canadian government issued a Cabinet Directive on 
the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals. 
Th e directive requires a strategic environmental assessment to be carried 
out whenever a policy, plan or programme proposal is submitted to an 
individual minister or the cabinet for approval, and where implementation 
of the proposal may result in important environmental eff ects, either 
positive or negative. Canada’s environmental assessment framework for 
trade negotiations was fi nalized in February 2001 (Canada, 2001). 
23  In anticipation of the Th ird WTO Ministerial Conference in 
1999, the European Commission prepared a strategy paper outlining 
its approach for the negotiations. Th at paper, which was presented to 
both the European Council and the European Parliament, contained 
a number of ideas which deserve attention because they explain the 
European Commission’s approach to sustainability impact assessments. 
Environmental considerations were to be integrated into the European 
Union’s approach and addressed throughout the negotiations, so as to 
achieve an outcome where environmentally friendly consequences could 
be identifi ed in the fi nal package. In 1999, the European Commission 
contracted the University of Manchester’s Institute for Development 
Policy and Management, in collaboration with a number of other 
institutions, to carry out a sustainability impact assessment (SIA) of 
WTO trade negotiations. Th e SIA methodology was fi nalized by the 
contractors in April 2002 (Kirkpatrick, Lee, Curran, Franklin, George 
and Nomura, 2002). While most approaches set out to investigate the 
environmental impacts of trade agreements, the European Commission 
framework is more ambitious, since it also examines the sustainability 
impact of trade and includes not only EU members, but other countries 
as well. 
24  In November 1999, President Clinton signed Executive Order 
13141, which committed the US to ongoing assessment and evaluation 
of the environmental impacts of certain trade agreements. Th e agreements 
to be covered by a review include multilateral trade rounds, bilateral or 
plurilateral free trade agreements and trade liberalization agreements in 
natural resource sectors. While the focus of the environmental review 
is the impact on the US, the reviews may also examine global and 
transboundary eff ects if that is deemed to be appropriate and prudent. 
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Th e guidelines for the implementation of Executive Order 13141 were 
fi nalized in December 2000 (US Trade Representative, 2000).
25  Th ese studies were conducted for the European Union by the 
University of Manchester research consortium.
26  Th e study was commissioned by the United Kingdom’s Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Aff airs (DEFRA). It estimated 
that, in 2004, emissions embodied in UK imports were 374 million 
tonnes of CO2, while emissions embodied in UK exports amounted to 
242.2 million tonnes of CO2. UK consumer emissions amounted to 
762.4 million tonnes of CO2, and were greater than producer emissions 
which accounted for 630.6 million tonnes of CO2. Th ese fi gures imply 
that imports accounted for between 49 per cent and 59 per cent of 
UK emissions of CO2 for consumption and production, respectively. 
27  However, in the case of developing countries, such as China, the 
interest is not in the carbon emissions embodied in their imports but in 
those embodied in their exports. See Weber et al (2008), who examine 
the contribution of Chinese exports to climate change. 
28  See UNCTAD (2007b). 
29  See Lloyd’s Maritime Intelligence Unit (MIU) (2007) at 
www.lloydsmiu.com.
30  Th is is based on data from IATA (2007). However, if one were to 
measure this expansion solely by tonnage so as to make it comparable 
with seaborne transport, air cargo volume only rose by 7.5 per cent 
between 1972 and 2004.
31  Th e International Energy Agency estimated that, in 2004, transport 
was responsible for 23 per cent of world energy-related greenhouse gas 
emissions. See IEA (2006c).
32  See Kahn Ribeiro et al. (2007) for the share of road transport. 
Information on the share of air transport comes from the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA) at www.iata.org.
33  A second phase covering other greenhouse gases is scheduled to be 
completed in April 2009.
34  Gross tonnes (GT) is a measure of the overall size of a ship. Tonnage 
measurements are governed by the IMO’s International Convention 
on Tonnage Measurement of Ships (1969), which entered into force on 
18 July 1982. Th e gross tonnage is a function of the moulded volume of 
all enclosed spaces of the ship. 
35  See Table 55 of IMO (2008).
36  See Table 48 of IMO (2008).
37  See Table 47 of IMO (2008).
38  See OECD (2005), page 27.
39  Goulder and Schneider (1999) appear to be making a similar point 
when they argue that climate policies will bias technical change towards 
emission saving technologies.
40  Th e scenario which involves the absence of agricultural border 
distortions (e.g. tariff s) and domestic subsidies results in welfare gains 
of US$ 6.9 billion (in 1992 dollars). A similar scenario, which however 
includes domestic subsidies, generates net economic welfare gains of only 
US$ 1.2 billion (in 1992 dollars).
41  Th e authors provide the following explanation for the complicated 
evolution over time of greenhouse gas emissions. Th e greenhouse gases 
produced by agriculture have three components: CO2, methane and N2O, 
each with its own cause and emitter. CO2 is caused by vegetation clearance 
(burning of natural vegetation) during the expansion of agricultural areas. 
Th is occurs mainly in South America and Asia. Full liberalization would 
cause current agricultural production taking place in North America and 
Europe (mainly beef and dairy farming) to move to new production areas 
in South America and Asia. As a result, these former agricultural areas 
would be abandoned and re-growth of natural vegetation (mainly forests) 
would occur. Th is would lead to a global decrease in CO2 emissions 
later during the simulation, because these new forest areas would absorb 
carbon dioxide. Methane is mostly emitted by ruminants (dairy and beef 
cows). One of the fi rst impacts of liberalization would be the relocation 
of this production to South America and Asia. However, the agricultural 
system in these regions is mostly “extensive” or pastoral (i.e. large areas 
and minimal capital and labour input, producing low yields). Because of 
these low yields, more cows need to be fed in these extensive systems to 
meet a given demand for meat. Subsequently, these systems become more 
intensive and fewer cows would be needed. In the case of N2O, manure 
of all animal types plays an important part. Unlike cattle farming, pigs 
and poultry (which constitute the largest part of livestock) are always 
managed in intensive agricultural systems. Th e relocation of production 
due to liberalization would not signifi cantly aff ect the number of animals, 
since the world demand is assumed to remain constant, and this would 
cause only a small change in global N2O emissions between the baseline 
and projected scenarios.
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Multilateral action to reduce A. 
greenhouse gas emissions
An international response to climate change is essential, 
given its global nature.1 As early as 1972, in the Stockholm 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, the importance of international 
cooperation “to eff ectively control, prevent, reduce 
and eliminate adverse environmental eff ects” was 
recognized.2 Th is call for international cooperation to 
address environmental challenges was reiterated during 
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (commonly referred to as the “Earth 
Summit”).3 
Th e Earth Summit proved to be groundbreaking on 
many fronts: it was one of the fi rst global dialogues on 
sustainable development, and led to the signing of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. 
Among other things, the Rio Declaration identifi ed a 
clear link between sustainable development, economic 
growth and environmental protection, and called on 
countries to “cooperate to promote a supportive and 
open international economic system that would lead 
to economic growth and sustainable development 
in all countries, to better address the problems of 
environmental degradation”.4 
Th e Earth Summit was also crucial from a climate 
change perspective, as it led to the adoption of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) – the fi rst global eff ort to address 
climate change. Although the UNFCCC, which 
entered into force in March 1994, represented a 
groundbreaking response to climate change by creating 
a general framework for action, it did not create legally 
binding commitments for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.
In view of this, and as scientifi c consensus and alarm 
regarding climate change grew during the years 
following the Earth Summit, there were increased calls 
for a supplementary agreement with legally binding 
commitments for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.5 
Th is increased political momentum ultimately led to 
the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. 
Th e Kyoto Protocol requires industrialized countries to 
meet agreed levels of emission reductions over an initial 
commitment period that runs from 2008 to 2012. Th e 
exact amount of emission reduction commitments 
varies for each country, but the total collective 
commitment represents the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions to at least 5 per cent less than their 1990 
levels in these industrialized countries.6 
Th e challenge now facing climate change negotiators 
is to agree on a multilateral response to climate change 
once the Kyoto Protocol’s fi rst commitment period has 
expired (i.e. in the “post-2012” period). Given this, 
current negotiations are broadly focused on issues such 
as the extent to which industrialized countries should 
reduce their emissions in the post-2012 period, and 
the level of technological and fi nancial support that 
developed countries should provide to developing 
economies in order to help them participate in 
mitigating, and adapting to, global climate change. 
Framework Convention on 1. 
Climate Change
Although scientifi c discussions about human-induced 
climate change date back more than a century, it was 
not until the 1980s that the international community 
started to actively focus on the issue.7 In 1988, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) was launched by the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) to undertake the 
fi rst authoritative assessment of climate science. When 
the IPCC’s fi rst report came out in 1990, it confi rmed 
the serious threat that climate change represents, and 
called for a global treaty to address the challenge.8 
Th e IPCC report catalysed governmental support for 
international negotiations on climate change, which 
began in February 1991 with the fi rst meeting of 
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for 
a Framework Convention on Climate Change, and 
concluded in 1992 with the adoption of the UNFCCC 
at the Earth Summit.9 Th e Convention entered into 
force on 21 March 1994,10 and has been ratifi ed by 192 
countries.11 
Part III: Multilateral Work Related to Climate Change
69
Pa
rt
 I
Pa
rt
 II
Pa
rt
 II
I
Pa
rt
 IV
Principlesa) 
Th e “ultimate objective” of the UNFCCC is the 
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference (i.e. resulting from human 
activity) with the climate system.”12 Th e Convention 
elaborates a number of principles to guide parties in 
reaching this objective: for instance, the Convention 
calls on parties to employ a “precautionary approach” 
to climate change: 
“Parties should take precautionary measures to 
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate 
change and mitigate its adverse eff ects. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientifi c certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures...”.13
Th e UNFCCC also refl ects the principle of “common 
but diff erentiated responsibilities,” which recognizes 
that even though all countries have a responsibility to 
address climate change, they have not all contributed 
to the same extent to causing the problem, nor are they 
all equally equipped to address it.14 Accordingly, the 
Convention places the initial burden of greenhouse 
gas emission reductions on the most industrialized 
countries, given their disproportionate contribution 
to climate change since the beginning of the industrial 
revolution. 
Moreover, the Convention explicitly states that “[t]he 
specifi c needs and special circumstances of developing 
country Parties”, especially those that would bear 
a “disproportionate or abnormal burden under the 
Convention, should be given full consideration”.15 
Th is concept is further refl ected in several UNFCCC 
provisions that require developed countries to provide 
assistance, particularly additional fi nancing, to enable 
mitigation measures to be taken by developing 
countries. 
Th ere is also an implicit recognition that responding 
to climate change may entail substantial costs. In order 
to minimize the economic costs of mitigating climate 
change, the Convention calls for all policies and measures 
that deal with climate change to “be cost-eff ective so as 
to ensure global benefi ts at the lowest possible cost”.16 
Closely linked to this “cost-eff ectiveness” principle, the 
UNFCCC also refl ects an “open economy” principle, 
which calls for parties to “promote a supportive and 
open international economic system” that will lead to 
COUNTRY 
GROUP ANNEX I ANNEX II NON-ANNEX I
Members Industrialized countries (all • 
24 members of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation 
and Development in 1992, 
14 economies in transition (EITs), 
Monaco, Liechtenstein)22 and the 
European Union23
Industrialized countries • 
(only 23 of the OECD 
members in 1992)24 and the 
European Union
Developing countries• 25
Mitigation Adopt policies and measures • 
with the aim of reducing their 
2000 greenhouse gas emissions to 
1990 levels
EITs have “fl exibility” in • 
implementing commitments
Provide fi nancial resources • 
to enable developing 
countries to mitigate climate 
change
Promote and facilitate • 
technology transfer to EITs 
and non-Annex I parties
Th e Conference of the Parties • 
(COP) identifi es activities to address 
non-Annex I needs and concerns
No quantitative obligations• 
Least-developed countries given • 
special consideration
Adaptation Plan, implement, and publish • 
strategies of integrating adaptation 
to climate change in development
Assist developing countries • 
to adapt to climate change
Plan, implement, and publish • 
strategies of integrating adaptation 
to climate change in development
TABLE 1.  Country groups and obligation diff erentiations under the UNFCCC
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sustainable economic development.17 Th e principle 
also suggests that measures focused on climate 
change “should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifi able discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade”,18 thus refl ecting a main principle 
contained in WTO agreements.19
Finally, the Convention supports the principle of 
“promoting sustainable development”, which is based 
on the idea that each party to the Convention should 
be free to tailor its response to climate change and to 
adopt measures which are appropriate for continuing 
economic development under its own national 
development strategy.20 
Obligationsb) 
Th e principles discussed above are refl ected in the 
specifi c commitments made by UNFCCC parties 
to stabilize their greenhouse gas concentrations. For 
instance, in keeping with the above-mentioned principle 
of common but diff erentiated responsibilities, the 
Convention divides countries into Annex I countries 
(industrialized nations, Russia and a number of eastern 
European countries), Annex II countries (only the most 
industrialized countries) and non-Annex I countries 
(developing countries).21 Each group of countries is 
assigned a particular set of commitments with regard to 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation 
to the impacts of climate change. Th ese commitments 
are summarized in Table 1. 
Th e Convention commits Annex I parties to adopt 
national policies and take measures to mitigate climate 
change, with the aim of returning to their 1990 
emission levels.26 Th e Kyoto Protocol (described in 
greater detail below) builds on this goal of returning 
to 1990 emission levels, and imposes legally binding 
commitments on Annex I Parties. 
Under the UNFCCC, parties also agree to sustainably 
manage the carbon sinks (such as forests and oceans) 
which absorb greenhouse gases27 and to cooperate 
in preparing for the eff ects of climate change, with 
particular emphasis on preparing coastal zones and 
on management of water resources.28 Parties agree to 
participate and cooperate in research on and assessment 
of climate change risks,29 and to exchange “scientifi c, 
technological, technical, socio-economic and legal 
information”.30 Moreover, parties to the UNFCCC 
agree to take account of climate change concerns 
when formulating national “social, economic and 
environmental policies and actions”.31 
In order to ensure that the commitments are being 
met, all parties have an obligation to “[d]evelop, 
periodically update, publish and make available to 
the Conference of the Parties ... national inventories 
of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by 
the Montreal Protocol”.32 Th is requirement to report 
such information is the primary means of monitoring 
compliance with the Convention. Parties must also 
“[f ]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update 
national and, where appropriate, regional programmes 
containing measures to mitigate climate change … and 
measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate 
change”.33 
Th ere are a number of provisions requiring developed 
countries to assist developing countries in meeting their 
obligations.34 In fact, the participation of developing 
country parties in greenhouse gas emission reductions 
is explicitly linked to fi nancial support and technology 
transfer from developed country parties.35 For instance, 
developed country parties are required to provide 
fi nancial assistance to help developing country parties 
fulfi l the obligation to update and report their national 
greenhouse gas emission inventories.36 Moreover, 
developed country parties are required to assist those 
developing country parties that are especially vulnerable 
to climate change with the costs of adaptation,37 and 
must “take all practicable steps” to assist in the transfer 
of any technology and knowledge which would 
facilitate compliance with the Convention.38 
As developing countries become the source of an 
increasingly larger percentage of the total greenhouse 
gas emissions, the question of how to engage them 
in mitigation eff orts and how to ensure suffi  ciently 
measurable, reportable and verifi able fi nancial support 
and technology transfer from developed countries has 
become a central issue in the negotiations for a new 
post-2012 climate regime. 
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The Kyoto Protocol 2. 
As noted above, the UNFCCC establishes the overall 
framework for international eff orts to tackle the 
challenges posed by climate change, and includes 
mainly voluntary provisions encouraging national 
actions and increased international cooperation to 
stabilize greenhouse gas emissions. Although the 
UNFCCC contains commitments to report on 
national emissions and to off er fi nancial assistance, it 
does not specify binding quantifi ed emission limits or 
reduction commitments. 
Drawing on the positive experience of the negotiations 
for the Montreal Protocol (1988),39 which provides 
legally binding commitments regarding ozone-
depleting substances, UNFCCC parties began 
exploring the development of a legal instrument that 
would include legally binding greenhouse gas emission 
reduction targets for Annex I parties. At the 1995 
meeting of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 
(COP) in Berlin, Germany, parties formally agreed to 
negotiate such a commitment in the form of a protocol 
or other legal instrument.40 Th e result of this initiative 
was the Kyoto Protocol, which was signed in late 1997 
at the UNFCCC COP meeting in Kyoto, Japan.41 
Although the Protocol was signed in 1997, in order 
to enter into force it had to be ratifi ed by at least 55 
parties to the Convention, whose total emissions 
would account for at least 55 per cent of the global 
carbon dioxide emissions of Annex I parties in 1990, 
the agreed base year.42 Negotiations on the specifi c 
rules and procedures for implementing the Protocol 
continued for another four years after its signature. 
Th ese negotiations fi nally culminated in 2001 at the 
7th Meeting of the UNFCCC COP in Marrakesh, 
Morocco, where parties agreed on a comprehensive 
rulebook for implementing the Kyoto Protocol.43 
Th e “Marrakesh Accords” provided the impetus for 
widespread ratifi cation of the Protocol, which eventually 
entered into force in February 2005. Currently, a total 
of 183 individual countries and one regional economic 
integration organization (the European Community) 
have deposited instruments of ratifi cation, acceptance, 
approval or accession to the Kyoto Protocol. Th e 
Annex I parties that have ratifi ed, or otherwise acceded 
to the Protocol, currently represent 63.7 per cent of 
the total carbon dioxide emissions for Annex I parties 
in 1990.44 
Obligations a) 
Th e Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I countries to 
collectively reduce their emissions of the six main 
greenhouse gases (i.e. carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, hydrofl uorocarbons, perfl uorocarbons, and 
sulphur hexafl uoride) to at least 5 per cent less than 
1990 emission levels.45 Th is target must be achieved 
over the fi ve-year period from 2008 to 2012.46 
However, not all Annex I parties are required to reduce 
their emissions by the same amount. Rather, this 
overall target is refl ected as specifi c emission reduction 
targets that vary for each of the Annex I parties.47 In 
addition to these binding commitments on emission 
reductions, the Kyoto Protocol also includes detailed 
requirements on reporting for Annex I parties,48 and 
contains provisions on developed-country fi nancial 
and technological assistance that are similar to the 
obligations under the UNFCCC.
Binding emission targetsi) 
Emission targets for Annex I countries vary considerably 
(See Table 2). Th ese targets are expressed as percentage 
reductions, or as caps on increases, based on each party’s 
greenhouse gas emission levels in 1990, which must be 
met over the 2008-2012 commitment period.49 
Th e Protocol allows two or more countries to jointly 
fulfi l their commitments provided that their overall 
combined emissions are not greater than their total 
reduction commitments.52 Th is is commonly referred 
to as an emission reduction “bubble”. Th e group of 
15 countries which formed the EU member states 
in 1990 represents the only group of countries to 
date to participate in this scheme by subdividing its 
overall target of −8% into diff erent targets for each 
participating member state (See Figure 1).53 
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Reporting requirements and other ii) 
obligations
Like the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol includes 
detailed reporting requirements for Annex I parties 
as a tool for assessing compliance.54 For instance, 
the Protocol requires Annex I parties to “have in 
place, no later than one year prior to the start of the 
fi rst commitment period, a national system for the 
estimation” of greenhouse gas emissions and carbon 
sinks.55 A national system is defi ned by the Marrakesh 
Accords as “all institutional, legal and procedural 
arrangements ... for estimating anthropogenic emissions 
by sources and removal by sinks ... and for reporting 
and archiving inventory information”.56 
Other important obligations set out in the Protocol 
include: 
an obligation to formulate, to the extent possible, • 
national and regional programmes containing 
measures to mitigate climate change and facilitate 
adaptation to climate change;57
requirements for developed countries to provide • 
fi nancial and technological support to developing 
countries in order to help them implement their 
reporting and other obligations under the UNFCCC 
and Kyoto Protocol;58 and
a commitment from developed countries to • 
implement policies and measures that, among 
other things, enhance energy effi  ciency in relevant 
sectors, protect and enhance carbon sinks, promote 
sustainable forms of agriculture, develop and promote 
renewable forms of energy, and reduce and phase-
out market imperfections (i.e. taxes and subsidies) in 
greenhouse gas emitting sectors.59
Source: European Environment Agency, 2005.
Spain + 15.0%
Greece  + 25.0%
Portugal    + 27.0%
Ireland    + 13.0%
Sweden   + 4.0%
France 0%
Finland   0%
Luxembourg     - 28.0%
Austria     - 13.0%
Belgium     - 7.5%
Netherlands      - 6.0%
Denmark     - 21.0%
Italy     - 6.5%
United Kingdom     - 12.5%
Germany     - 21.0%
GHG emissions (MtCO2-equivalent)
- 300 - 250 - 200 - 150 - 100 - 50 0 + 50 + 100
FIGURE 1. Burden sharing among EU-15 countries of the Kyoto reduction commitment
Source: Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol
TABLE 2. Emission reduction targets in the Kyoto 
Protocol for Annex I countries – arranged by percentage 
of reduction
COUNTRIES TARGET 
(1990-2008/2012)
EU-15,50 Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Switzerland 
−8%
United States 51 −7%
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland −6%
Croatia −5%
New Zealand, Russia, Ukraine 0
Norway +1%
Australia +8%
Iceland +10%
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Key provisionsb) 
Th e Kyoto Protocol includes a number of provisions 
which are intended to help parties meet their 
obligations and to ensure compliance. In particular, 
the three “fl exibility mechanisms” (Emission Trading, 
Joint Implementation, and the Clean Development 
Mechanism) are generally acknowledged to be a 
unique feature of the Protocol, as they provide parties 
with the possibility of meeting their obligations in the 
most cost-eff ective manner.60 Moreover, the Protocol’s 
compliance mechanism is considered to be among 
the most comprehensive and rigorous of the existing 
multilateral environmental agreements.61
Flexibility mechanismsi) 
Th e Kyoto Protocol includes three “fl exibility 
mechanisms” that give Annex I parties freedom to 
fi nd the most inexpensive method for reducing their 
emissions.62 By providing three alternative methods to 
meet targets, the Protocol relieves the burden of meeting 
targets only by means of national greenhouse gas 
emission reductions, and instead allows parties to seek 
the lowest-cost ways of achieving reductions consistent 
with the UNFCCC principle of cost eff ectiveness.
To participate in these fl exibility mechanisms, 
parties must fulfi l strict eligibility requirements and 
obligations, including ratifi cation of the Protocol, 
establishment of the level of emission reductions to be 
achieved, maintenance of a national inventory system 
and national registries, and submission of annual 
inventories.63 A more detailed discussion of each of the 
three fl exibility mechanisms follows.
Emission Trading 
Emission trading, as set out in the Kyoto Protocol, 
allows countries that have emission units “to spare” – 
i.e. countries whose emission levels are lower than their 
permitted limit – to sell this excess to countries that are 
over their targets.64 
Emission trading is a classic example of a cap-and-trade 
scheme designed to ensure that the overall target, or cap, 
is maintained, while allowing for internal fl exibility. 
Th is system has led to the creation of an “international 
carbon market” – so named because carbon dioxide 
represents the principal greenhouse gas. It is estimated 
that the global carbon market in 2009 will grow by 
20 per cent in terms of volume to 5.9 GtCO2-eq as 
compared to 4.9 GtCO2-eq in 2008.
65 Th e Protocol’s 
emission trading scheme is not limited to the allowable 
emissions within the overall cap for Annex I Parties. It 
also includes trade in emission credits from activities 
such as reforestation, generated from developing 
countries under the Clean Development Mechanism, 
which is discussed below. 
Joint Implementation 
Th e Joint Implementation fl exibility mechanism allows 
a Kyoto Protocol Annex I country to invest in emission 
reduction or emission removal projects in another 
Annex I country, and thus to earn emission reduction 
units (ERUs), which can be counted towards meeting 
its emission target.66 Joint Implementation is seen as 
mutually benefi cial for the participants, as it allows 
the investing country to ensure a cost-effi  cient means 
of fulfi lling part of its Kyoto commitments, while the 
host party benefi ts from foreign investment, from the 
potential for technology transfer and from selling a 
share of the agreed national emission allowance. 
Th e approval process for Joint Implementation projects 
may follow one of two diff erent “tracks” depending on 
how the emission reductions are verifi ed. Under the 
Joint Implementation “Track 1” process, the host party 
itself (i.e. the country where the emission reduction 
project is situated) may verify the emission reductions 
and issue the appropriate quantity of emission 
reduction units, provided it meets certain eligibility 
requirements, such as having in place a national system 
for estimating greenhouse gas emissions and removals 
by carbon sinks.67
Parties which are unable to meet all the eligibility 
requirements, however, must use a “Track 2” process, 
and seek external verifi cation from the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee 
(JISC) or from an accredited and independent third 
party verifi er.68 Th us far, however, only one company 
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has been accredited as a third party verifi er of Joint 
Implementation Track 2 projects.69 
As of 18 February 2009, there had been 30 Track 1 and 
170 Track 2 projects submitted for public comment, 
which is the fi rst step in the approval and verifi cation 
process.70 It has been estimated that the 170 Track 2 
projects alone could yield around 300 million tonnes 
of emission reductions by 2012.71 However, there is 
only one project to date – a Track 2 project – that has 
received fi nal approval and verifi cation.72 Th e project 
involves a cement plant in Ukraine which is expected to 
produce more than 3 million tonnes of carbon credits 
from 2009 to 2012. Th ese credits will be purchased by 
an Irish company.73 
Clean Development Mechanism 
Similar to Joint Implementation, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) allows a country 
with greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments 
to meet its obligations by implementing emission 
reduction projects in another country.74 Unlike Joint 
Implementation projects, however, CDM involves 
projects between a developed and a developing country, 
rather than between two Annex I countries. 
Another major diff erence between these two types 
of fl exibility mechanism is that developing countries 
do not have emission reduction targets, and thus the 
emission reductions obtained through CDM projects 
(known as certifi ed emission reductions (“CERs”)) 
are not deducted from an emission allowance in the 
country where the project is located. 
Th e CDM therefore requires that emission reductions 
be “additional” in the sense that they would not have 
occurred if the CDM project had not existed. Th is 
requirement for additional emission reductions is 
critical to the environmental integrity of the CDM. 
Typically, project sponsors are required to demonstrate 
that their project will lower emissions below a baseline 
estimate of emission levels in the absence of the 
CDM project.75 Th e Kyoto Protocol also requires that 
the projects qualify through a validation, registration, 
and issuance process overseen by the CDM Executive 
Board.76 
Use of the CDM has been steadily growing over the 
past few years. From October 2007 to September 2008, 
the CDM Executive Board received approximately 
160 requests per month to validate project activities, 
representing a 10 per cent increase over the previous 
year. Th ese validation requests refl ect a wide range 
of focus (about 60 per cent are renewable energy or 
energy-effi  ciency projects) and sizes (about 60 per 
cent are small-scale projects).77 As of end of May, the 
CDM has registered over 1,600 projects that are 
estimated to result in certifi ed emission reductions 
totalling over 1.5 GtCO2-eq by the end of the fi rst 
commitment period.78
Despite these achievements, concerns remain about 
the CDM, including whether many of the projects are 
indeed “additional”; and how the current situation – 
where the vast majority of projects have focused on 
only a few of the major developing countries – may 
be remedied.79 Concerns also remain about whether 
the CDM has enabled transfer of skills, know-how, 
information, capital and goods related to climate 
technologies. 
Although the CDM does not have an explicit technology 
transfer mandate, it may contribute to technology 
transfer by supporting projects that use technologies 
currently unavailable in the host countries.80 Since 
technology transfer is not compulsory for qualifi cation 
as a CDM project no easy way exists to measure the 
extent of technology transferred under the CDM.81 
However, a UNFCCC study analyzing claims of 
technology transfer made on CDM project design 
documents found that 33 per cent of the projects claim 
to involve technology transfer.82 Given that there is no 
common defi nition of technology transfer used by the 
project participants, the study was not able to ascertain 
whether the transfer involved equipment, knowledge, 
or a combination of both.83 
Compliance mechanismii) 
Th e Kyoto Protocol’s ultimate eff ectiveness depends 
on whether parties comply with their obligations. 
Th e Protocol’s mechanism to ensure compliance 
consists of an independent Compliance Committee 
made up of a facilitative branch and an enforcement 
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branch whose objective is to “facilitate, promote and 
enforce compliance with the commitments under 
the Protocol”.84 Th e compliance mechanism also 
includes mechanisms to generate information about 
performance, to facilitate compliance, and to deter 
non-compliance through penalties.85 
For instance, an Annex I party that fails to fulfi l its 
emission reduction target during the fi rst commitment 
period will have its amount of permitted carbon 
emissions reduced during the second commitment 
period by the amount of emissions necessary to bring 
it back into compliance, plus a penalty of a further 
reduction, equal to 30 per cent of the amount by which 
it exceeded its emission target.86 
In addition, a failure to meet eligibility requirements for 
the three fl exibility mechanisms, including the various 
reporting requirements, can result in a suspension 
of the right to participate in these mechanisms.87 
For example, in a recent case Greece’s eligibility to 
participate in fl exibility mechanisms was suspended 
because the country was found to be in violation 
of national reporting requirements.88 After Greece 
submitted a compliance plan and an annual report, the 
suspension on eligibility was lifted.89 
Achievementsc) 
Th e Kyoto Protocol represents a signifi cant step 
forward in the multilateral response to global climate 
change by creating specifi c and legally binding emission 
reduction commitments for industrialized countries. 
As the fi rst commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
has just begun, it is too early to determine the ultimate 
eff ectiveness of its provisions. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to consider its short-term impact on greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Figure 2 shows the relative changes in regulated 
greenhouse gas emissions (in per cent) from 1990 
to 2006 for three diff erent groups of Kyoto Annex I 
parties: all 40 Annex I parties; the 14 EIT parties in 
Annex I; and the 26 non-EIT parties of Annex I.90 
While the fi gure shows that emissions of all Annex I 
parties were 5.5 per cent lower in 2006 than in 1990 
when including emissions/removals from land use 
change and forestry (LULUCF), this result requires 
further elaboration.
As shown in Figure 2, emissions from non-EIT parties 
have increased by 9.1 per cent over 1990 levels. Th e 
EIT parties reached a total reduction in emissions of 
35 per cent, which was more a result of their economic 
transition towards market economies in the early 1990s 
when many of their heavy industries failed, rather than 
the result of activities to reduce emissions in accordance 
FIGURE 2. Greenhouse gas emissions by Annex I parties, 1990-2006
Source: UNFCCC, FCCC/SBI/2008/12 (17 November 2008).
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with the Kyoto Protocol.91 Moreover, greenhouse gas 
emissions worldwide increased by around 24 per cent 
between 1990 and 2004, despite action taken under 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.92
Many critics cite the net emission increases during this 
period as evidence of the failure of the Kyoto Protocol 
to achieve its goals.93 Th e Kyoto Protocol, however, was 
never intended to address global emissions, as it focuses 
on achieving emission reductions in the industrialized 
countries as a fi rst step. 
Velders et al. (2007b) calculate that the emission 
reduction target set by the Kyoto Protocol 
corresponds to 5.8 per cent of the 1990 baseline of 
18.4 GtCO2-eq, in other words a decrease of 
0.97 GtCO2-eq per year over the 2008-2012 period. 
If the emissions avoided since 1990 are added to those 
from the 2008-2012 period, they estimate that the 
Kyoto Protocol will actually result in a reduction of 
about 2 GtCO2-eq per year over the 2008-2012 period, 
or about 10 GtCO2-eq in total.
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Post-2012 UNFCCC and Kyoto 3. 
Protocol negotiations
In 2007, at the 13th UNFCCC Conference of Parties 
meeting in Bali, Indonesia, parties decided to launch 
the Bali Action Plan to “enable the full, eff ective and 
sustained implementation of the Convention through 
long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 
2012”.95 It was also decided that the Kyoto negotiating 
process, which began before the Bali meeting, and 
which focuses on further commitments of Annex I 
countries after the Kyoto Protocol’s fi rst commitment 
period expires, would continue as a separate and parallel 
negotiating process.96
As a result, climate negotiations for the post-2012 
period currently follow two tracks: the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations focused on commitments by Annex I 
parties, and the UNFCCC negotiations under the 
Bali Action Plan. Each track is represented by an 
ad hoc working group that oversees the ongoing 
negotiating process: the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
further commitments for Annex I parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) conducts the work for the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations; and the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-
LCA) oversees the UNFCCC negotiations. Th ese two 
negotiating groups are working to achieve agreement at 
the 15th UNFCCC Conference of the Parties meeting 
in December 2009, in Copenhagen, Denmark.
While the two working groups are not formally 
linked, the negotiations around them are closely 
intertwined. Th e following section briefl y assesses 
the progress under these two negotiation tracks, and 
discusses some of the key building blocks for a future 
agreement, while noting that this process is constantly 
evolving.
Kyoto Protocol negotiationsa) 
As noted above, the AWG-KP negotiations focus on 
achieving further emission reduction commitments 
for Annex I Kyoto Protocol parties. Early in the 
deliberations, there was broad agreement among 
parties that the cap and trade approach embodied in 
the Kyoto Protocol should be retained, but that the 
specifi c mechanisms would require further refi nement 
based on the lessons learned during the Protocol’s 
implementation, and also that any trading should be 
done as a supplement to domestic emission-reduction 
measures taken in Annex I countries.97 By the end of 
2008, the negotiations were still focused largely on 
the negotiating process itself, and no conclusions had 
been reached on the range of emission reductions to be 
undertaken by developed countries after 2012. 
Table 3 provides a summary of emission reductions 
required for Annex I and non-Annex I parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol under diff erent atmospheric carbon 
concentration scenarios. Th is illustrates the estimated 
levels of cuts necessary to stabilize carbon concentrations 
in the atmosphere. 
Th e scenario of 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2-eq has 
been mentioned by several parties as a possible starting 
point for considering new Annex I party emission 
reduction commitments.98 According to Table 3, this 
would require a reduction of approximately 25-40 per 
cent from 1990 levels. Th ere is currently, however, no 
consensus on this point.99
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Trade issues have also been raised in the context of the 
AWG-KP negotiations. In particular, the importance 
of considering the environmental, social and economic 
consequences, or spillover eff ects of tools, policies, 
measures and methodologies available to Annex I 
parties to achieve their commitments has been raised. 
Th e potential impact of tariff s and other measures 
aff ecting trade, such as taxes and trade-distorting 
subsidies, has been highlighted in this context.100 
UNFCCC negotiationsb) 
Th e UNFCCC negotiations, which, as noted above, 
are taking place within the AWG-LCA, are focused on 
key issues elaborated in the Bali Action Plan, including 
enhanced action on mitigation, adaptation, technology 
transfer, and the provision of fi nancial support. 
In terms of mitigation, the Bali Action Plan calls 
for measurable, reportable, and verifi able emission 
reduction commitments on the part of developed 
countries.101 It also calls for consideration of reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD), and sectoral approaches and sector-specifi c 
actions as potential mitigation measures.102 
Signifi cantly, the Bali Action Plan also considers, for 
the fi rst time, the involvement of developing countries 
in mitigation eff orts through “[n]ationally appropriate 
mitigation actions”, which are carried out in a 
sustainable development context and must be enabled 
by technology, fi nancing and capacity-building support 
that is measurable, reportable and verifi able.103 
In terms of adaptation, the Bali Action Plan suggests 
that measures for adapting to climate change should 
include international cooperation, especially in 
conducting assessments of vulnerability and fi nancial 
need, prioritizing actions, and implementing capacity 
building and response strategies.104 Th e needs of 
particularly vulnerable developing countries – such as 
small island nations and African nations susceptible 
to desertifi cation, drought, or fl ooding – must also 
be taken into account.105 Moreover, the Bali Action 
Plan calls for risk management and risk-reduction 
strategies,106 disaster-reduction strategies,107 and 
economic diversifi cation to increase resilience.108 
In order to assist in the implementation of both 
adaptation and mitigation strategies, the Bali Action 
Plan calls on parties to cooperate in technological 
development and transfer, and to fi nd ways to increase 
the amount of technology transferred to developing 
countries.109 In conjunction with technology transfer, 
developed countries are called on to provide fi nancial 
assistance for the adoption of mitigation and adaptation 
strategies. Such assistance includes improving access 
to “adequate, predictable and sustainable fi nancial 
resources and fi nancial and technical support, and the 
provision of new and additional resources, including 
offi  cial and concessional funding for developing 
country Parties”.110 Finally, parties are encouraged to 
SCENARIO 
CATEGORY
REGION 2020 2050
A-450 ppm 
CO2-eq 
Annex I −25% to −40% from 1990 levels −80% to −95% from 1990 levels
Non-Annex Substantial deviation from the baseline in 
Latin America, the Middle East, east Asia 
and Central Asia 
Substantial deviation from baseline in all 
regions 
B-550 ppm 
CO2-eq 
Annex I −10% to −30% from 1990 levels −40% to −90% from 1990 levels
Non-Annex Deviation from baseline in Latin America, 
the Middle East, and east Asia 
Deviation from baseline in most regions, 
especially in Latin America and the Middle 
East 
C-650 ppm 
CO2-eq 
Annex I 0% to −25% from 1990 levels −30% to −80% from 1990 levels
Non-Annex Baseline Deviation from baseline in Latin America, 
the Middle East,  and east Asia
TABLE 3. Ranges of emission reductions required for various stabilization levels 
Source: IPCC 2007, Mitigation, pp. 776 and 227.
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consider innovative fi nancial mechanisms, such as 
encouraging climate-friendly public and private sector 
investment.111
Th ese elements of the Bali Action Plan are meant 
to come together in a shared vision on long-term 
cooperative action, which includes a “long-term global 
goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate 
objective of the Convention, in accordance with the 
provisions and principles of the Convention”.112 In 
2008, a number of proposals regarding the elements 
discussed above were put forward by various parties. 
Th e negotiations are now focused on developing a 
draft text with the aim of reaching a fi nal agreement 
at the 15th UNFCCC Conference of Parties meeting in 
December 2009.113 
Montreal Protocol4. 
While the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol represent 
the principal agreements addressing climate change, 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer114 has emerged as a signifi cant mechanism 
for the international regulation and phase-out of certain 
greenhouse gases with a high global warming potential 
(GWP). Th ese ozone-depleting industrial gases were 
intentionally not controlled under the UNFCCC or 
the Kyoto Protocol, although they are very potent 
greenhouse gases, and are produced on a large scale 
worldwide. 
Th e Montreal Protocol was established in 1987 
in response to the discovery of an ozone “hole” 
over Antarctica, and the scientifi c evidence that 
ozone in the stratosphere was being destroyed by 
chlorofl uorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting 
chemicals. Th e Protocol’s primary objective is to phase-
out the consumption and production of nearly 100 
chemicals known as “ozone depleting substances” 
(ODS). Under the Protocol, both developed and 
developing countries have binding, time-targeted and 
measurable commitments, but developing countries 
are given longer time periods and fi nancial assistance 
in meeting their targets.
By 2007, the Protocol had led to the phase-out of about 
97 per cent of the consumption and production of 
ozone-depleting potential-weighted ODS worldwide.115 
In fact, the phase-out has been faster, the costs have 
been lower, and the alternatives and substitutes have 
been more environmentally acceptable than the parties 
to the Montreal Protocol anticipated during the initial 
negotiations.116 Given all of these factors, the Protocol 
has often been widely praised as one of the most 
successful multilateral environmental agreements.117 
Since many of the ODS and the fl uorocarbon gases 
used as substitutes for ODS are signifi cant greenhouse 
gases in terms of their global warming potential,118 the 
Montreal Protocol plays an important role in mitigating 
climate change.119 In fact, the annual contribution of 
ODS to global warming peaked in 1988, at a value 
slightly less than half that of global CO2 emissions.
120 
Moreover, it has been estimated that, in the absence 
of the Montreal Protocol, ODS emissions would have 
reached 14-18 GtCO2-eq/year by 2010. However, as 
a result of the Montreal Protocol, it is predicted that 
ODS emissions will only reach 1.4 GtCO2-eq/year 
in 2010, thereby resulting in an overall decrease in 
ODS emissions of 135 GtCO2-eq over the 1990-2010 
period.121 Given this, some experts have argued that, 
since it was brought into eff ect in 1987, the Montreal 
Protocol has achieved signifi cantly greater climate 
protection (i.e. four to fi ve times) than that foreseen 
during the fi rst commitment period under the Kyoto 
Protocol.122
Th e Montreal Protocol recently had another 
breakthrough that will further contribute to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. In 2007, the parties decided 
to accelerate the phase-out of hydrochlorofl uorocarbons 
(HCFCs), which are gases with low ozone depletion 
potential that were developed for use as transitional 
replacements while CFCs were quickly phased out.124 
Developing countries must now freeze their HCFC 
production and consumption at their 2009-2010 level 
by 2013, and phase-out 10 per cent of production 
and consumption by 2015, 35 per cent by 2020, 
67.5 per cent by 2025, and 100 per cent by 2030, 
with 2.5 per cent allowed, if necessary, for servicing 
existing equipment until 2040. Developed countries 
have also advanced their phase-out schedule by 
10 years to completely eliminate HCFC production 
Part III: Multilateral Work Related to Climate Change
79
Pa
rt
 I
Pa
rt
 II
Pa
rt
 II
I
Pa
rt
 IV
and consumption by 2020, with 0.5 per cent allowed, 
if necessary, for servicing existing equipment until 
2030.125 
Th e accelerated phase-out of HCFCs presents 
developing countries with an unprecedented opportunity 
to adopt ozone- and climate-friendly technologies and 
policies. Th is transition to ozone- and climate-friendly 
options is being fi nancially and technically supported 
by the Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund, through 
the preparation and implementation of national 
HCFC Phase-out Management Plans for developing 
countries. Th e parties to the Montreal Protocol directed 
the Multilateral Fund, when providing this assistance, to 
also focus on substitutes and alternatives that minimize 
other impacts on the environment, including on 
climate, taking into account global warming potential, 
energy use and other relevant factors.126 
According to various estimates, phasing out HCFCs 
and their by-products could result in signifi cant climate 
benefi ts by 2050. Depending on the implementation 
and data sets used for calculation, estimated reductions 
in emission levels range from 17.5 to 25.5 GtCO2-eq 
overall between 2010 and 2050. 
Th e IPCC and the Montreal Protocol’s Technology 
and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) estimated in 
a joint study that the climate benefi ts of phasing out 
HCFCs would be a total reduction in emissions of about 
18 GtCO2-eq over the 2015-2050 period.
127 Velders 
et al. (2007a)128 and the United States Environment 
Protection Agency129 calculate a potential reduction 
of 17.5 GtCO2-eq between 2010 and 2050, and 
17.68 GtCO2-eq between 2010 and 2030 respectively. 
Th e Brazilian Government has off ered the most positive 
estimates, with potential reductions of 25.5 GtCO2-eq 
between 2010 and 2040.130 Achieving these potential 
reductions and their associated climate benefi ts depends 
on the replacement technologies adopted, and can only 
be attained if low or zero global warming potential 
alternatives are adopted as replacements to HCFCs. 
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FIGURE 3. Actual world ODS emissions and estimated 
world emissions in the absence of the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol (in GtCO2-eq/year)
Source: Kintisch Eli, Tougher Ozone Accord Also Addresses Global 
Warming, Science, Vol. 317, 28 September 2008, p. 1843123.
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Trade negotiationsB. 
In the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, 
members established a clear link between sustainable 
development and trade opening in order to ensure that 
market opening goes hand in hand with environmental 
and social objectives. In the ongoing Doha Round of 
negotiations, WTO members went further in their 
pledge to pursue a sustainable development path by 
launching the fi rst multilateral trade and environment 
negotiations. Th e issue of climate change, in itself, 
is not part of the WTO’s ongoing work programme 
and negotiation agenda. However, the WTO’s rules 
and institutions are relevant because climate change 
measures and policies intersect with international trade 
in a number of diff erent ways. 
In the context of the Doha Round, ministers have 
called for the liberalization of environmental goods 
and services. Th e mandate of negotiations stipulates 
“the reduction, or as appropriate, elimination of tariff  
and non-tariff  barriers to environmental goods and 
services”.131 Th ese negotiations could result in fewer 
and lower barriers to trade in environmental goods and 
services, and therefore improve global market access to 
more effi  cient, diverse, and less expensive goods and 
services, including goods that can contribute to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. 
Another question addressed in the Doha Round is 
the relationship between the WTO and multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs), such as the 
UNFCCC. In this area of the negotiations, WTO 
members have focused on the means for further 
strengthening cooperation between the WTO and 
MEA secretariats, as well as promoting coherence and 
mutual supportiveness between the trade and climate 
regimes. 
With regard to the liberalization of environmental goods 
and services, as well as to the WTO-MEA relationship, 
the Doha mandate provides an unprecedented 
opportunity for the multilateral trading system to 
contribute to furthering mutual supportiveness of trade 
and environment.132 Signifi cant work has been carried 
out in the Special Session of the Committee on Trade 
and Environment (CTE in Special Session), which 
is the negotiating group responsible for overseeing 
discussions relating to the trade and environment 
mandate.133 However, many issues have yet to fi nd a 
resolution and the outcome of the negotiations remains 
elusive. 
Th is section provides an overview of key areas identifi ed 
in the negotiations under Paragraph 31 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration that may be relevant to the 
goals of climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Improving access to climate-1. 
friendly goods and services
Climate-friendly technologies include a variety of 
technologies that can be employed to mitigate and 
adapt to climate change in diverse sectors. It has been 
pointed out that no single technology or sub-set of 
technologies is able to meet the challenge of climate 
change. Rather, numerous technological options must 
be pursued simultaneously.134 
Th e IPCC has identifi ed a range of mitigation and 
adaptation technologies that can assist in overcoming 
the challenges posed by climate change.135 Many of 
these technologies involve products which are currently 
being discussed in the Doha negotiations, such as 
wind and hydropower turbines, solar water heaters, 
photovoltaic cells, tanks for the production of biogas, 
landfi ll liners for methane collection, as well as the 
equipment necessary for the operation of renewable 
energy plants and technologies (e.g. thermostats, 
AC generators, clutches, gears, etc.).136 In this 
context, the WTO environmental goods and services 
negotiations have a role to play in improving access to 
climate-friendly goods and technologies. 
In the CTE in Special Session137 a number of countries 
have identifi ed a broad range of goods serving various 
environmental purposes, including mitigation 
of climate change.138 For instance, the following 
categories of goods have been discussed:139 water 
and waste-water management; air pollution control; 
management of solid and hazardous waste; renewable 
energy production; heat and energy management; 
cleaner or more resource-effi  cient technologies and 
products; and environmental monitoring, analysis and 
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assessment. Climate-friendly goods and technologies 
are contained in several of these categories, particularly 
in the category of renewable energy.
Environmental services are covered as part of the 
services negotiations under Article XIX of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which form 
an integral part of the negotiating framework under 
the Doha Development Agenda. In the negotiations 
on environmental services, WTO members are seeking 
specifi c commitments on activities which may be 
directly relevant to policies aimed at mitigating climate 
change.
Th ere is a twofold rationale for reducing tariff s and 
other trade barriers regarding climate-friendly goods 
and technologies. First, reducing or eliminating import 
tariff s and non-tariff  barriers for these types of products 
should reduce their price and therefore facilitate their 
deployment at the lowest possible cost.140 Access to 
lower-cost and more energy-effi  cient technologies 
may be particularly important for industries which 
must comply with climate change mitigation policies 
that place the burden of emission reductions on the 
emitters (see Part IV).141 
A number of studies have shown that tariff  reductions 
can ease the economic barriers to the use of climate-
friendly goods and services, particularly in the renewable 
energy sector, since cost is the principal obstacle to 
the deployment of renewable energy-based electricity 
generation.142 A number of climate-friendly products 
have high tariff s in some countries. Th e reduction 
or removal of these tariff s could therefore contribute 
signifi cantly to improving access to these goods.
In the category of renewable energy, as it is currently 
discussed in the Doha negotiations,143 applied tariff 
rates in developing countries range from 0 to 60 per 
cent (with the average tariff  being about 6 per cent). In 
least-developed countries, they range from 0 to 35 per 
cent (with an average of about 10 per cent) and in 
developed countries they vary from 0 to 10 per cent 
(with an average tariff  of about 2 per cent). 
For instance, a number of countries apply a tariff 
on the product line which covers solar water heaters 
(categorized in the Harmonized System144 under 
HS 841919) of over 20 per cent (in more than 
30 countries), or a tariff  of over 15 per cent on 
hydraulic turbines, parts for hydraulic turbines, and 
wind-powered generating equipment.145 Reducing 
tariff s in these goods could substantially improve the 
diff usion of these technologies worldwide. It has also 
been observed, for instance, that lowering tariff s on the 
components of goods necessary for the exploitation of 
geothermal energy could help a number of countries to 
develop this source of energy domestically.146 
A study of selected climate change mitigation 
technologies in the electricity-generation and heavy-
industry sectors has identifi ed various types of 
non-tariff  measures that may potentially hinder trade 
in these technologies. Th ese include measures such 
as burdensome pre-shipment inspection and customs 
procedures; quantitative import restrictions (for 
example, through import licensing, import quotas, 
or prohibitions), import surcharges or border taxes, 
technical requirements and voluntary standards, 
burdensome conformity assessment procedures, costly 
certifi cation and testing procedures, and discriminatory 
taxes.147
Th e second reason for reducing tariff s and other trade 
barriers is the fact that trade liberalization of climate-
friendly goods would provide incentives to producers 
and provide them with domestic expertise to expand 
the production and export of these goods. It is argued 
that trade liberalization of such goods would allow 
developing countries, in particular, to promote the 
industrial diversifi cation of their economies and realize 
economies of scale.148 
Indeed, increased trade allows larger markets for climate-
friendly goods, leading to profi ts from economies of 
scale and giving producers the opportunity to learn and 
benefi t from technological advances.149 For instance, it 
has been noted that the reduction of certain import 
tariff s has encouraged the adoption of energy-effi  cient 
lighting in Ghana.150 Moreover, trade liberalization 
of climate-friendly goods, in particular in developing 
countries, could help increase local capabilities for 
innovation and adaptation of domestic technology 
rather than foster dependence on transfer of foreign 
82
Trade and Climate Change
technology. Trade opening could then facilitate the 
integration of small and medium-sized enterprises 
into related global supply chains, thereby increasing 
employment and reducing poverty.151 
A review of several developing-country case studies 
has noted a signifi cant shift in the structure of these 
countries’ environmental goods and services industries, 
from traditional “end-of-pipe” activities to the use of 
cleaner technologies that reduce pollutants at source.152 
Several other studies have further noted that many 
developing countries, such as China, Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, India and Indonesia, have emerged as 
leading producers in clean energy sectors, such as wind 
and solar energy or effi  cient lighting.153 
A number of developing countries have a signifi cant 
export interest in certain product lines which are 
included in the category of renewable energy. For 
example, in 2007 the following developing economies 
were among the top fi ve exporters for at least one 
HS 6-digit subheading in the category of renewable 
energy products:154 Brazil; China; Hong Kong, China; 
India; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; Turkey; 
Singapore; South Africa; and Th ailand.155 In addition, 
the following countries were among the top ten 
exporters: Argentina, Jordan, the Philippines, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Republic of Tanzania. Five 
developing economies are among the top ten exporters 
of the entire renewable energy category of goods: 
China; Hong Kong, China; Mexico; Singapore; and 
Th ailand. 
Moreover, several developing countries are the 
top exporter of one or more product lines in the 
renewable energy category. For instance, Mexico is 
the top exporter of the product line which covers solar 
water heaters (HS 841919), while China is the top 
exporter of lines which include wind turbine towers 
(HS 730820), static converters that change solar energy 
into electricity (HS 850440), solar batteries for energy 
storage in off -grid photovoltaic systems (HS 850720), 
and concentrator systems used to intensify solar power 
in solar energy systems (HS 900290). 
For certain countries, exports in the renewable energy 
category represent a substantial part of their overall 
exports. For instance, in 2007, about 2 per cent of 
China’s exported goods fi gured in renewable energy 
product lines, while both Mexico and Th ailand’s 
exports of these goods amounted to 2.2 per cent. 
It should also be noted that in 2007, world exports 
of goods contained in the 30 product lines (HS 
6) of the renewable energy category amounted to 
US$ 189 billion (i.e. they accounted for 1.5 per cent of 
world exports).156 Developing countries’ exports in the 
same category amounted to US$ 59 billion and their 
imports amounted to US$ 69 billion. 
Finally, the trade of climate-friendly goods has seen 
a considerable increase in the past few years. For 
instance, between 1997 and 2007 exports of goods 
contained in the product lines listed in the renewable 
energy category grew by 598 per cent in developing 
countries and by 179 per cent in developed countries, 
representing 62 per cent and 29 per cent of annual 
average growth respectively.
It should of course be noted that the price of climate-
friendly goods is not the only factor that aff ects the 
diff usion of these technologies. A number of authors 
have pointed to other important factors, such as a 
country’s gross domestic product, its level of foreign 
direct investment and the regulatory framework for 
climate change action.157 Th is last aspect is the focus 
of Part IV on national eff orts to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change. 
Mutual supportiveness between 2. 
trade and environment
Th e Doha negotiations on trade and environment 
also provide WTO members with an opportunity 
to consider the mutual supportiveness between the 
trade and environment rules, and how institutional 
cooperation can help foster mutual supportiveness. 
Th e objective of Paragraph 31(i) and (ii) of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration is to ensure coherence by 
fostering a positive synergy between the trade and 
environment regimes. 
Paragraph 31(i) calls for negotiations on the relationship 
between existing WTO rules and the specifi c trade 
obligations set out in multilateral environmental 
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agreements (MEAs). In this context, WTO members 
are discussing ways to ensure a harmonious coexistence 
between WTO rules and specifi c trade obligations in 
the diff erent agreements that have been negotiated 
multilaterally to protect the environment. Th e 
importance of these negotiations cannot be over-
emphasized, given the present consensus in the 
international community on the value of multilateralism 
and concerted actions to combat climate change.
While, until now, there has been no legal dispute 
between the trade and environmental regimes, 
a successful outcome to these negotiations will 
nevertheless reinforce the relationship between 
them. Th e negotiators have drawn on experiences in 
the negotiation and implementation of multilateral 
environmental agreements at the national level, and 
are seeking ways to improve national coordination and 
cooperation between trade and environment policies. 
At the inter-institutional level, Paragraph 31(ii) of 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration focuses on the 
exchange of information between the WTO and 
MEA secretariats, as well as on the criteria for granting 
observer status in WTO bodies. Certain procedures 
are being discussed to improve or complement existing 
practices and cooperation mechanisms. Th is exchange 
of information extends to the participation of each 
body in the meetings of the other, and also to the 
organization of information exchange sessions and joint 
technical assistance and capacity-building activities. 
Cooperation is already taking place between the 
WTO and climate change bodies: the UNFCCC 
participates in meetings of the regular WTO Committee 
on Trade and Environment and is an ad hoc observer to 
the CTE in Special Session, while the WTO secretariat 
attends UNFCCC Conference of Parties meetings.
As negotiations progress for a post-2012 international 
climate change regime, issues relating to coherence 
between the trade and climate change regimes, and to 
the institutional cooperation required to foster such 
coherence will become increasingly important. A positive 
outcome to the Doha negotiations on these questions 
can contribute to further strengthening collaboration, 
while the trade and climate change regimes continue to 
evolve in a mutually supportive manner, within their 
respective spheres of competence. 
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Climate change mitigation and adaptation measures 
and policies intersect with international trade in a 
number of ways. Th is part reviews the range of policies 
to mitigate, and adapt to the eff ects of, climate change. 
It provides examples of national eff orts on climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, whether voluntary 
or mandatory, public or private. It is based mainly on 
national experiences and key literature on the topic. In 
broad terms, it provides an overview of the rationale 
behind these mitigation and adaptation policies and 
their potential implications for the environment and 
trade. Th e key aspects in the design of climate change 
related measures are presented in order to draw a 
clearer picture of their overall potential and eff ects on 
environmental protection, development and trade. 
A number of policy measures have been used or are 
available at the national level to mitigate, and adapt 
to, climate change. Th ey are typically distinguished 
as either regulatory measures (i.e. regulations and 
standards) or economic incentives (e.g. taxes, tradable 
permits, and subsidies). Climate change resulting from 
emissions of greenhouse gases is, in economic terms, a 
negative externality.1 In order to correct such negative 
externalities and to “internalize” environmental costs, 
setting a price on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
is a key policy response. However, the existence of a 
number of market imperfections2 means that carbon 
pricing alone may not be suffi  cient or may be diffi  cult 
to implement. Th erefore, apart from national eff orts 
to internalize the environmental costs of greenhouse 
gas emissions (see Section IV.A below), other 
policies are being considered and implemented by 
governments, including fi nancial measures to promote 
development and deployment of climate-friendly 
goods and technologies (see Section IV.B below), and 
technical requirements to promote the use of such 
goods and technologies (see Section IV.C below). 
Th ese distinctions also provide a useful framework for 
considering the potential relevance of trade rules, and 
this is how this report is structured below.
In addition, it should be noted that a number of 
adaptation and mitigation measures in the area of 
agriculture with related impacts on forestry and 
biodiversity are being explored at the national level. 
As noted in Parts I and II of this Report, a changing 
climate will likely have a profound impact on current 
agricultural production systems and may require 
farmers to adapt. For some this may present new 
opportunities, but for others, particularly farmers in 
developing countries, this could present signifi cant 
challenges. Adaptation in the agricultural sector has 
taken place throughout history and often without 
specifi c policy interventions. As farmers recognise the 
impact of a changing climate on agricultural yields, they 
alter their practices, such as the timing of operations, 
the choice of crops or livestock breed or the mix of 
their production, to account for the new situation.
However, the risk of a rapidly changing climate caused 
by greenhouse gas emissions may require policy 
interventions to ensure that farmers can respond 
in a timely manner and that support is available as 
farmers consider their options. Support for research 
will also become increasingly important to ensure the 
knowledge base required to deal with new pests and 
diseases and the changing climate is available. In this 
context, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) may play an important role. For example, the 
Agreement on Agriculture, in particular through its 
“Green Box” provisions for permissible subsidies, 
provides exemptions for research and development. 
Similarly, the SPS Agreement would help countries 
align their response to new types of pest and disease 
outbreaks as a result of climate change. 
Th ere are also opportunities within national agriculture 
policy to focus on mitigation. Notwithstanding the 
diffi  culties of calculating agricultural emissions, there 
is an expectation that emissions from agriculture 
should be reduced. At a practical level, a reduction 
in emissions can be achieved through a wide range of 
activities, including adopting energy saving practices, 
changing livestock feeding methods, reducing the 
application of pesticides, and improving manure and 
slurry storage. Moreover, enhancing carbon storage in 
soils and biomass by removing land from production 
(thereby avoiding soil disturbance) or by creating new 
woodlands are seen by many as providing a useful 
mitigation opportunity. From a trade policy perspective, 
the removal of trade barriers that currently encourage 
carbon-intensive agricultural practices may be an 
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option. For instance, several commentators have called 
for the reduction and removal of the most harmful 
kinds of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies; a step 
that is currently being addressed in the Doha Round.
Although national policies related to agriculture 
may off er important adaptation and mitigation 
opportunities, an in-depth analysis of these policy 
areas is beyond the scope of this Report. Additional 
studies are clearly required to address these and other 
types of national adaptation and mitigation measures 
currently under consideration. Rather, as previously 
stated, the analysis below focuses on price and market-
based mechanisms to internalize the environmental 
costs of greenhouse gas emissions, and on fi nancial 
and technical measures to encourage the development, 
deployment and use of climate-friendly technologies.
In this Part, the universe of relevant WTO rules is 
addressed in connection with the presentation of the 
diff erent types of domestic policies and not in relation 
to specifi c measures. Broadly speaking, WTO rules and 
case law that relate generally to environmental issues 
are relevant to the examination of climate change 
measures. Th e general approach under WTO rules 
has been to acknowledge that trade measures may be 
used to achieve certain policy objectives as long as a 
number of carefully crafted conditions are respected. 
Moreover, WTO rules, as a whole, off er a framework 
for ensuring predictability, transparency and the fair 
implementation of such measures.
A number of WTO rules may be relevant to the 
examination of mitigation and adaptation measures and 
most of them are explained in this Part in detail. First, 
several provisions of the General Agreement on Tariff s 
and Trade (GATT) should be mentioned, including: 
the disciplines on tariff s, essentially prohibiting 
members from collecting tariff s at levels higher than that 
provided for in their WTO scheduled consolidation; 
a general prohibition against quantitative restrictions; 
a general non-discrimination principle, consisting 
of the most-favoured-nation and national treatment 
principles; and the general exceptions of the GATT 
that allows WTO members to adopt policy measures 
to protect the environment. Moreover, specifi c rules 
on technical regulations and standards as contained in 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
may be relevant, and for instance the rules that such 
measures may not be more restrictive than necessary to 
fulfi l a legitimate objective, must respect the principle 
of non-discrimination and be based on international 
standards, where they exist. 
Also, rules of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) may be relevant as 
they defi ne the concept of “subsidy”, establishe the 
conditions under which WTO members may or may 
not employ subsidies, and regulate the remedies that 
may be taken against subsidized imports. Th e disciplines 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) should also be mentioned: it imposes general 
obligations such as most-favoured-nation treatment, as 
well as further obligations in sectors where individual 
members have undertaken specifi c commitments such 
as environmental and energy services. Th e provisions of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) may also be 
relevant, for instance in relation to the development 
and diff usion of climate-friendly technologies. Finally, 
other disciplines may be applicable, for instance those 
on import licensing and rules of origin and those 
related to the plurilateral Government Procurement 
Agreement.
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Price and market mechanisms A. 
to internalize environmental costs 
of GHG emissions
Th is section discusses domestic eff orts to internalize 
the environmental costs of greenhouse gas emissions 
and therefore to set a price on such emissions. Th e 
section starts by presenting two types of internalization 
mechanisms: internal taxes on greenhouse gas emissions, 
and emission trading schemes (see subsection IV.A.1 
below). Generally, such domestic climate change 
policies alter the relative prices of traded goods covered 
by such schemes and taxes and may aff ect conditions 
for international trade. Th erefore, a discussion of the 
disparities in domestic levels of carbon pricing among 
countries, and the risk of “carbon leakage”3 will follow 
(see subsection IV.A.2 below). In this context, the 
options discussed in the literature on this subject and 
suggested by some policy makers to counterbalance 
these disparities (e.g. border measures) will also be 
addressed. Finally, the section will present WTO rules 
that may be relevant to domestic eff orts to internalize 
environmental costs of greenhouse gas emissions, 
including related border measures (see subsection 
IV.A.3 below).
Domestic measures1. 
Taxes on greenhouse gas emissions, a) 
and in particular “carbon taxes”
Of the range of measures available to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, one possibility, which is widely 
discussed in the relevant literature and has already 
been implemented by several countries, is the use of 
taxation to put a price on the release of CO2 into the 
atmosphere. Th e main tax base of a “carbon tax”4 is 
the combustion-related CO2 emissions of fossil fuels 
(which are the key source of CO2 emissions). Such 
a tax is usually calculated by measuring the carbon 
content of fossil fuels,5 which is directly proportional 
to the amount of CO2 that is produced during their 
combustion.6 Th e tax base typically varies for each of 
the fossil fuels to refl ect their varying carbon content, 
i.e. higher carbon-content fuels, such as coal and oil, are 
often taxed more, and relatively lower carbon-content 
fuels, such as natural gas, taxed less.7 Th e CO2 tax may 
also be based on measured emissions.8 However, a 
review of the relevant literature and existing legislation 
did not identify any example of taxes on the emissions 
of CO2 during production of goods (e.g. in the cement 
and steel sectors).
Broadly speaking, a carbon tax may be levied on two 
main points of taxation or application: consumers 
and producers. Although the revenue implications of 
one collection point over another are considered to 
be relatively minimal, whether the consumer or the 
producer is taxed may have an eff ect on the incentives 
for switching fuel and thus on the overall environmental 
impact of the tax, as well as on the costs of collection 
and enforcement.9 Most countries implementing a 
“carbon tax” levy it directly on consumers through a 
tax on fuel consumption “at the pump”.10 
National carbon taxes are already in use in some 
countries, including Finland,11 which was the fi rst 
country to enact a carbon tax in 1990, and was later 
followed by seven other European countries.12 Several 
other non-European countries have also envisaged the 
introduction of a carbon tax, but ultimately decided 
not to proceed with it.13 Carbon taxes have also been 
discussed or introduced at the city or state level. For 
instance in Canada, the province of Quebec introduced 
a carbon tax in October 200714 and in July 2008 the 
province of British Columbia began phasing in a carbon 
tax on all fossil fuels;15 and in the United States, the San 
Francisco Bay Area (California) adopted a greenhouse 
gas fee in May 2008.16 
Often, governments use a combination of a tax on 
CO2 emissions and a tax on energy use.
17 A “carbon tax” 
and an “energy tax” have diff erent tax bases: an energy 
tax is based on the energy content of energy sources, 
while a carbon tax is based on their carbon content. 
Th erefore, energy taxes can be imposed on both fossil 
fuels and on carbon-free energy sources.18 Since energy 
taxes apply to fossil fuels, they have a de facto eff ect 
on CO2 emissions and can be considered as “implicit 
carbon taxes”.19 An energy tax falls more heavily on oil 
and gas than a carbon tax, because oil and gas have 
a greater energy content than coal. A carbon tax, on 
the other hand, places a greater burden on coal than 
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on gas and oil, because coal releases more CO2 during 
combustion than gas or oil do.20 
For example, Finland21 and Sweden combined a tax 
on CO2 emissions and a tax on energy use.
22 Other 
countries have not adopted explicit carbon taxes 
but have introduced general energy taxes aimed at 
promoting energy effi  ciency and energy savings, 
thereby reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Th is is the 
case, for example,23 in the United Kingdom with the 
Climate Change Levy24 as well as in Germany,25 in the 
context of a general environmental tax reform aimed at 
promoting energy saving and effi  ciency.26 
Other greenhouse gases are also subject to taxation. 
For example, France introduced a tax on nitrous 
oxide (N2O) emissions in its general tax on polluting 
activities.27 In Norway, taxes on the import and 
production of hydrofl uorocarbons (HFCs) and 
perfl uorocarbons (PFCs) were introduced in 2003.28 
In Denmark, imports of industrial gases, HFCs, PFCs, 
and sulphur hexafl uoride (SF6) have been subject to 
taxation since 2001.29 In 2003, the government of 
New Zealand proposed a methane (CH4) tax on sheep 
and cattle, which has, however, never been adopted.30
Emission trading schemesb) 
Another way of setting a price on activities that have 
a negative impact on the environment is to: (i) fi x a 
cap on total emissions, (ii) translate this cap into 
“allowed emissions” or allowances to cover emissions, 
and (iii) create a market in which these allowances 
can be auctioned and/or traded, at a price set by the 
market (i.e. a tradable allowance system).31 In theory, 
the market price of these allowances should refl ect 
the marginal cost32 of emission reductions and thus 
encourage emitters to reach a specifi ed emission 
reduction target. Th e price paid for the allowance is in 
eff ect, the carbon price.33 
Th e fi rst such emission trading scheme (ETS) was 
introduced in the United States following the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977 in order to reduce 
emissions of air pollutants in certain regions.34 In 
the following years, several other emission trading 
programmes were implemented in the United States,35 
including provisions for trading sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
allowances among electric utilities in order to reduce 
the emissions that contributed to acid rain, in line with 
the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.36 
A provision for international emission trading 
for greenhouse gases was subsequently included 
in Article 17 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC, as explained in Section III.A.37 It was 
intended to enable parties to Annex I of the Kyoto 
Protocol to reduce emissions through international 
emission trading. Annex I parties can acquire units 
from other parties and use them towards meeting their 
emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Since the 
conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol, the use of emission 
trading at the domestic level has received increased 
attention as an effi  cient and eff ective tool in complying 
with greenhouse gas emission targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
Th ere are a limited number of mandatory emission 
trading schemes implemented at the national level. 
Th e European Union introduced, in January 2005, 
the world’s largest greenhouse gases emission trading 
scheme (the EU-ETS), which currently covers more 
than 10,000 installations in the energy and industrial 
sectors that are collectively responsible for about half of 
the EU’s emissions of CO2.
38 Denmark implemented, 
in 2001-2004, an emission trading scheme to control 
CO2 emissions from producers in the electricity sector 
(in 2005, the EU-ETS superseded this scheme).39 In 
2005-2007, Norway implemented an emission trading 
scheme on CO2 emissions, which covered 10 per cent 
of the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions. Th e 
scheme has now merged with the EU-ETS, although 
installations that were already subject to Norwegian 
CO2 taxes are not included in the EU scheme.
40 In 
Switzerland, since 2008, companies wishing to be 
exempted from the CO2 tax must undertake a legally 
binding commitment to reduce their energy-related 
CO2 emissions and, in return, receive emission 
allowances that can be traded directly on the domestic 
and international markets.41 New Zealand also adopted 
legislation on an emission trading scheme in 2008.42
Other proposals have been discussed, or announced 
for the near future. In Australia, a mandatory national 
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emission trading scheme is planned.43 Since 2007, 
Canada has also been developing a greenhouse gas 
emission reduction plan, which includes the creation 
of a carbon emission trading market by 2010.44 In 
the United States, since 2007, several climate change 
and energy bills are being discussed, including the 
possibility of introducing a mandatory cap-and-trade 
scheme.45 
Voluntary national emission trading schemes have 
also been put in place. For instance, in 2002-2006, 
the United Kingdom implemented an ETS based 
on voluntary participation that is open to both the 
public and private sectors.46 In 2005, Japan launched 
a voluntary ETS covering CO2 emissions from 
companies that agreed to commit to reaching emission 
reduction targets.47 Another example of a voluntary 
emission trading system is the Chicago Climate 
Exchange, launched in 2003 in North America.48 Its 
members are business fi rms and governmental and 
non-governmental organizations that choose to make 
voluntary commitments to reduce emissions of all 
six major greenhouse gases.49 Once these voluntary 
commitments are made, they become legally binding.
At the sub-national level, the state of New South Wales 
in Australia introduced, in 2003, the Greenhouse 
Gas Abatement Scheme, which is the second-largest 
mandatory scheme, after the EU-ETS.50 In the United 
States, the Air Resources Board of the state of California 
recently approved a framework for implementing a 
cap-and-trade programme for the electricity generation 
sector, which will be implemented in 2012.51 Seven 
western states of the United States and four Canadian 
provinces52 also committed, in 2007, to the Western 
Climate Initiative, under which a regional cap-and-
trade programme will be implemented in 2012.53 In 
2009, ten northeast states54 of the United States, as part 
of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, launched 
the fi rst cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gas 
emissions within the United States.55 
Emission trading schemes share a number of design 
characteristics that are briefl y discussed below: the 
scope; the allocation of emission allowances; the 
linkages with other existing schemes; and some other 
features.56 Th ese design characteristics are important, 
as they determine the cost burden for participants, 
and infl uence the overall trade implications of the 
schemes.
Scopei) 
First, domestic trading schemes can be linked to two 
types of emission targets:57 (i) an overall emission level 
(the cap-and-trade system); or (ii) an emission standard 
for each source (the rate-base system). In a cap-and-
trade system, the government defi nes an overall 
maximum amount of greenhouse gases, usually set 
in physical units (e.g. tonnes), that regulated sources 
can emit over a specifi ed time-frame.58 To achieve the 
goal of decreased emissions, this maximum quantity of 
allowable emissions is often capped at a lower level than 
the amount of past emissions, and this cap typically 
decreases over time. Th e government then creates a 
number of “allowances” to cover emissions equal to the 
size of the cap. 
In contrast, under a rate-based system (also called relative 
cap, “baseline and credit”59 or carbon intensity-based), 
the government determines a standard of emissions 
for each source, usually expressed in either emissions 
allowed per unit of production, or emission-intensity.60 
For instance, the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme 
in New South Wales (Australia) and the emission 
trading market currently under discussion in Canada 
use rate-based cap-setting.61 In Canada, the baseline 
of each fi rm is planned to be its emission-intensity 
target.62 
Th ere are two key diff erences between cap-and-trade 
and rate-based systems.63 A rate-based model does 
not set a general cap on emissions and therefore gives 
rise to uncertainty about the overall emission level 
that may be achieved. Moreover, the administrative 
burden involved is higher with a rate-based system 
than with cap-and-trade: as with an environmental tax, 
the regulating authorities would need to periodically 
recalculate and adjust rate standards to achieve a certain 
emission target and correct for additional emissions 
that may result from increased production.64 
Second, the number of participants in an emission 
trading scheme is also an important element in 
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determining the potential impact on emission 
reduction of any given scheme.65 However, the extent 
to which small and large emitters contribute to reaching 
the overall emission target is uneven, and the cost-
eff ectiveness of including small installations in emission 
trading schemes has been questioned.66 In fact, existing 
and proposed schemes usually provide for minimum 
thresholds of CO2 emissions so as to exclude small 
installations. For instance, in the third phase of the 
EU-ETS, installations emitting under 25,000 tonnes 
of CO2 per year will be allowed to opt out of the ETS, 
provided that alternative reduction measures are put 
in place.67 Th e proposed Canadian,68 Australian69 and 
Californian70 emission trading schemes also include 
minimum thresholds. 
Th ird, sectoral coverage varies. Some schemes cover a 
wide range of sectors or allow for the gradual inclusion 
of more sectors. For instance, in the post-2012 period, 
the scope of the EU-ETS – which currently covers 
power generation, iron and steel, glass, cement, pottery 
and bricks, among others – will be extended to include 
new sectors, including petrochemicals, ammonia 
and the aluminium sector.71 Th e proposed Canadian 
scheme is also intended to cover a wide array of sectors: 
electricity generation produced by combustion; oil and 
gas; forest products; smelting and refi ning; iron and 
steel; some mining; and cement, lime and chemicals.72 
Finally, concerning the type of gases covered, most 
regimes cover only CO2, as is the case for the EU-ETS, 
the United States’ Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
and Switzerland’s trading scheme. In contrast, New 
South Wales (Australia) and the proposed Canadian 
scheme also cover other greenhouse gases.73 Th e 
EU-ETS post-2012 phase foresees the inclusion of 
two new greenhouse gases: nitrous oxide (N2O) and 
perfl uorocarbons (PFCs).74 
Allocation of emission allowancesii) 
In an emission trading system, allowances are the 
common currency. Usually, one allowance gives the 
holder the right to emit one tonne of CO2, as in the case 
of the EU-ETS, or the right to emit one tonne of CO2-
equivalent (CO2-eq), as, for example, in the New South 
Wales scheme.75 Companies that keep their emissions 
below the level of their allowances can sell their excess 
allowances. On the other hand, companies that emit 
more than the level of their allowances usually have 
two possibilities, which may also be combined: take 
measures to reduce their emissions (such as investing in 
more climate-friendly technologies), or buy the extra 
allowances they need on the market.
Th e method of allocating allowances may have 
important implications on the distribution of costs 
among covered companies as well as how costs are 
passed on to consumers, and therefore may infl uence 
the potential loss or gain in competitiveness for certain 
industries.76 In this regard, both the point of application 
(or regulation) of the scheme and how allowances are 
distributed are important considerations.
Broadly speaking, there are two points of application, 
which may also be combined.77 In an “upstream” design, 
the overall limit on emissions applies to producers and 
importers of fossil fuels and to producers of other energy 
sources. Th e emission costs are typically passed on to 
consumers in the form of higher prices. It is argued 
that one key advantage of an upstream system is that 
it involves relatively low administrative costs because it 
regulates the emissions of a limited number of entities. 
However, since there are no real options for suppliers of 
fossil fuels to reduce the carbon content of these fuels, 
it is argued that an emission cap amounts to a simple 
fuel cap, with the related negative impact on the profi ts 
of fossil fuel producers and importers. Moreover, an 
upstream design may be insuffi  cient to encourage end-
user energy effi  ciency and emission reductions.
In a “downstream” design, the emission limit applies 
to sources of emissions, e.g. to end-users of fossil fuels, 
who are the actual emitters of CO2.
78 Th e downstream 
system off ers the advantage of a potentially wide and 
effi  cient market for emission trading. Its main drawback 
lies in higher administrative costs, as it may apply to 
potentially large numbers of participants.79
Most existing schemes are designed in a downstream 
fashion, as for example the EU-ETS, which applies 
to single installations in the targeted sectors.80 Th e 
appropriate point of application may diff er from sector 
to sector. For instance, where emissions linked to the 
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transport sector are concerned, it is considered that a 
downstream point of application would be diffi  cult to 
implement, as it would have to include all owners and 
operators of vehicles,81 and therefore an upstream point 
of regulation is usually favoured, at the level of refi ners 
and importers of fuels. 
Currently, there are two key methods used by 
the regulator to distribute allowances to existing 
installations:82 allocation free of charge and/or 
auctioning. Free allowances can be based on historical 
emission levels (“grandfathering”), or on projected 
sectoral emissions, or they can be distributed by 
another method, for example on the basis of emissions 
per unit of output (“benchmarking”).83 Th e advantages 
of the free distribution of allowances are that it reduces 
the risk of losing competitiveness in energy-intensive 
and trade-exposed sectors; and it may also be a fi rst 
step in the progressive phase-in of an emission trading 
scheme. 
With auctioning, companies are required to bid for the 
number of allowances they need to purchase in order 
to cover their emissions, as opposed to receiving an 
initial amount free of charge.84 Reasons in favour of 
auctioning include the following: it is likely to provide 
an immediate price signal in the allowances market, 
which should increase the scheme’s overall eff ectiveness, 
as the consumers of CO2-intensive products will adjust 
demand accordingly; it provides higher incentives to take 
early action to reduce emissions; and it may attenuate 
the windfall benefi t problem85 and therefore be more in 
keeping with the “polluter pays” principle.86
In practice, allowances have often been distributed for 
free, mainly to address the competitiveness concerns of 
energy-intensive industries.87 For instance, Switzerland 
has distributed 100 per cent of its allowances for free.88 
In the third phase of the EU-ETS, there will be a 
substantial increase in the amount of auctioning (from 
less than 4 per cent in Phase II to more than 50 per cent 
in Phase III).89 Also, under Australia’s emission trading 
scheme a high proportion of free allowances will be 
allocated to emission-intensive and trade-exposed 
industries.90 On the other hand, under the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, several participating 
northeast states of the United States have decided to 
auction 100 per cent of their annual allowances.91 
Linkages with existing schemes, iii) 
including offsets
A number of emission trading schemes have already 
been established or are planned for the near future. 
Although it may be very challenging to link several 
schemes, as they often vary in some of their key 
characteristics (such as size, environmental stringency, 
reporting and monitoring mechanisms, or CO2 price), 
there are some clear advantages in doing so. For 
example, linking emission trading systems could lead 
to the creation of a larger market, which may in turn 
bring down the overall cost of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, increase liquidity92 and reduce volatility of 
allowance prices.93 
Two types of links may be distinguished. First, 
direct links can be set up, whereby emission allowances 
are traded across several diff erent emission trading 
schemes.94 For instance, in the third phase of the EU-
ETS, linking and mutual recognition of allowances will 
be allowed between the EU-ETS and the cap-and-trade 
systems of any country at the national or sub-national 
levels, as long as the design of the other emission 
trading schemes do not undermine the “environmental 
integrity” of the EU-ETS.95 
Second, indirect links (which are quite common)96 
may also be established, whereby emission trading 
schemes are linked to project-based off sets.97 “Carbon 
off setting” (or “off sets”) refers to the act of reducing 
or avoiding greenhouse gas emissions in one place in 
order to “off set” greenhouse gas emissions occurring 
somewhere else.98 Off sets are credits typically generated 
from emission-reducing projects, such as tree planting, 
or investments in renewable energy, energy conservation 
or methane capture. 
Credits from project-based off sets can be generated 
from abroad, for example through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).99 For instance, 
under the EU-ETS, operators are allowed, within a 
certain limit, to cover their emission allowances by 
buying credits generated by emission-saving projects 
Part IV: National Policies to Mitigate, and Adapt to, Climate Change, and their Trade Implications
95
undertaken in other countries.100 Th ese projects must 
be offi  cially recognized under the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Joint Implementation mechanism or the CDM. CDM 
projects are also accepted as off sets in Norway, Japan, 
the Chicago Climate Exchange, Switzerland101 and in 
the proposed Australian emission trading scheme.102 
Some ETSs also provide for the possibility to use 
domestic off sets from domestic projects that are not 
part of the emission trading scheme.103 For instance, in 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (United States) 
and the New South Wales (Australia) schemes, other 
types of off sets from United States104 and New South 
Wales-based projects,105 respectively, can be used. In 
the third phase of the EU-ETS, it will also be possible 
to use domestic off set credits from domestic projects 
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions but that are not 
covered by the ETS.106 
Other featuresiv) 
Most emission trading schemes provide for a banking 
mechanism in order to help stabilize the fl uctuations of 
allowance prices and limit the risk of non-compliance.107 
Banking enables allowances to be carried over from one 
phase to the other, i.e. allowances not used during the 
trading period for which they were issued can be banked 
for use at a later trading period.108 Banking typically 
achieves early results in emission reduction, as most 
fi rms reduce their emission levels further than required, 
or buy more allowances than they need, in order to 
be sure of avoiding non-compliance penalties.109 Th e 
banking of allowances can help fi rms meet emission 
targets while providing fl exibility to undertake large 
investments that are necessary to reduce emissions. 
Provisions allowing the banking of allowances are, for 
instance, incorporated in the EU-ETS (from the second 
period onwards),110 in the emission trading schemes of 
New South Wales in Australia, in the Chicago Climate 
Exchange, in the United States’ Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative, in Switzerland, in the national scheme 
proposed in Australia, and in California’s proposed 
scheme.111
Borrowing is another fl exibility mechanism that allows 
a greenhouse gas-emitting entity to use allowances 
from a future time-period to cover current emissions: 
the entity borrows from potential reductions that have 
not been realized yet, but are anticipated to occur 
in the future, presumably at lower cost than current 
reductions.112 Borrowing can constitute an insurance 
mechanism against price spikes in the event of sustained 
demand for allowances. For instance, Australia’s 
scheme will allow a limited degree of borrowing, using 
allowances from the following year, in order to increase 
fl exibility.113 However, there are some limitations to the 
use of borrowing, such as the fact that the environmental 
objective of reduced emissions could be undermined if 
companies launch into borrowing against future rights 
and thus delay their emission reductions for several 
years.114 
Emission trading schemes may also include some 
enforcement mechanisms, including possible 
sanctions.115 Th e eff ectiveness of such mechanisms will 
depend on the regulator’s technical ability to monitor 
and detect violations, and legal ability to deal with 
violations once detected.116 For instance, under the 
EU-ETS, if an installation does not possess suffi  cient 
allowances to cover its annual emissions, it will be 
fi nancially penalized, and the amount of the defi cit in 
allowances will be carried over to the following period. 
Th e fi ne for non-compliance in the fi rst phase of the 
EU-ETS was 40 euros/tonne CO2, and is 100 euros/
tonne CO2 for the second phase.
117 From 1 January 
2013 onwards, the fi ne for non-compliance will 
increase in accordance with the European Index of 
Consumer Prices.118
Environmental effectivenessc) 
Carbon taxes and emission trading schemes may 
have two key environmental eff ects:119 (i) a “direct 
eff ect”, i.e. a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, a 
stimulation of energy-effi  cient measures, the switching 
to low-carbon fuels and products, and changes in the 
economy’s production and consumption structures; 
and (ii) an “indirect eff ect”, through the “recycling” of 
the fi scal or auctioning revenues to fund, for instance, 
investment in more climate-friendly technologies, or 
to enhance emission-reducing changes in investment 
and consumption patterns. 
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Th e “direct eff ect” stems from the fact that a carbon 
tax or an emission trading scheme internalizes the 
environmental cost of carbon by setting a price on the 
carbon content of energy and on the CO2 emissions 
generated in production and/or consumption. In 
theory, an appropriate price signal on carbon should 
have the following consequences: ensure that emitting 
entities pay the full environmental cost of their actions; 
encourage individuals and businesses to move away 
from the use of high-carbon goods and services, and to 
invest in low-carbon alternatives; and, in the long run, 
promote innovation in new production methods and 
products that meet consumer demand while reducing 
pollution.120 
In order to be fully effi  cient, a carbon tax should be set 
at a level that internalizes the costs of environmental 
damage, so that prices refl ect the real environmental 
costs (the so-called “Pigouvian tax”).121 Most of the 
integrated assessment models that have been employed 
to determine the optimal trajectory of a carbon tax 
show it rising over time. For example, Nordhaus’s 
(2008) study based on his DICE (Dynamic Integrated 
Model of Climate and the Economy) model shows that 
the optimal carbon tax begins at $34 (in 2005 prices) 
per metric ton carbon in 2010, then rises to $42 per 
ton in 2015, $90 per ton in 2050, and $220 per ton 
carbon in 2100. Th e explanation for this is that the 
carbon tax should be set to equal the marginal damage 
caused by the emissions.122 Over time, this marginal 
damage will increase as the stock of carbon in the 
atmosphere accumulates so that to fully internalize these 
rising costs, the carbon tax must increase accordingly. 
However, the literature and regulations reviewed in 
this section show that such optimal carbon taxes have 
rarely been used by policy makers, given, inter alia, the 
diffi  culty in estimating environmental damage cost and 
the fl uctuations of energy prices. 
It seems, however, that countries have rather followed 
the more pragmatic “Baumol-Oates” approach, 
pursuant to which the tax rate is set so as to simply 
infl uence taxpayers’ behaviours to achieve a given 
environmental objective.123 Th is more pragmatic 
concept is easier to implement in a context where the 
cost of environmental damage is diffi  cult to evaluate.124 
In practice, the carbon tax rate used varies from country 
to country: for instance, in Nordic countries, the 
average CO2 tax revenue ranges from 7.8 euros/tonne 
CO2 in Finland to 23 euros/tonne CO2 in Sweden.
125
Th e “indirect eff ect” of a carbon tax or an emission 
trading scheme (under auctioning) may vary depending 
on how the public revenue which has been raised 
is used. Th e revenue can either be included in the 
government’s general budget, or can be redistributed 
in order to: fi nance specifi c programmes, in particular 
environmental ones (this is known as “earmarking”); 
compensate industries that are most aff ected by the tax 
or the emission trading scheme (and hence alleviate 
competitiveness concerns); or reduce the burden 
imposed by some other taxes (such as labour and value-
added taxes).126 Moreover, it has been argued that some 
additional benefi ts may be generated by the manner 
in which the revenues collected with carbon taxes or 
pursuant to auctioning under an emission trading 
scheme are “recycled”, i.e. reinvested in the economy 
(this is known as a “double dividend”).127 In addition 
to an “environmental double dividend” (i.e. reducing 
CO2 emissions may be accompanied by a decrease in 
local pollution), there may also be an “economic double 
dividend”, i.e. recycling the revenues from carbon 
tax or from auctioning by reducing some other taxes 
may have a benefi cial impact on economic growth, 
employment or technological development.128 
Even though recycling the collected revenue, in particular 
with certain earmarked programmes, might result in 
environmental advantages, such “fi scal cushioning” 
may undermine the environmental eff ectiveness of 
climate policies and therefore circumvent the intended 
eff ect of a carbon tax or emission trading scheme. A 
number of problems related to this practice have been 
underlined, among them: fi rms may delay giving up 
polluting modes of production; revenue recycling 
might not motivate companies to fully face up to the 
environmental cost of their emissions; and earmarking 
may create obstacles to necessary tax re-evaluations, 
based on economic and environmental rationales, 
because the use of the revenue is fi xed in advance by 
the regulator.129 
In practice, countries often use a mix of possibilities for 
redistributing the revenues generated from emission 
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trading schemes or carbon taxes. For instance, Finland 
uses carbon tax revenues both to promote renewable 
forms of energy and energy effi  ciency (earmarking), 
and to reinvest in the general national budget.130 In 
Denmark, fi scal revenues are recycled to industry 
through investment grants for energy-effi  cient 
production measures, through reductions of employers’ 
contributions to labour funds, as well as through a 
special fund for small and medium-sized enterprises.131 
In Sweden, tax-relief rules have been introduced for 
sectors “subject to competition” and a strategy was 
adopted in 2000 for a “green tax shift”, under which 
increased carbon taxes are off set by reduced taxes on 
labour.132 Norway uses part of the revenues from the 
carbon tax to reduce income tax.133 Finally, in the 
third phase of the EU-ETS, a substantial portion of 
the revenues which will be generated by the auctioning 
of allowances as from 2013 will be used to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the impacts 
of climate change, through contributions to certain 
funds for third countries, investment in renewable 
energies, and aff orestation and reforestation measures 
in developing countries, among others.134
How successful have carbon taxes and emission trading 
schemes been in practice? Overall, most studies on the 
results of carbon taxes show relatively small but positive 
eff ects on CO2 emissions. For instance, a 2004 survey 
of evaluations of CO2-based taxes concluded that all 
these taxes, either on their own or as part of a wider 
package, had generally contributed to the reduction 
of emissions.135 Also, a 2000 assessment showed that 
Finland’s CO2 emissions would have been 7 per cent 
higher in 1998 had the energy taxes been kept at the 
1990 level.136 Th e relatively low levels of environmental 
eff ectiveness are usually explained by the extensive tax 
exemptions and the relatively inelastic demand in the 
sectors that were taxed.137 When looking at specifi c 
sectors, however, emission reductions seem larger. For 
instance, in Sweden, emissions from district heating, 
and from the industrial and housing sectors decreased 
by 19 per cent from 1987 to 1994 and 60 per cent of this 
reduction could be attributed to the CO2 taxation.
138 A 
1996 study in Norway also found a decrease of 21 per 
cent in emissions from stationary combustion plants 
from 1991 to 1995, due to the introduction of the 
carbon tax.139
In theory, a well-functioning emission trading scheme 
should limit emissions to the specifi ed caps, and 
should therefore achieve a high level of environmental 
eff ectiveness.140 However, due to the political, practical 
and economic reasons analysed in the previous section, 
most emission trading schemes until now have 
had limited scope and thus a limited ability to curb 
emissions. Moreover, assessments of the results are 
still at an early stage, since existing emission trading 
schemes have not been in operation for long.141 For 
instance, the performance of the EU-ETS to date 
cannot be evaluated without recognizing that the fi rst 
three years (2005-2007) constituted a “trial” period 
aimed at developing the cap-and-trade infrastructure 
needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.142 
Both carbon taxes and emission trading schemes are 
mechanisms that set a price on greenhouse gas emissions 
and therefore aim at internalizing the environmental 
cost of such emissions, with a view to reducing the 
quantity of emissions to environmentally optimal 
levels, at the minimum cost.143 In the case of a carbon 
tax, the price is determined directly by the regulators 
through the tax rate (i.e. exogenously), while the 
quantity of emissions that will be reduced is a result of 
measures adopted by the industry to reduce emissions 
(i.e. endogenously). On the other hand, in the case of 
an emission trading scheme, the quantity of emissions 
that will be reduced is determined by the regulators 
(i.e. exogenously) while the price is determined by the 
market (i.e. endogenously) according to the supply 
of and demand for emissions, and the price adjusts 
itself to the marginal abatement costs (i.e. the cost of 
reducing one additional unit of emissions).144 
Th e regulator’s choice of instrument is arguably 
dependent on the relative value assigned to price versus 
the need to ensure the certainty of an environmental 
outcome. A carbon tax may be more appropriate when 
the costs of achieving a desired level of emissions 
are uncertain. An emission trading scheme may be 
preferable in situations where greater environmental 
certainty is needed. For instance, a typical case where 
greater environmental certainty is relatively more 
important than price certainty is where there is a risk of 
reaching a threshold of damage. Th is is the case when 
the environmental damage is relatively limited below a 
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certain threshold, and potentially catastrophic above the 
threshold. In this situation, if a safe emission threshold 
can be identifi ed, a cap is the preferable option in order 
to avoid severe environmental consequences.145
On the other hand, when there is no threshold of 
damage, and the marginal abatement costs are relatively 
sensitive to the level of pollution identifi ed as being 
acceptable, a tax may be preferable. For instance, in 
the case of stock pollutants (defi ned as pollutants that 
accumulate over time), it is generally argued that every 
unit of pollution has roughly the same eff ect on the 
environment. In this situation, greater price certainty 
is relatively more important than environmental 
certainty, and therefore a tax would be preferable to an 
emission cap.146 
In the case of climate change, the harmful environmental 
eff ects derive from the accumulation over time of stock 
pollutants such as greenhouse gases. Th is would make a 
case for the adoption of a tax. On the other hand, in the 
long term, the continued concentrations of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere may eventually reach a 
certain threshold that could give rise to catastrophic 
environmental consequences, as discussed in Part I of 
this publication. In such cases, stabilizing emissions 
below a threshold level would be very important, 
providing a rationale for setting an emission cap.147
Border measures2. 
In the absence of an internationally agreed price on 
carbon148 and since emission reduction policies, such as 
taxes and/or trading schemes, are not applied universally, 
the implementation of emission reduction policies has 
given rise to concerns about competitiveness as well as 
about environmental effi  ciency, i.e. “carbon leakage”. 
Concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage, 
particularly in relation to energy-intensive industries, 
have recently come to the forefront of climate change 
discussions, triggered by the consideration and 
implementation of emission trading schemes in several 
developed countries. 
To reduce the cost of compliance for potentially 
aff ected industries, mechanisms such as free allowances 
or exemptions are used.149 Another mechanism is to use 
trade measures at the border to impose a similar cost 
on importers. Th is type of trade policy is also argued 
to be an incentive for other countries to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions, so that the environmental 
objectives of domestic legislation are achieved and at 
the same time the global nature of climate change is 
taken into account.
Th e following sections fi rst clarify the concepts of 
“competitiveness” and “carbon leakage”, and then 
present the various types of border mechanisms 
that are being suggested to remedy them: border tax 
adjustments to carbon or energy taxes; border measures 
in relation to an emission trading scheme; and some 
other types of border measures. 
Rationale: competitiveness effects and a) 
carbon leakage
Both unilateral carbon taxes and emission trading 
schemes aff ect relative costs of goods and hence, to a 
certain extent, also aff ect the competitiveness of fi rms 
and sectors.150 Th e competitiveness of a sector may be 
defi ned as its ability to maintain profi ts and market 
shares.151 Eff ects on competitiveness arise in particular 
if environmental policies in diff erent countries impose 
diff erent levels of costs on competing fi rms, thus 
creating a price advantage for fi rms located in countries 
with less stringent environmental policies.152 
Th e eff ects of climate change measures on the 
competitiveness of sectors will depend on a number 
of factors that relate to: (i) the specifi c characteristics 
of the sector (e.g. its trade exposure; how energy-
intensive or CO2 emission intensive it is; its direct and 
indirect carbon costs;153 its production costs; the ability 
to pass on cost increases through prices; the market 
structure; transportation costs; its capacity to reduce 
emissions and/or energy consumption; the possibility 
to evolve towards cleaner production technologies 
and processes); (ii) the design of the regulation (e.g. 
the amount of the carbon charge; the stringency of 
the regulation; the availability of alleviations and 
exemptions; and in the case of an emission trading 
scheme the allocation method for allowances); and 
(iii) other policy considerations (e.g. energy and 
climate policies adopted by other countries).154 Th e 
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infl uence of each of these factors may be industry-
specifi c and quite complex to determine. Two of these 
factors have been at the centre of discussions on the 
eff ects on competitiveness of recent emission trading 
schemes and of those under consideration: the “cost 
pass-through capability” of companies, and their trade 
exposure. 
Th e “cost pass-through capability” of a company is 
its capacity to transfer to consumers any increases in 
the cost of its production processes by increasing its 
product prices, without losing profi tability (in other 
words the cost recovery potential). Th e price increase 
needed to recover costs incurred due to emission 
reduction schemes may be determined by adding the 
direct costs of meeting the emission cap to the indirect 
carbon costs. Direct carbon costs depend on the carbon 
intensity and energy intensity of the production process 
and the availability of emission abatement techniques. 
In addition to direct costs, industries may also face 
indirect carbon costs related to increases in the cost 
of energy inputs in reaction to an increased “carbon 
constraint” (such as an increase in electricity price).155
Th e ability to “pass through” costs depends on a number 
of elements, including: the elasticity of demand, 
i.e. the price responsiveness of demand for a product; 
the market structure; and the trade exposure.156 For 
example, electricity companies can more easily pass on 
their costs to consumers because electricity demand is 
relatively price-inelastic (i.e. demand remains nearly 
constant, whether prices increase or fall), the market 
structure is usually highly regulated, and there is very 
limited international competition from countries with 
no carbon emission reduction policies.157 Moreover, 
it is argued that producers of internationally traded 
commodities will have far less scope to off set their 
carbon costs through price increase, as they fear loss of 
market share.158 Exposure to international trade is seen 
as the main constraint to companies’ ability to pass 
through costs to consumers.159 
Studies done to date have generally found that 
the eff ects on competitiveness of environmental 
regulations, including climate change policies, are 
relatively small, or are likely for only a small number 
of sectors, because the costs of compliance with a 
regulation are a relatively minor component of a 
fi rm’s overall costs, which also include, for example, 
exchange rate fl uctuations, transportation costs, energy 
prices and diff erences across countries in the costs of 
labour.160 For instance, a study examining the literature 
on competitiveness eff ects of a carbon price concluded 
that it would negatively impact the competitiveness of 
only a few energy-intensive manufacturing industries 
and would be likely to have a limited impact on output 
and employment levels.161 It should be noted, however, 
that the carbon constraint in some emission trading 
schemes (e.g. in Phase III of the EU-ETS) is expected 
to be increasingly stringent, with fewer free allowances, 
which will therefore increase the potential impact on 
the competitiveness of a number of sectors.162
Related to the potential impact of climate change 
mitigation policies on competitiveness, the issue 
of “carbon leakage”, or the risk of energy-intensive 
industries relocating to countries with weaker 
environmental policies, has recently received a great 
deal of attention. It is clear that the price of carbon will 
be diff erent between countries that have implemented 
carbon constraining regulations such as a carbon tax 
or an emission trading scheme and countries that have 
not. Moreover, among countries that use such a pricing 
instrument or which have enacted diff erent regulatory 
measures to mitigate climate change, the price of 
carbon may also vary considerably.163
Th e concerns related to carbon leakage are usually 
linked to two risks: a risk of creating “carbon havens”, 
i.e. countries with less stringent carbon policies 
which attract carbon-intensive industries, thereby 
endangering the global eff ectiveness of carbon-
constraining environmental policies, and a risk of job 
relocation resulting from the relocation of industries to 
countries where climate change mitigation policies are 
less costly.164
Some countries have proposed – or have already 
introduced in their legislation on emission trading 
schemes – criteria to identify sectors or sub-sectors 
that would be at risk of carbon leakage. Th ese criteria 
include the following: increases in production costs 
induced by the introduction of the new regulation; 
trade exposure; emission intensity; the extent to 
Pa
rt
 I
Pa
rt
 II
Pa
rt
 II
I
Pa
rt
 IV
Trade and Climate Change
100
which it is possible to reduce emissions or electricity 
consumption; and the extent to which other countries 
are taking comparable action to reduce emissions and 
improve carbon effi  ciency.165 Identifi cation of the 
sectors that may be at risk of carbon leakage may prove 
to be a challenging task in practice, mainly because of 
the diffi  culties involved in collecting the data for the 
above-mentioned indicators.
In the context of emission trading, free allocation of 
emission allowances to energy-intensive industries 
or output-based rebates have been considered to be 
a means to prevent carbon leakage. For instance, in 
the third phase of the EU-ETS certain sectors could 
continue to receive all their allowances for free for 
the period 2013-2020 if the European Commission 
determines that they are “at signifi cant risk of carbon 
leakage”.166 
But alleviations and exceptions may not be suffi  cient 
to prevent carbon leakage, and the question that then 
arises is whether the concerns over carbon leakage 
and competitiveness impact warrant government 
intervention in the form of border adjustments.167 
Key characteristicsb) 
In complement to the domestic implementation of 
carbon taxation or of an emission trading scheme, 
the introduction of border measures aimed at 
off setting possible asymmetries in competitiveness and 
preventing carbon leakage has been widely discussed 
in the literature on the subject, and in some countries. 
Th e following sections address border tax adjustments 
to carbon taxes or energy taxes, border measures in 
relation to emission trading schemes, and other types 
of border measures. 
Border tax adjustments to carbon taxes i) 
or energy taxes
As shown in Subsection IV.A.1(a), the term “carbon 
tax” has been used by countries and in the related 
literature to refer to two broad types of climate change 
related taxation: (i) taxes on the consumption of fossil 
fuels in relation to their carbon content; and (ii) taxes 
on the emissions of CO2 during the production process 
(e.g. in the cement and steel sectors) – although the 
general review of countries’ taxation in the previous 
subsection did not identify any examples of this type. 
In addition, countries usually impose a number of taxes 
on the consumption of energy in general (i.e. taxes that 
are not linked to the carbon content of fossil fuels, but 
are aimed at reducing the consumption of all energy 
sources).
Th e 1970 report of the GATT Working Party on Border 
Tax Adjustments168 referred to a defi nition of border 
tax adjustment used in the OECD.169 Under this 
defi nition, a border tax adjustment (BTA) consists of 
two situations: (i) the imposition of a tax on imported 
products, corresponding to a tax borne by similar 
domestic products (i.e. BTA on imports); and/or 
(ii) the refund of domestic taxes when the products are 
exported (i.e. BTA on exports).
Border tax adjustments are commonly used with 
respect to domestic taxes on the sale or consumption 
of goods.170 BTAs are considered by tax experts to be 
a means to implement in a government’s fi scal policy 
the “destination principle”, according to which goods 
are taxed in the country of consumption.171 Th e overall 
economic objective of a BTA is to level the playing 
fi eld between taxed domestic industries and untaxed 
foreign competitors by ensuring that internal taxes on 
products are “trade-neutral”.172 For example, many tax 
schemes adjust for taxes on products such as cigarettes 
or alcohol.173 Countries also commonly adjust domestic 
taxes on fossil fuels when importing such fuels.174 
However, not all internal taxes may be suitable for 
adjustment. Th e question whether domestic carbon/
energy taxes are eligible for border tax adjustment 
pursuant to GATT and WTO rules is discussed below 
in Section IV.A.3(a). 
Border adjustments in relation to an ii) 
emission trading scheme
Border adjustments in relation to an emission trading 
scheme (for instance in the form of an obligation on 
importers to hold emission allowances) have not yet 
been put in place. However, as part of the discussion 
on domestic emission trading schemes, a debate is 
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currently taking place in certain countries on possible 
means to impose border adjustments.175 
For instance, it has been envisaged to link an emission 
trading scheme to certain requirements on imports 
from countries that do not impose similar emission 
reduction obligations on their industries. In such cases, 
importers would have to submit emission allowances or 
certifi ed emission credits to cover the emissions created 
during the manufacturing process of the imported 
good; or they would be allowed to purchase allowances 
in the domestic emission trading markets on equal 
terms with domestic industries.176 
Other border measures iii) 
A number of other types of border measures have 
been envisaged by governments and in literature on 
the subject, in particular with a view to encouraging 
certain countries to agree to emission reduction 
commitments.177 Such measures would be imposed on 
imported products, especially energy-intensive ones, 
originating from certain countries, and include for 
instance: an import charge or a higher tariff .178 
Academics have also discussed the possibility of raising 
a countervailing duty (against “de facto subsidies”) or an 
anti-dumping duty (against “environmental dumping”) 
on imported goods produced in countries that do not 
impose climate change related regulations, in order 
to off set the emission-reduction costs those imports 
have avoided paying, or the de facto, or “hidden” 
subsidy that those goods are receiving.179 It has been 
argued that inaction involves a benefi t, and therefore 
the avoided cost of fi ghting climate change could be 
considered to be a hidden subsidy on emissions which 
could be countervailed.180 A number of other authors, 
however, are of the view that it would be diffi  cult to 
qualify a country’s failure to adopt climate legislation 
as a “subsidy” or environmental “dumping” in terms 
of WTO law.181 
Another type of measure that has been discussed is 
the possibility of imposing a tax on certain means of 
international transport – for example on trucks driving 
through a country’s territory – based on their evaluated 
emissions of CO2.
182 Such a measure mainly aims at 
internalizing the costs of means of transport to better 
refl ect their true impact on society and the environment, 
and also aims at promoting a more equitable taxation 
for the use of road infrastructure based on principles 
such as “user-pays” and “polluter-pays”.183 
Practical challengesc) 
Th ere are, however, a number of practical diffi  culties 
involved in the implementation of a border tax 
adjustment in relation to a carbon or energy tax, and 
further diffi  culties in designing a mechanism to adjust 
the cost of emission allowances and calculate the 
proper level of border adjustment. Th e main challenges 
relate to (i) the diffi  culty in assessing product-specifi c 
emissions, and (ii) the fl uctuations of the carbon price 
(or allowance price) in the context of an emission 
trading scheme. An additional diffi  culty may arise 
in cases where imported products are subject, in the 
country of origin, to other climate change regulations, 
such as technical regulations, rather than price 
mechanisms such as taxes.184 Compliance with certain 
regulations, such as a fuel effi  ciency standard, may also 
involve a cost (e.g. investment in more energy-effi  cient 
technologies) that may be complex to evaluate and 
transform into an adjustable price or a “comparable 
action”.
Th e main diffi  culty in assessing products’ emissions 
comes from the fact that greenhouse gas emissions 
involved in the production process may vary depending 
on the product, the company and the country.185 Th e 
CO2 intensity of a product (i.e. embedded CO2 divided 
by its value) depends on the quantity of fuels used, the 
production process of a particular good, the energy 
effi  ciency of the production process, the type of fuels or 
energy used, the source of the energy (i.e. the particular 
energy mix used in the country of production).186 If 
the input is not recognizable in the fi nal product, then 
it will not be possible to calculate the tax or charge 
from merely inspecting the product at the border, 
and alternative methods of assessment of the amount 
of border adjustment to be imposed on imported 
products will therefore be necessary.187 Several methods 
are usually discussed. First, the country of import could 
require that imported products be accompanied by 
some sort of certifi cation or labelling as to the relevant 
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aspects of the production process used.188 Th e second 
potential method would be for the importing country 
to assume that the imported product has been made 
according to the “predominant method of production” 
used in the country of import or the “best available 
technology” currently available and to tax the product 
accordingly.189 
It is generally considered that the fi rst approach 
requiring that the imported products be accompanied by 
certifi cation or other information documents may raise 
a number of practical issues, such as: (i) the diffi  culty of 
precisely assessing the actual quantity of CO2 emitted 
during the production of a specifi c item; and (ii) the fact 
that producers may not be willing to share confi dential 
information on the composition of their products.190 
Such an approach had been envisaged by the United 
States in relation to chemical products. In the GATT 
Superfund case, the panel found that a United States 
tax on certain chemicals that was imposed directly on 
products was eligible for border tax adjustment and 
consistent with GATT Article III.2.191 Importers were 
required to provide suffi  cient information regarding 
the chemical inputs of taxable substances to enable the 
tax authorities to determine the amount of BTA to be 
imposed.192 
A case that arose under European Union law is also often 
referred to concerning the practical diffi  culties involved 
in the estimation of the amount of border adjustment 
to a carbon/energy tax: the 1998 Outokumpu Oy 
case.193 Th e Finnish government had imposed a tax on 
electricity using diff erent rates depending on how it 
was generated. Finland taxed imports at a fl at rate set to 
approximate an average of the domestic rates, because 
it argued that it was impossible to determine how 
imported electricity was produced once it had entered 
the distribution network. Outokumpu Oy, an electricity 
importer, complained that this fl at rate was a violation 
of the European Communities Treaty, which forbids 
direct and indirect discrimination against imported 
products. Th e European Court of Justice agreed and 
explained that Finland’s law did not give the importer 
the opportunity to demonstrate that its electricity was 
produced by a particular method in order to qualify for 
the rate applicable to domestic electricity produced by 
the same method.194 However, the Court also held that, 
provided that a tax diff erential was based on objective 
criteria and applied to domestic and foreign products 
alike, it was lawful for member states to tax the same or 
similar products diff erentially.195
In cases where industries are not in a position to disclose 
any such information, the second option that has been 
suggested is for the country imposing the adjustment 
to assume that the imported products have been 
produced using the “best available technology” versus 
the average technology.196 It has been argued that the 
“best available technology” chosen could be one that 
has a certain world market share for the production of 
the products concerned. Th e level of the tax would then 
correspond to the quantity of greenhouse gases that 
would have been emitted if all components had been 
manufactured with the “best available technology”. It 
has also been suggested, for credibility reasons, that 
elaboration of the best available technology standards 
should be entrusted to an independent body that would 
receive all required information from the industry.197
Some authors argue198 that a similar approach has 
been implicitly accepted by the GATT Panel in 
the Superfund case. Under the Superfund Act, if the 
importer failed to provide information regarding the 
chemical inputs of taxable substances, the United 
States could impose instead a rate equal to the amount 
that would be imposed if the substance were produced 
“using the predominant method of production”.199 Th e 
panel did not fi nd that this method would constitute 
an infringement of the national treatment principle, as 
contained in Article III.2, fi rst sentence.200
Th e fl uctuations of the carbon price in an emission 
trading scheme is in fact one of the major diff erences 
with an adjustment on a carbon/energy tax (which 
establishes a fi xed carbon price).201 Th e actual cost of 
allowances varies from fi rm to fi rm due, for example, 
to grandfathering, diff erent experiences in emission 
allowance markets, or worldwide diff erences in emission 
profi les within a given industry.202 In fact, a single fi rm 
might also hold diff erent types of allowances: some 
received free of charge, some purchased from the 
government in an auction, and others purchased on 
the open market. Th erefore, it may be diffi  cult to base 
a border adjustment on the current market price of 
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allowances, especially when some free allocations have 
been distributed.203 
Relevant WTO rules3. 
Several WTO disciplines may come into play if a 
carbon/energy tax or an emission trading scheme 
and/or their adjustments aff ect international trade.204 
Th e literature has been very prolifi c on the extent to 
which GATT and WTO rules would apply to border 
measures based on the carbon content of products or 
based on the adoption of “comparable” climate change 
mitigation measures.205 
Th e discussion has been triggered by a number of 
factors, including: (i) the recent design by governments 
of new policy mechanisms to mitigate climate change; 
(ii) the concerns over competitiveness and carbon 
leakage and the related risk of protectionism; (iii) the 
absence of universal commitment to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and the related temptation to use trade 
measures to encourage reduction in emissions; and 
(iv) some perceived legal uncertainties in GATT 
and WTO provisions about measures on production 
processes (in particular “non-product related PPMs”), 
as they have not yet been clarifi ed in the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO. 
Th e following subsections fi rst focus on GATT and 
WTO disciplines that deal specifi cally with border tax 
adjustments and then address more general rules that 
may be relevant to diff erent types of border measures 
and to domestic regulations that have an eff ect on 
trade.
Rules specifi c to border tax adjustmentsa) 
Generally speaking, two types of internal taxes may 
be distinguished: taxes on products (called indirect 
taxes) and taxes on producers (i.e. direct taxes).206 In its 
examination of BTAs, the 1970 GATT Working Party 
indicated that taxes directly levied on products (i.e. so-
called indirect taxes, such as excise duties, sales taxes and 
the tax on value added) were eligible for adjustment, 
while certain taxes that were not directly levied on 
products (i.e. direct taxes such as taxes on property or 
income) were normally not eligible for adjustment.207 
In 1976, a GATT panel, in the United States Tax 
Legislation (DISC) case,208 confi rmed, for the export 
side and in relation to GATT rules,209 the distinction 
between direct and indirect taxes and the ineligibility 
of direct taxes (on producers) for adjustment.210 Th e 
question of whether domestic carbon/energy taxes 
are eligible for border tax adjustment pursuant to 
GATT and WTO rules and, if so, under which 
conditions, is addressed in this subsection.
Border tax adjustments on imported i) 
products
Pursuant to GATT Article II on tariff  concessions 
and customs duties, for a BTA on imports to be 
characterized as a tax adjustment and not a customs 
duty,211 the charge imposed on the imported product 
needs to be equivalent to the tax imposed on the “like” 
domestic product. In other words, there is a diff erence 
between a “border tax” and a “border tax adjustment”. 
A “border tax” is a tax (or customs duty) imposed on 
imported goods, while a “border tax adjustment”, is 
an adjustment of the taxes imposed domestically on 
products when the goods are imported. Th erefore, 
GATT Article II.2(a) allows WTO members, at any 
time, to impose on the importation of any product a 
charge equivalent to an internal tax (e.g. a border tax 
adjustment).212
Th ere is an extensive legal debate over the eligibility, 
for border adjustment, of domestic carbon/energy 
taxes. Some authors have also discussed whether the 
price paid by an industry to participate in an emission 
trading scheme (in the form of an obligation to hold 
emission allowances) could be qualifi ed as an “internal 
tax or other internal charge of any kind” under 
GATT Article III.2,213 and would therefore be 
comparable to a carbon/energy tax for the purpose 
of introducing border adjustments. According to 
these authors, GATT and WTO rules on border tax 
adjustment could then become relevant.
Two GATT provisions are at the centre of the discussion 
on border tax adjustments in relation to carbon/energy 
taxes: (i) Article II.2(a) and its phrase “articles from 
which the imported product has been manufactured or 
produced in whole or in part”; and (ii) Article III.2, fi rst 
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sentence and the terms “applied, directly or indirectly, 
to like domestic products”. 
Article II.2(a) allows two types of import charges 
(i.e. border tax adjustments): (i) charges imposed on 
imported products that are like domestic products; 
and (ii) charges imposed on articles from which the 
imported product has been manufactured or produced 
in whole or in part. Th e fi rst type could refer, for 
instance, to charges imposed on domestic fuels and 
imported “like” fuels.214 
Concerning the second type of charges, however, 
extensive discussion has taken place on the extent to 
which the energy inputs and fossil fuels used in the 
production of a particular product could be considered 
to be “articles from which the imported product has 
been manufactured or produced in whole or in part”.215 
It has been suggested by some that the wording of 
Article II.2(a) may restrict the application of Article 
II to inputs physically incorporated into, or part of, 
the fi nal product, which would therefore exclude the 
possibility to adjust taxes on the energy or fossil fuels 
used during the production of goods (other than taxes 
on fuels themselves).216 
Article II.2(a) also states that internal taxes and 
equivalent charges on imported products need to be 
imposed consistently with GATT Article III.2 and the 
preamble to Ad Note Article III.217 Under Article III.2, 
border adjustments on imported products is only 
allowed in respect of taxes “applied, directly or indirectly, 
to like domestic products” (i.e. indirect taxes).218 Th e 
meaning of the words “directly or indirectly” has 
been extensively debated in the literature related to 
adjustments of taxes on CO2 emissions. In particular, 
the focus of the debate has been the question whether, 
pursuant to both Articles II.2(a) and III.2, only the 
environmental taxes on inputs which are physically 
incorporated into the fi nal product may be eligible for 
adjustments when the fi nal product is imported.219 
It has been argued by some that the word “indirectly” 
contained in Article III.2 may be interpreted as 
allowing the use of border tax adjustments on taxes 
that are charged on inputs used during the production 
process of a particular product, i.e. applied indirectly 
to products.220 According to this argument, a tax on 
the energy or fuels used in the production process or 
the CO2 emitted during production (neither of which 
are physically incorporated in the fi nal product) could 
therefore be considered to be applied indirectly to 
products.221 
Th e GATT Superfund case222 has been mentioned in 
this context. In this case, the dispute panel found that 
a US tax on certain substances (used as inputs in the 
production process of certain chemicals)223 which was 
imposed directly on products was eligible for border 
tax adjustment.224 It has been argued that this case 
confi rms that the GATT allows border tax adjustments 
on imported products in relation to an internal tax on 
certain inputs used in the production process.225 
Border tax adjustments on exported ii) 
products
GATT and WTO rules permit, under certain conditions, 
the use of border tax adjustments on exported products. 
Export BTAs cannot be subject to anti-dumping duties 
imposed on goods that are deemed to be “dumped” 
(i.e. exported at less than the cost price in the domestic 
market) nor can they be subject to countervailing duties 
that an importing country introduces to off set certain 
subsidies provided in the exporting country.226 Export 
BTAs do not constitute subsidies.227 Export BTAs are 
therefore neither prohibited nor “actionable” under the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM) and GATT rules. Footnote 1 of the 
SCM Agreement reads:
“In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of 
GATT 1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the provisions 
of Annexes I through III of this Agreement, the 
exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes 
borne by the like product when destined for domestic 
consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes 
in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, 
shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.” [emphasis 
added]
GATT Article VI:4, the Ad Note to Article XVI 
and footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement refer to taxes 
“borne by” products and not “applied to” or “subject 
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to” as contained in GATT Article III:3. In 1970, 
i.e. before the SCM Agreement came into eff ect, 
the GATT Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments 
took note of these diff erences in wording in the GATT 
and concluded that they had not led to any diff erences 
in interpretation of the provisions.228 It also noted 
that GATT provisions on tax adjustment applied the 
“principle of destination” identically to imports and 
exports.229 
Furthermore, Items (e) and (g) of the Illustrative List 
of Export Subsidies contained in Annex I of the SCM 
Agreement endorse the distinction between direct and 
indirect taxes.230 Border tax adjustments on exports 
with respect to direct taxes are considered to be export 
subsidies (Item (e)) and are therefore prohibited under 
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.231 On the other 
hand, border tax adjustments on exports with respect 
to indirect taxes are considered an export subsidy only 
when the BTAs are “in excess” of taxes “levied in respect 
of the production and distribution of like products 
when sold for domestic consumption” (Item (g)). Item 
(g) provides that the following is an export subsidy:
“Th e exemption or remission, in respect of the 
production and distribution of exported products, of 
indirect taxes [footnote omitted] in excess of those 
levied in respect of the production and distribution of 
like products when sold for domestic consumption.”
Item (g) therefore allows, for instance, a tax on 
domestically produced fossil fuels to be rebated when 
a product is exported, provided that the rebate is not 
larger than the actual tax levied on “like” products 
“when sold for domestic consumption”.232 Moreover, 
Item (g) allows border tax adjustment (if not “in excess” 
of taxes that are charged on like products) in relation 
to indirect taxes levied “in respect of the production 
and distribution” of like domestic products. Th is has 
been interpreted by some authors as including taxes on 
energy or fuel consumption, since those taxes are levied 
in respect of the production of the goods.233 
It has also been argued that carbon and energy taxes are 
a particular type of indirect tax and would fall under 
the category of “taxes occultes” (literally, “hidden 
taxes”).234 Th e 1970 GATT Working Party on Border 
Tax Adjustments included, under this category, taxes 
on “advertising, energy, machinery and transport” 
(emphasis added).235 In fact, the Working Party noted 
a divergence of views among delegations regarding the 
eligibility for adjustment of “taxes occultes” and even 
indicated that adjustment was not normally made for 
“taxes occultes” except in countries having a cascade 
tax.236 However, it has been argued by some authors 
that certain of the “taxes occultes” that were mentioned 
by the GATT Working Party are now explicitly allowed 
by the SCM Agreement: the Working Group listed 
taxes on “machinery and transport” as examples of 
“taxes occultes”, whereas the SCM Agreement allows 
border tax adjustments on taxes not in excess of 
domestic indirect taxes in respect of the “production 
and distribution” of like products, which potentially 
could include transport taxes.237
Finally, there has been extensive discussion on the 
extent to which Item (h)238 on “prior stage cumulative 
indirect taxes” (PSCI taxes)239 of the Illustrative List of 
Export Subsidies read together with footnote 61240 to 
Annex II on “Guidelines on consumption of inputs 
in the production process” could be interpreted as 
implying that carbon and energy taxes are eligible for 
border tax adjustment on both the product and the 
related production process of the product.241 
General disciplinesb) 
Th e following subsections will focus on one of the key 
disciplines of the GATT and WTO agreements: the 
non-discrimination principle (i.e. national treatment 
principle and the most-favoured nation clause). 
Moreover, if a trade-related climate change measure is 
found to be inconsistent with one of the core provisions 
of the GATT (e.g. Articles I, III or XI), justifi cation 
could still be sought under Article XX. Th is will be the 
focus of the last subsection. 
Other disciplines and WTO agreements may be also 
relevant to climate change related measures such as 
the prohibition of quantitative restrictions242 and 
disciplines on technical barriers to trade.243 Also, 
the provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) may be relevant to 
emission trading schemes, for instance if allowances 
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are allocated free of charge. Some authors244 are of the 
view that free allowances could constitute actionable 
subsidies covered by the SCM Agreement.245 It should 
be noted however that if free allowances are found to be 
actionable subsidies covered by the SCM Agreement, 
“adverse eff ects” would have to be demonstrated for 
action to be taken by another WTO member.246 
Non-discrimination principlei) 
National treatment 
Th e national treatment principle may be particularly 
relevant in cases where a climate change related 
regulation is applied diff erently to domestic and foreign 
producers. Th e national treatment principle is a key 
discipline of the WTO and GATT. In accordance with 
GATT Article III, a member shall not discriminate 
between its own and like foreign products (giving them 
“national treatment”). 
Article III.2 deals specifi cally with internal taxes or 
other internal charges. For a tax or charge on imports 
to fall under this provision, it needs to apply “directly or 
indirectly, to like domestic products”. As already briefl y 
discussed in previous subsections, the key question is 
whether a potential tax on CO2 emissions released 
during the production process will be considered to 
be a tax applied indirectly to products. For taxes or 
charges on imports to be consistent with Article III.2, 
they should not be applied “in excess” to taxes levied 
on like domestic products. Moreover, in accordance 
with GATT Article III.2, second sentence, and the Ad 
Note, “directly competitive or substitutable” imported 
and domestic products shall incur similar taxes, and 
these shall not be applied so as to aff ord protection to 
domestic production. 
GATT Article III.4 addresses “all laws, regulations and 
requirements aff ecting the internal sale, off ering for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use” of 
products. As indicated by the Appellate Body in the 
US – FSC (Article 21.5, EC) case, the word “aff ecting” 
in Article III.4 can be interpreted as having a “broad 
scope of application”.247 Article III.4 provides that, 
in respect of all such regulations and requirements, 
imported products shall not be accorded treatment 
less favourable than that accorded to like domestic 
products. In the Korea – Various Measures on Beef case, 
the Appellate Body found that imported products are 
treated less favourably than like products if a measure 
modifi es the conditions of competition in the relevant 
market to the detriment of imported products.248 
Th e national treatment principle is also found in 
several other WTO agreements, such as the Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement (Articles 2, 5, 
Annex 3.D) and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement (Article 2). On the other hand, 
it should be noted that in the GATS, Article XVII 
allows a WTO member to maintain discriminatory 
conditions on its national treatment obligations unless 
it commits otherwise.
Most-favoured nation clause
According to the most-favoured nation clause, a 
WTO member shall not discriminate between 
“like” products from diff erent trading partners 
(giving them equally “most favoured-nation” status). 
GATT Article I.1 provides that “any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity” granted by any member to any 
product originating in or destined for any other member 
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other members. As explicitly provided 
in Article I.1, the scope of application of this provision 
also extends to all matters referred to in paragraphs 
2 and 4 of Article III (see above). Th e most-favoured 
nation clause is also found in other WTO agreements, 
including Article II of the GATS and Article 2 of the 
TBT Agreement.
Defi nition of like products
One of the key questions discussed in relation to the 
application of the non-discrimination principle as 
contained in GATT Articles I and III relates to the 
“likeness” of domestic and imported products. Th is 
is an important question: when a domestic product 
and an imported product are found to be “like”, 
their treatment must be consistent with the national 
treatment principle and the most-favoured nation 
clause. 
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Th e question of the defi nition of “likeness” has been 
addressed by a number of dispute settlement cases. As 
rephrased249 by the Appellate Body in the EC – Asbestos 
case, the analysis of the likeness of products is based 
on four categories of “characteristics” that the products 
involved might share:250 “(i) the physical properties 
of the products; (ii) the extent to which the products 
are capable of serving the same or similar end-uses; 
(iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and 
treat the products as alternative means of performing 
particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want 
or demand; and (iv) the international classifi cation of 
the products for tariff  purposes”.251 
Th e Appellate Body has made it clear that the concept 
of likeness is one that needs to be addressed on a case-
by-case basis:252 the four criteria are simply tools to 
assist in the task of sorting and examining the relevant 
evidence and not a closed list of criteria that determine 
the legal characterization of products.253 An important 
question in relation to the application of the four 
above-mentioned criteria to climate change measures is 
whether products may be considered “unlike” because 
of diff erences in the way in which they have been 
produced (referred to as non-product-related processes 
and production methods (PPMs)), even though the 
production method used does not leave a trace in the 
fi nal product, i.e. even if the physical characteristics of 
the fi nal product remain identical. 
GATT exceptionsii) 
A number of authors have underlined the importance 
of the case law related to GATT Article XX on General 
Exceptions in the context of climate change related 
measures.254 If a particular measure is inconsistent with 
one of the core provisions of the GATT (e.g. Articles I, 
III or XI), it could still be justifi ed under Article XX. 
Article XX lays out a number of specifi c instances 
in which WTO members may be exempted from 
GATT rules.255 Two exceptions are of particular 
relevance to the protection of the environment: 
paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX. According to these 
two paragraphs, WTO members may adopt policy 
measures that are inconsistent with GATT disciplines, 
but necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health (paragraph (b)), or relating to the conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources (paragraph (g)).
GATT Article XX on General Exceptions consists of 
two cumulative requirements. For a GATT-inconsistent 
environmental measure to be justifi ed under Article XX, 
a member must perform a two-tier analysis proving: 
fi rst, that its measure falls under at least one of the 
exceptions (e.g. paragraphs (b) and/or (g), two of the 
ten exceptions under Article XX); and, second, that the 
measure satisfi es the requirements of the introductory 
paragraph (the “chapeau” of Article XX), i.e. that it 
is not applied in a manner which would constitute 
“a means of arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail”, 
and is not “a disguised restriction on international 
trade”.256
Environmental policies covered by Article XX
WTO members’ autonomy to determine their own 
environmental objectives has been reaffi  rmed on a 
number of occasions (e.g. in US – Gasoline, Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres). Th e Appellate Body also noted, in 
the US – Shrimp case, that conditioning market access 
on whether exporting members comply with a policy 
unilaterally prescribed by the importing member was 
a common aspect of measures falling within the scope 
of one the exceptions of Article XX.257 In past cases, a 
number of policies have been found to fall within the 
realm of paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX: (i) policies 
aimed at reducing the consumption of cigarettes,258 
protecting dolphins,259 reducing risks to human health 
posed by asbestos,260 reducing risks to human, animal 
and plant life and health arising from the accumulation 
of waste tyres261 (under Article XX(b)); and (ii) policies 
aimed at the conservation of tuna,262 salmon and 
herring,263 dolphins,264 turtles,265 petroleum,266 and 
clean air267 (under Article XX(g)). 
Although policies aimed at climate change mitigation 
have not been discussed in the dispute settlement 
system of the WTO, the example of the US – Gasoline 
case may be relevant. In this case, the panel had agreed 
that a policy to reduce air pollution resulting from the 
consumption of gasoline was a policy concerning the 
protection of human, animal and plant life or health 
as mentioned in Article XX(b).268 Moreover, the panel 
found that a policy to reduce the depletion of clean air 
was a policy to conserve a natural resource within the 
meaning of Article XX(g).269 Against this background, 
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some authors have argued that policies aimed at reducing 
CO2 emissions could fall under Article XX(b), as they 
intend to protect human beings from the negative 
consequences of climate change (such as fl ooding or 
sea-level rise), or under Article XX(g), as they intend to 
conserve not only the planet’s climate but also certain 
plant and animal species that may disappear because of 
global warming.270
Also in the US – Shrimp case, the Appellate Body 
accepted as a policy covered by Article XX(g) one that 
applied not only to turtles within the United States’ 
waters but also to those living beyond its national 
boundaries. Th e Appellate Body found that there was a 
suffi  cient nexus, or connection, between the migratory 
and endangered marine populations involved and 
the United States for purposes of Article XX(g).271 
Th is point is particularly important in the context 
of climate change mitigation policies. Some authors 
have indeed argued that this fi nding could be relevant 
to establishing a suffi  cient nexus between a member’s 
domestic mitigation policy or a border measure and 
the intended objective of this policy, the protection of 
a global common asset, the atmosphere.272 
Degree of connection between the means and the 
environmental policy objective
In order for a trade-related climate change measure 
to be eligible for an exception under Article XX, 
paragraphs (b) and (g), a connection needs to be 
established between its stated climate change policy 
goal and the measure at issue. Th e measure needs to be 
either: necessary for the protection of human, animal 
or plant life or health (paragraph (b)) or relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
(paragraph (g)). 
To determine whether a measure is “necessary” to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health under 
Article XX(b), a process of weighing and balancing a 
series of factors has been used by the Appellate Body, 
including the contribution made by the environmental 
measure to the policy objective, the importance of the 
common interests or values protected by the measure 
and the impact of the measure on international trade. 
If this analysis yields a preliminary conclusion that the 
measure is necessary, this result must be confi rmed by 
comparing the measure with its possible alternatives, 
which may be less trade-restrictive while providing 
an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the 
objective pursued.273 
For instance, in the Brazil – Retreaded Tyres case, the 
Appellate Body found that the import ban on retreaded 
tyres was “apt to produce a material contribution to the 
achievement of its objective”, i.e. the reduction in waste 
tyre volumes.274 Th e Appellate Body also found that 
the proposed alternatives, which were mostly remedial 
in nature (i.e. waste management and disposal), were 
not real alternatives to the import ban, which could 
prevent the accumulation of tyres.275
In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body also found, as a 
result of a process of weighing and balancing a series of 
factors, that there was no reasonably available alternative 
to a trade prohibition. Th is was clearly designed to 
achieve the level of health protection chosen by France 
and the value pursued by the measure was found to be 
“both vital and important in the highest degree”.276 Th e 
Appellate Body made the point that the more vital or 
important the common interests or values pursued, the 
easier it was to accept as necessary measures designed to 
achieve those ends.277
For a measure to be “relating to” the conservation 
of natural resources in line with Article XX(g), a 
substantial relationship between the measure and the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources needs to 
be established. In the words of the Appellate Body, a 
member has to establish that the means (i.e. the chosen 
measure) are “reasonably related” to the ends (i.e. the 
stated policy goal of conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources).278 Moreover, in order to be justifi ed under 
Article XX(g), a measure aff ecting imports must be 
applied “in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption” (the even-handedness 
requirement).279 
For instance, in the context of the US – Gasoline case, 
the United States had adopted a measure regulating 
the composition and emission eff ects of gasoline in 
order to reduce air pollution in the United States. Th e 
Appellate Body found that the chosen measure was 
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“primarily aimed at” the policy goal of conservation of 
clean air in the United States and thus fell within the 
scope of paragraph (g) of Article XX.280 As far as the 
second requirement of paragraph (g) is concerned, the 
Appellate Body ruled that the measure met the “even-
handedness” requirement, as it aff ected both imported 
and domestic products.281
In the US – Shrimp case, the Appellate Body considered 
that the general structure and design of the measure 
in question were “fairly narrowly focused” and that it 
was not a blanket prohibition of the importation of 
shrimp imposed without regard to the consequences 
to sea turtles;282 thus, the Appellate Body concluded 
that the regulation in question was a measure “relating 
to” the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource 
within the meaning of Article XX(g).283 Th e Appellate 
Body also found that the measure in question had been 
made eff ective in conjunction with the restrictions 
on domestic harvesting of shrimp, as required by 
Article XX(g).284
In the context of climate change, according both to 
Article XX(b) and to Article XX(g), a substantial link will 
need to be established between the trade measure and 
the environmental objective. It should be noted that in 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body recognized 
that certain complex environmental problems may be 
tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising 
a multiplicity of interacting measures. Th e Appellate 
Body pointed out that the results obtained from certain 
actions – for instance, measures adopted in order to 
address global warming and climate change – can only 
be evaluated with the benefi t of time.285
Th e importance of the manner in which trade-
related environmental measures are applied
Th e introductory clause of Article XX (its “chapeau”) 
emphasizes the manner in which the measure in 
question is applied. Specifi cally, the application of the 
measure must not constitute a “means of arbitrary or 
unjustifi able discrimination” or a “disguised restriction 
on international trade”. 
Th e chapeau requires that the measure does not 
constitute an abuse or misuse of the provisional 
justifi cation made available under one of the 
paragraphs of Article XX, that is to say, is applied in 
good faith.286 In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate 
Body recalled that the chapeau serves to ensure that 
WTO members’ right to avail themselves of exceptions 
is exercised in good faith in order to protect legitimate 
interests, not as a means to circumvent one member’s 
obligations towards other WTO members.287 In 
other words, Article XX embodies the recognition by 
WTO members of the need to maintain a balance 
between the right of a member to invoke an exception, 
and the rights of the other members under the GATT. 
WTO jurisprudence has highlighted some of the 
circumstances which may help to demonstrate 
that a measure is applied in accordance with the 
chapeau. Th ese include relevant coordination and 
cooperation activities undertaken by the defendant at 
the international level in the trade and environment 
area, the design of the measure, its fl exibility to take 
into account diff erent situations in diff erent countries, 
as well as an analysis of the rationale put forward to 
explain the existence of a discrimination (the rationale 
for the discrimination needs to have some connection 
to the stated objective of the measure at issue).
For instance, in the US – Gasoline decision, the 
Appellate Body considered that the United States had 
not suffi  ciently explored the possibility of entering 
into cooperative arrangements with aff ected countries 
in order to mitigate the administrative problems 
raised by the United States in their justifi cation of 
the discriminatory treatment.288 Moreover, in the 
US – Shrimp case, the fact that the United States had 
“treated WTO Members diff erently” by adopting a 
cooperative approach regarding the protection of sea 
turtles with some members but not with others also 
showed that the measure was applied in a manner 
that discriminated among WTO members in an 
unjustifi able manner.289 
At the compliance stage, in US – Shrimp (Article 21.5), 
the Appellate Body found that, in view of the serious, 
good faith eff orts made by the United States to negotiate 
an international agreement on the protection of sea 
turtles, including with the complainant, the measure 
was now applied in a manner that no longer constituted 
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a means of unjustifi able or arbitrary discrimination.290 
Th e Appellate Body also acknowledged that, “‘as far as 
possible’, a multilateral approach is strongly preferred” 
over a unilateral approach.291 But, it added that, 
although the conclusion of multilateral agreements 
was preferable, it was not a prerequisite to benefi t from 
the justifi cations in Article XX to enforce a national 
environmental measure.292 
Moreover, in the US – Shrimp case, the Appellate Body 
was of the view that rigidity and infl exibility in the 
application of the measure (e.g. by overlooking the 
conditions in other countries) constituted unjustifi able 
discrimination.293 It was deemed not acceptable that 
a WTO member would require another member to 
adopt essentially the same regulatory programme, 
without taking into consideration that conditions in 
other members’ territories might be diff erent, and 
that the policy solutions might be ill-adapted to their 
particular conditions.294 
In order to implement the panel and Appellate Body 
recommendations, the United States revised its measure 
and conditioned market access on the adoption of 
a programme comparable in eff ectiveness (and not 
essentially the same) to that of the United States. For 
the Appellate Body, in US – Shrimp (Article 21.5), 
this allowed for suffi  cient fl exibility in the application 
of the measure so as to avoid arbitrary or unjustifi able 
discrimination.295 Th e Appellate Body pointed 
out, however, that Article XX does not require a 
WTO member to anticipate and provide explicitly for 
the specifi c conditions prevailing in every individual 
member.296 
Finally, an environmental measure may not constitute 
a “disguised restriction on international trade”, i.e. may 
not result in protectionism. In past cases, it was found 
that the protective application of a measure could most 
often be discerned from its “design, architecture and 
revealing structure”. For instance, in US – Shrimp 
(Article 21.5), the fact that the revised measure allowed 
exporting countries to apply programmes not based on 
the mandatory use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs), 
and off ered technical assistance to develop the use of 
TEDs in third countries, showed that the measure was 
not applied so as to constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade.297
Financial mechanisms to B. 
promote the development and 
deployment of climate-friendly 
goods and technologies
Th e previous section discussed eff orts to internalize 
the environmental costs of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Th rough such eff orts, a price signal on emissions is set 
and individuals and businesses are encouraged to switch 
away from high-carbon goods and services and to invest 
in low-carbon alternatives. Government funding to 
enhance the deployment and utilization of new climate-
friendly technologies and renewable energy is another 
type of economic incentive commonly used in climate 
change mitigation policies. Th is section introduces 
and gives examples of the wide range of governmental 
policies that are in place, or being discussed, to facilitate 
the innovation process or address the additional 
costs related to the use of climate-friendly goods and 
technologies so as to encourage their development and 
deployment. 
Rationale1. 
Th e Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) underlined that many 
mitigation technologies are currently commercially 
available, and more are expected to be commercialized 
soon.298 However, the development and deployment of 
new technologies, including technologies for the use 
of renewable and/or cleaner energy sources, may be 
occurring at a slower pace than is desirable from an 
environmental point of view, and may therefore need 
to be reinforced by national policies. 
Although the private sector plays the major role in 
the development and diff usion of new technologies, 
it is generally considered that a closer collaboration 
between government and industry would stimulate 
the development of a broad range of low-carbon 
technologies at more aff ordable prices.299 
A number of factors may hamper the development of 
new climate-friendly goods and technologies, and may 
inhibit innovation in the climate change technology 
sector.300 First, there is the problem of “environmental 
externality”: because carbon emissions do not have a 
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cost, fi rms and consumers have no direct incentive 
to fi nd ways to reduce them. Second, companies’ 
incentive to invent and develop new technologies may 
be reduced due to the “knowledge eff ect”: in other 
words, individual companies may not always be able 
to profi t fully from their investment in innovation 
because “knowledge” about such technologies (and 
therefore the opportunity to make a profi t from them) 
may spread to other companies, and to other countries. 
Th ird, companies may not always be able to convince 
private investors of the relevance and interest of a 
research project in the climate change area, because 
they may not be in a position to demonstrate the 
environmental eff ectiveness of their product until it 
has been brought into use on a wide scale.
Furthermore, a number of factors may aff ect the cost of 
deployment of climate-friendly and renewable energy 
technologies.301 First, the cost of energy from renewable 
sources – except large hydropower installations, 
combustible biomass (for heat) or large geothermal 
projects – is generally not competitive with wholesale 
electricity and fossil fuel prices. One of the biggest 
challenges facing renewable energy technologies is 
therefore the development of options that can generate 
energy at costs that are competitive with conventional 
energy sources. Public funding policies may be able 
to make the price of energy from renewable sources 
competitive with that of fossil fuels. 
Second, it has been observed that the removal of 
subsidies on fossil fuels, by changing patterns of energy 
use and encouraging the development and widespread 
application of more energy-effi  cient technologies could 
be an important mechanism for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions.302 A number of studies have analysed 
the economic and environmental impact of removing 
or signifi cantly reducing fossil fuel public subsidies.303 
Such studies usually demonstrate that there would be a 
substantial reduction in CO2 emissions. Th e Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
may be relevant in this regard. Also, some experts have 
attempted to draw a link between the current Doha 
Round negotiations on disciplining fi sheries subsidies 
and future multilateral action to address fossil fuel 
subsidies. It should be noted that a number of countries 
have engaged in a policy of reduction in subsidies for 
fossil fuels and coal, both on the production and on the 
consumption side. In China, for instance, fuel prices 
rose substantially (over 40 per cent) between 2004 
and 2006, as the country removed fuel subsidies.304 
Pre-existing fuel subsidies have also been reduced in 
other countries, such as Pakistan305 and Nigeria.306
Th ird, low-emission energy technologies in sectors 
other than electricity generation (such as transport 
and industry) are also generally more expensive than 
conventional technologies. Here, too, governmental 
funding for industries and individuals using less 
energy-intensive or emission-intensive technologies – 
such as purchasing more energy-effi  cient products or 
installing meters to measure electricity use – may also 
help to off set the additional cost involved in the use of 
these cleaner technologies. 
Finally, putting new renewable energy or climate-
friendly technologies on the market is also associated 
with a “learning cost”, i.e. the additional cost involved 
in adapting to the new technology.307 If the learning 
rate is low, and/or the time before the technology 
becomes competitive spans decades, the learning cost 
will be high, and private sector fi rms may be unwilling 
to risk deploying the new technology. In fact, new 
technologies may not become cost-eff ective until 
signifi cant investment has been made and experience 
has been accrued, and such “learning cost” may reduce 
the incentive to deploy climate-friendly goods and 
technologies.
In response to all these factors aff ecting the cost of 
climate-friendly and renewable energy goods and 
technologies, governmental funding may contribute 
to their faster deployment and increased use, and may 
also help reduce the gap between their cost and that 
of conventional technologies and sources of energy.308 
Th e following subsections introduce the wide range of 
existing or proposed governmental policies to facilitate 
the innovation process or to reduce the additional 
costs related to the use of climate-friendly goods and 
technologies, and thus encourage their development 
and deployment.
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Scope2. 
Policies to promote the development and deployment 
of goods and technologies aimed at mitigating or 
adapting to the eff ects of climate change have been 
established by certain national and/or sub-national 
bodies. A number of countries309 have set up funding 
programmes at the national level to support climate 
change policies, such as Denmark’s Energy Technology 
Development and Demonstration Programme310 or 
Finland’s BioRefi ne Programme on biomass.311 
Programmes based on fi nancial incentives (rather 
than direct payments) usually occur at the national 
level. For instance, Germany312 and Spain313 have both 
established renewable energy feed-in tariff s (i.e. this 
refers to a regulated minimum guaranteed price per 
kilowatt-hour that an electricity company must pay 
for renewable energy fed into the national electricity 
grid by a private independent producer. At the sub-
national level, some bodies also provide funding.314 For 
instance, some provinces in Germany, such as North 
Rhine-Westphalia,315 have set up energy research 
programmes. Another example is Kristianstad, a Swedish 
municipality, which in 1999 declared its intention of 
becoming a “Fossil Fuel Free Municipality”.316 Th is 
programme, funded by a combination of municipal 
and state grants, includes promotion of the use of 
biomass and biogas, energy effi  ciency and sustainable 
community planning.
Depending on the type of projects being fi nanced by 
national and sub-national policies, the population 
targeted by the policy may vary. A distinction may 
be made between measures targeted at consumers 
(“demand-pull”) and measures targeted at producers 
(“supply-push”).317 “Demand-pull” policies are designed 
to increase the demand for mitigation technologies by 
reducing their cost for end-users, and are mainly used 
in the energy, transport and building sectors. “Supply-
push” policies aim at providing entrepreneurs with the 
right incentive to invent, adopt and deploy mitigation 
technologies. Such production support programmes 
are mainly used in the energy sector (especially in 
renewable energy production) and in the transport 
sector. 
Furthermore, certain industries may be specifi cally 
targeted by funding programmes, such as the “Wave 
and Tidal Stream Energy Demonstration scheme” 
in the United Kingdom, which gives support to 
businesses using the newly developed technologies for 
wave and tidal stream power generation.318 “Energy 
aid” in Finland is another such programme available 
to enterprises: it is state aid intended to promote the 
development of less CO2-intensive energy production 
and consumption.319 
In Germany, since 1990, a public bank has provided 
private companies with low-interest loans for specifi ed 
renewable energy projects.320 Some programmes may 
also be addressed to a wider public, as is the case of 
the “Sustainable Development Technology Canada” 
foundation,321 whose “SD Tech Fund” aims at 
stimulating research, development and demonstration 
of technologies related, among other things, to climate 
change and air quality. Eligible benefi ciaries include the 
private sector, academic bodies and non-governmental 
organizations.
Type of support3. 
Usually, incentive policies related to climate change 
may focus on three areas: (i) increased use of renewable 
and/or cleaner energy sources; (ii) development and 
deployment of energy-effi  cient and/or low carbon-
content goods and technologies; and (iii) development 
and deployment of carbon sequestration 
technologies.322 
It should be noted that, in recent years, a large number 
of incentive policies, in particular fi scal measures, 
have focused on the development and deployment of 
liquid biofuels (fuel ethanol and biodiesel). Th ere is 
an extensive body of literature, which is not reviewed 
here, on the contribution of diff erent types of biofuel 
support measures to achieving their intended objectives, 
including greenhouse gas emission reduction, 
minimizing environmental implications, assuring food 
security, or contributing to the improvement of rural 
areas for developing countries.323
Th ere are numerous stages in the technology 
innovation process. Subsection IV.B(a), below, 
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presents governmental eff orts to foster research 
and development of climate-friendly goods and 
technologies. Subsection IV.B(b) focuses on policies 
aimed at increasing the deployment of such goods and 
technologies (including their commercialization and 
diff usion).324 
Incentives to promote invention of new a) 
climate-friendly technologies and goods
Because of the deterrents to investment outlined 
above – including the “knowledge” and “learning” 
eff ects – basic research must often be stimulated 
through grants and awards to encourage innovators to 
invent new technologies and processes.325 A number 
of governmental grants are intended to facilitate the 
development of greenhouse gas emission-reducing 
technologies or renewable energy technologies by 
fi nancing the cost of research.326 For example, in New 
South Wales (Australia), the Climate Change Fund 
provides, inter alia, grants aimed at supporting the 
demonstration and early commercialization of new 
renewable energy technologies.327 
Another example is New Zealand’s Plan of Action for 
Sustainable Land Management and Climate Change, 
which provides, inter alia, research grants for the 
agriculture and forestry sectors aimed at increasing 
their resilience and their adaptability to a changing 
climate.328 In Korea, too, the Automobile Low Emission 
Technology Development Support funded research 
institutions developing, inter alia, hybrid vehicles for 
use as public shuttle buses.329
Th ere is also growing interest in other means of 
encouraging innovation, such as awards for the 
development of new technologies.330 Such awards 
may be provided ex post by recompensing existing 
innovations, i.e. by making a return on investments 
which have already been made in R&D. Grants may 
also be awarded exante to encourage new research and 
development projects, in which case the technological 
improvement to be achieved is generally specifi ed prior 
to the research process. Th is type of award is more likely 
to be used when specifi c innovations are needed. 
For instance, the Bright Tomorrow Lighting Prizes 
(L Prize), sponsored by the US Department of Energy 
under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007, will be awarded to participants that develop 
technologies for a new “21st Century Lamp” to replace 
60 watt incandescent light bulbs and PAR 38 halogen 
lamps.331 Th e competition will award signifi cant cash 
prizes and off er other benefi ts for the winning designers 
(including opportunities for federal purchasing).
A number of governmental support measures 
for innovation are implemented on fulfi lment of 
certain conditions, such as reaching performance 
targets. Performance conditions relate mainly to the 
achievement of a particular emission target. For instance, 
in Australia, to be eligible for the Low Emissions 
Technology Demonstration Fund, technologies had to 
demonstrate a potential to be commercially available 
by 2020 to 2030 and able to reduce the energy sector’s 
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 2 per cent per 
annum from 2030.332 Australia has also set up the 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program, which provides 
capital grants to projects that are expected to result in 
quantifi able emission abatement.333
Incentives to encourage the b) 
deployment of climate-friendly goods and 
technologies and the increased use of 
renewable sources of energy
Deployment incentives mainly take the form of 
fi nancial assistance or support that concerns the cost 
of production or of use of climate-friendly goods and 
services. Governmental support measures to encourage 
the deployment of climate-friendly goods and 
technologies and the increased use of renewable sources 
of energy may be implemented upon the fulfi lment of 
certain conditions and criteria. 
First, governmental support may be linked to output.334 
Such output-linked support is usually provided 
through a feed-in tariff  (i.e. a minimum guaranteed 
price per kilowatt-hour) or through direct payments 
and tax credits provided in proportion to the volume of 
production. Second, governmental support for climate-
friendly production may target intermediate inputs in 
the production process, such as the energy sources that 
are used for heat and electricity. Finally, production 
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support may also focus on value-adding factors such 
as capital and labour. In the United Kingdom, for 
instance, the Off shore Wind Capital Grants Scheme 
provided support covering up to 40 per cent of eligible 
costs, for the deployment of off shore wind electricity-
generating facilities with certain minimum generation 
levels.335 
Th ere may also be some conditions related to the 
origin of production. For instance, in some US states, 
tax credits are only awarded if the raw materials used 
during production have been produced in the same 
state in which the production plant is situated. Th is 
is the case in Montana, for example, where ethanol 
producers receive a tax credit only if their ethanol is 
produced from Montana agricultural products, or is 
produced from non-Montana agricultural products 
only when Montana products were unavailable.336 
Th e following sections outline three types of fi nancial 
incentives which are used or are being considered for 
use by governments to encourage the deployment 
of climate-friendly goods and technologies: fi scal 
measures, price support measures and investment 
support. 
Fiscal measuresi) 
Typically, two types of fi scal measure are used to 
encourage participation in climate change mitigation 
eff orts: tax reductions (i.e. tax exemptions, tax 
deduction and tax rebates) and tax credits (i.e. income 
tax credits, personal tax credits, corporate tax credits, 
production tax credits and investment tax credits). Such 
fi scal measures may be either targeted at consumption 
(i.e. they may reward the purchase and installation of 
certain technologies) or at facilitating investment in the 
production of climate-friendly goods and renewable 
energy.337 
Fiscal measures aimed at consumption, for instance, 
can be illustrated by the reduction in value-added tax 
(VAT) for small hydroelectric, wind and biogas power 
generation plants in China, while measures targeting 
investment decisions can be seen in the Chinese 
government’s reduction of income taxes for producers 
of wind and biogas power projects.338 
Another fi scal measure, which is used mainly to 
encourage the use of renewable energy sources, is 
“accelerated depreciation”, which allows investors in 
renewable energy technologies to depreciate the value 
of their plant and equipment at a faster rate than is 
typically allowed, thereby reducing their stated income 
for the purposes of income taxation.339 Examples340 of 
countries which use such policies include Mexico,341 
the Netherlands,342 India343 and the United States.344
Price support measuresii) 
In the past, feed-in tariff s have been a primary price-
support mechanism, used both in Europe and in the 
United States to encourage the generation of electricity 
by means of renewable energy sources. A “feed-in tariff ” 
usually refers to a regulated minimum guaranteed price 
per kilowatt-hour that an electricity company must pay 
for renewable energy fed into the national electricity 
grid by a private independent producer.345 
Th is type of programme was fi rst implemented in 
the United States in 1978, with the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).346 PURPA required 
public utilities to purchase power from renewable 
energy producers and to pay the utility’s avoided 
cost. Another example is Germany’s feed-in tariff , 
introduced in the 1991 Electricity Feed Act, and 
its successor, the 2000 Renewable Energy Sources 
Act.347 Other countries followed these early examples, 
including Spain,348 Italy,349 France,350 and the state of 
South Australia (for solar photovoltaic installations 
only).351 Feed-in tariff s have also been introduced in a 
number of developing countries,352 including Algeria353 
and Th ailand.354 In China, the Renewable Energy Law 
(2006) established feed-in tariff s for biomass and wind 
power.355
Feed-in tariff s have proved successful for a number of 
reasons.356 First, feed-in tariff s for renewable energy 
sources usually have a long time-frame and therefore 
off er long-term price guarantees, providing a high 
level of security for investors. Moreover, feed-in tariff s 
are fl exible in design and can be adjusted to account 
for advances in technology and changing market 
conditions, making them more eff ective and effi  cient. 
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It has also been argued that feed-in tariff s encourage 
the development of local production of renewable 
energy, thereby increasing price competition, and also 
contribute to increasing companies’ profi t margins, 
thus encouraging innovation. Th e literature on this 
topic shows that feed-in tariff s have been particularly 
successful when they form part of a broad package 
of support measures, including tax deductions, “soft” 
loans (i.e. at subsidized rates) as well as investment 
incentives (such as subsidies or partial debt relief ) for 
selected technologies.357 
“Net metering” is another common measure aimed 
at reducing costs for owners of small-scale on-site 
renewable energy power generation equipment.358 If the 
amount of power that a consumer’s renewable energy 
equipment (such as solar panels or wind turbines) 
supplies to the national electricity grid is greater than 
the amount the consumer takes from the grid during 
a certain billing period, the consumer receives a credit 
for that amount on future energy bills. In the United 
States, net metering is available in most states,359 while 
in Canada it is off ered in the provinces of Ontario 
and British Columbia.360 Net metering has also been 
adopted in Th ailand361 and Mexico.362
Investment supportiii) 
Investment support policies are used to reduce the 
capital cost of installing and deploying renewable energy 
technologies:363 a specifi ed percentage of the costs of 
constructing or installing climate-friendly technologies 
is returned to the investor in the form of a capital grant, 
resulting in signifi cant reductions in the overall cost of 
such technologies.364 For instance, between 1994 and 
2002, in order to stimulate the development and use of 
photovoltaic (i.e. solar) power systems, Japan set up a 
capital grant programme365 which is considered to have 
been the driving force behind the rapid deployment of 
photovoltaic power systems in that country. 
In 2006, the state of California approved the California 
Solar Initiative, which provides rebates to homeowners, 
businesses and farmers for the installation of rooftop 
solar systems.366 Grants to encourage energy-effi  cient 
modernization or renovation programmes are off ered 
in many countries, as for instance in Canada, where 
property owners can apply for EcoENERGY Retrofi t 
grants for improving the energy effi  ciency of their 
home.367
Investment support policies may also take the form of 
favourable lending conditions, or low-cost fi nancing 
with subsidized interest rates for investors in climate-
friendly technologies or goods.368 For instance, in 
Germany the “100,000 Roofs Programme”, launched 
in 1999, off ered “soft loans” (i.e. at subsidized rates) to 
encourage the installation of photovoltaic systems.369 
Another example is the Indian Solar Loan Programme, 
which provides low-cost fi nancing for solar energy 
systems.370 
In Bangladesh, the micro-fi nancing institutions Proshika 
and Grameen have started to off er assistance aimed at 
increasing adaptability and reducing vulnerability to 
the eff ects of climate change, through the use of loans 
for construction of safer housing, for helping people 
to diversify from agriculture and for undertaking more 
disaster-proof activities, and through the provision of 
rapid credit facilities to promote fast recovery in the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster.371 
Relevant WTO rules4. 
Governmental funding policies to increase the 
development and deployment of renewable energy 
sources and of low-carbon goods and technologies 
may have an impact on the price and production of 
such goods. From an international trade perspective, 
such policies lower the costs for producers, leading 
to lower product prices. In turn, lower prices may 
reduce exporting countries’ access to the market of the 
subsidizing country or may increase the exports of the 
subsidizing country.372 
Moreover, some countries may provide domestic 
energy-consuming industries with subsidies to off set 
the cost of installing emission-reducing technologies, 
thus enabling them to maintain international 
competitiveness.373 Since the renewable energy and 
low-carbon technology sectors are open to international 
trade, WTO disciplines on subsidies (as contained 
in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM)) may become relevant to certain 
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support policies. Moreover, the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture may be relevant: it contains a category of 
permissible green subsidies, known as Green Box, which 
could allow countries to pursue climate adaptation and 
mitigation measures in the area of agriculture.
Th e SCM Agreement aims at striking a balance between 
the concern that domestic industries should not be put 
at an unfair disadvantage by competition from goods 
that benefi t from government subsidies, and the concern 
that countervailing measures to off set those subsidies 
should not themselves be obstacles to fair trade.374 
Th e rules of the SCM Agreement defi ne the concept 
of “subsidy”, establish the conditions under which 
WTO members may or may not employ subsidies, and 
regulate the remedies (countervailing duties) that may 
be taken against subsidized imports.375 
Th e SCM Agreement also contains surveillance 
provisions: Article 25 requires each member to notify 
the WTO of all the specifi c subsidies it provides, 
and Article 26 calls for the Committee on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures to review these 
notifi cations.376 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement defi nes a subsidy 
as having three necessary elements: (a) a fi nancial 
contribution has been provided; (b) the contribution 
was made by a government or a public body within the 
territory of a WTO member; and (c) the contribution 
confers a benefi t.377 
A “fi nancial contribution” is defi ned by an exhaustive 
list of measures, which include direct transfers of funds 
(for example grants or loans), potential direct transfers 
of funds (such as loan guarantees), government revenue 
forgone (e.g. fi scal incentives through tax credits), the 
provision by government of goods and services other 
than general infrastructure, and government purchase 
of goods.378 Th e range of governmental measures which 
may be described as subsidies is broadened further by 
Article 1.1(a)(2), which includes any form of income 
or price support.379 
Th e SCM Agreement does not provide guidance on how 
to evaluate whether or not a “fi nancial contribution” 
confers a “benefi t”. However, the Appellate Body ruled 
in the Canada – Aircraft case that the existence of a 
benefi t is to be determined by comparison with the 
market-place (i.e. on the basis of what the recipient 
of the benefi t would have received in the market).380 
Moreover, the SCM Agreement’s operative provisions 
only apply to subsidies that are “specifi c”381 to a certain 
enterprise or industry or to a group of enterprises or 
industries, because it is assumed that non-specifi c 
subsidies will not distort the allocation of resources 
within the economy.382 
Th e Agreement makes a distinction between two 
categories of subsidies:383 (i) prohibited subsidies (i.e. 
subsidies contingent upon the export or use of domestic 
rather than imported products);384 and (ii) actionable 
subsidies (i.e. subsidies that cause adverse eff ects to 
the interests of other WTO members).385 Subsidies 
in the second category are open to challenge by other 
members only if they are believed to cause adverse 
eff ects. In either case, the complaining member may 
challenge the subsidizing member’s subsidies in 
WTO dispute settlement.
Th ree types of adverse eff ect are identifi ed in the 
Agreement:386 “injury” to the domestic industry of 
another WTO member; nullifi cation or impairment 
of benefi ts accruing under GATT 1994; and “serious 
prejudice” to the interests of another member, as 
defi ned in the SCM Agreement.387 Th ese adverse eff ects 
generally occur when a subsidy has a negative impact 
on the access to the subsidizing member’s market or to 
a third country’s market, or aff ects domestic producers 
in the home market of the complaining member.388 
In addition to challenging subsidies through 
WTO dispute settlement, a member may impose 
countervailing measures on imported products in order 
to off set the benefi ts of specifi c subsidies that have 
been granted uponthe manufacture, production or 
export of those goods.389 However, a WTO member 
may not impose a countervailing measure unless three 
specifi c conditions are met: (i) it must determine that 
there are subsidized imports; (ii) it must establish 
that there is injury to the domestic industry; and 
(iii) it must show that there is a causal link between 
the subsidized imports and the injury.390 Th e 
SCM Agreement also includes rules on procedures for 
initiating and conducting investigations, and rules on 
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the implementation and duration (normally fi ve years) 
of countervailing measures.391
Finally, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) may 
be relevant to the development and diff usion of climate-
friendly technologies.392 Th e essential objective of the 
grant and enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
as set out in the TRIPS Agreement, is to both promote 
necessary innovation and facilitate the diff usion of 
technology, balancing legitimate interests in a socially 
benefi cial manner. Intellectual property protection 
should “contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations”.393
While the TRIPS Agreement sets out general standards 
for the protection of intellectual property under 
national laws, achieving this “balance” in practice is 
a matter for domestic policymakers and legislators to 
establish, through an appropriate mix of law, regulation 
and administrative measures within the policy 
space defi ned by the TRIPS Agreement, including 
through the use of fl exibilities in the application of 
TRIPS standards. Specifi cally concerning the 
promotion of climate-friendly innovation and the 
diff usion of climate friendly technology, patent-related 
measures that have been raised in policy discussions 
include promoting technology sharing and patent 
pooling,394 technology brokering and clearing house 
initiatives, more eff ective use of patent information 
tools to locate useful technologies, and the facilitation 
of patent examination of green technologies,395 as well 
as limitations or exceptions to patent rights such as 
research exceptions and specifi c regulatory interventions 
such as non-voluntary licensing,396 government use 
authorizations and disciplines or guidelines on patent 
licensing to promote competition.397 Beyond patent 
law, other areas of TRIPS standards are relevant to the 
protection of marks certifying environmentally friendly 
products and suppressing acts of unfair competition 
such as making misleading representations about the 
positive environmental qualities of products (so-called 
“greenwashing”).398  
Technical requirements to C. 
promote the use of climate-friendly 
goods and technologies
In addition to economic incentives such as carbon 
pricing and fi nancial measures, another approach 
commonly taken in environment and climate strategies 
is to develop technical requirements – e.g. in the form 
of mandatory technical regulations or voluntary 
standards – for products and production methods, 
so as to bring about emission reductions and gains in 
energy effi  ciency. 
In relation to climate change, such regulations and 
standards intend generally to: (i) improve the energy 
effi  ciency of products and processes; and (ii) reduce 
their energy consumption and/or the quantity of 
greenhouse gases emitted during the production of a 
product, or emitted while it is being used. Moreover, 
some regulations and standards are being developed to 
facilitate the adaptation to the consequences of climate 
change. However, as indicated in Part I, adaptation 
measures are usually undertaken in the context of larger 
national initiatives related mainly to urban planning, 
the water sector and coastal management, and few such 
measures have been put in place so far; this section, 
therefore, does not review specifi c examples of such 
policies.
Since the 1980s, countries have made increasing use 
of mandatory regulations and voluntary standards to 
promote the use of more energy-effi  cient equipment 
and electric appliances399 thereby reducing the levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with their usage. It 
is estimated that energy-effi  ciency improvements have 
resulted in savings of more than 50 per cent in energy 
consumption over the last 30 years.400 Furthermore, 
according to the Stern Review, there is a considerable 
potential for increased energy effi  ciency in the 
buildings, transport, industry, agriculture and power 
sectors in particular.401 
Th is section examines the range of technical 
requirements aimed at reducing greenhouse gas 
emission levels and promoting energy effi  ciency, and 
discusses related implementation and enforcement 
instruments, such as information tools, procedures for 
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assessing conformity to regulations, and restrictions 
and prohibitions. Th e various aspects of the design 
of such instruments will determine their potential for 
climate change mitigation. Furthermore, since the 
fulfi lment of certain regulatory requirements may have 
an impact on conditions of competition, there can 
be implications for international trade, and thus the 
relevant WTO rules and work are also reviewed. 
Key characteristics1. 
Scopea) 
Technical requirements to promote energy effi  ciency 
and reduce emissions levels are mainly developed 
and implemented at the national level. Standards 
and technical regulations, targeting energy effi  ciency 
in particular, have been adopted by most developed 
countries and by a growing number of developing 
countries.402 Such national measures can be public 
(such as the minimum energy-effi  ciency performance 
standards for major domestic appliances, set by the 
federal government in Canada)403 or private (such as 
the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED), which is a set of standards in the building sector 
developed by the US Green Building Council).404 
In addition, national measures can be either mandatory 
or voluntary. For instance, in Australia the Minimum 
Energy Performance Standards (MEPS) for appliances 
are mandatory regulations;405 while in the United States, 
ENERGY STAR is a voluntary labelling endorsement 
programme.406 Moreover, technical requirements may 
also be instituted at the sub-national level, as is the 
case in the United States, with California’s appliance 
effi  ciency regulations407 or in Italy, with Umbria’s 
energy-effi  ciency building standards.408 
Standards that aim at enhancing energy effi  ciency 
and that set targets for emission reductions are 
also developed internationally. Such international 
standards are often used as a basis for regulations at 
the national level.409 Currently, examples of areas where 
international standards may off er practical tools for 
the application of climate-related regulations include: 
(i) measurement and methodological standards to 
measure energy effi  ciency and greenhouse gas emissions; 
and (ii) standards related to the use and development 
of new energy-effi  cient technologies and renewable 
energy sources. 
Examples of the fi rst category include standards 
prepared by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) that can be used to calculate 
the thermal properties of a building or of individual 
construction materials.410 Similarly, the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) has developed 
standards for measuring the effi  ciency of power 
conditioners because of their widespread use in solar 
power generation systems.411 
Examples of international standards related to the use 
and development of new energy-effi  cient technologies 
and renewable energy sources include the ISO standards 
on solar energy, hydrogen and wind technologies, and 
solid and liquid biofuels.412 In the sector of biofuels 
in particular, endeavours to promote collaboration 
are being made in order to reduce the signifi cant 
diff erences in the specifi cations of biofuels between 
the major producers and users of biofuels (in particular 
with respect to biodiesel).413 Such eff orts include the 
Tripartite Task Force, whose members are Brazil, 
the European Union and the United States;414 the 
Energy Working Group in the context of Asia-Pacifi c 
Economic Cooperation (APEC);415 the International 
Biofuels Forum416 (which includes Brazil, China, the 
European Union, India, South Africa and the United 
States); international eff orts within the ISO;417 as 
well as private sector collaboration eff orts, such as the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels.418
Key specifi cationsb) 
Regulators may establish measures that specify 
requirements on products and/or processes and 
production methods in order to achieve reductions in 
emission levels or other energy-effi  ciency objectives. 
Product-related requirements may achieve indirect 
results, depending on consumers’ purchasing choices 
and after-sale consumption behaviour. In the context 
of climate change, such product-related requirements 
mainly address the energy effi  ciency and the greenhouse 
gas emissions related to the use of the product. On 
Part IV: National Policies to Mitigate, and Adapt to, Climate Change, and their Trade Implications
119
the other hand, requirements targeting production 
methods may result in direct environmental outcomes 
during production processes, as they improve energy 
effi  ciency or limit greenhouse gas emissions to a certain 
level.
Moreover, standards and regulations, whether related 
to products or to processes, can be based either on 
design or descriptive characteristics, or in terms of 
performance.419 Th ese diff erent characteristics are 
outlined in the following subsections.
Design-based requirementsi) 
Technical requirements for energy effi  ciency or emission 
reduction that are based on design or descriptive 
characteristics specify the particular features a product 
must have, or the specifi c actions to be undertaken 
during production, and determine which goods to use, 
or which technologies to install. For instance, several 
governments have developed technical measures with 
respect to the quality and specifi cations of biofuels420 
(e.g. Brazil,421 India,422 the European Union,423 and the 
United States).424 Japan’s standards for business owners 
concerning the rational use of energy in factories are an 
example of descriptive requirements for a production 
process, as they specify, inter alia, that combustion 
facilities must use a certain type of energy-effi  cient 
equipment.425 
Regulations such as design standards (also called 
technology standards) that are based on descriptive 
characteristics are best used when there are few options 
to the polluter for controlling emissions; in this case, the 
regulator is able to specify the technological steps that 
a fi rm should take to control pollution.426 Moreover, 
when emissions cannot be measured, or when concerns 
exist about the feasibility of other policy options, design 
standards related to existing technologies may provide a 
practical way to reduce pollution by helping eliminate 
the least effi  cient technologies from the market and 
promoting the use of more effi  cient ones.427 
Performance-based requirementsii) 
Performance-based requirements for emission reduction 
or energy effi  ciency (also known as performance 
standards) dictate the standards of performance to be 
achieved for products or processes, or mandate specifi c 
environmental outcomes per unit of production 
(e.g. they may limit emissions to a certain number of 
grams of CO2 per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated). 
In other words, they stipulate environmental outcomes 
to be delivered by products or production methods, 
without pronouncing how the outcomes should be 
achieved. Such requirements are especially prevalent 
in eff orts to improve energy effi  ciency in such areas as 
appliances, buildings and transport. 
Often, performance requirements are established to 
encourage the removal of cost-ineff ective, energy-
ineffi  cient products from the marketplace, and to 
stimulate the development of more effi  cient alternatives 
and processes. Performance-based requirements 
generally provide more fl exibility than design-
based requirements, and costs may be lower because 
fi rms can choose how they will meet the stipulated 
environmental target. Indeed, performance standards 
increase the number of ways that compliance can be 
achieved, by off ering more than a single mandated 
technology. Th ese compliance options may include 
fi nding solutions through changes in the production 
process, reduction in output, switching to diff erent 
fuels or other inputs, and alternative technologies.428 
Costs can be further reduced in performance standard 
implementation by the introduction of additional 
fl exibility, for example through the use of averages. 
Th e performance of a product or process may be set 
in various ways. Standards may be established, for 
instance, in terms of maximum CO2 emissions levels, 
maximum energy consumption levels, minimum 
energy performance levels, or minimum fuel economy. 
For instance, in the European Union, a directive 
provides that the electricity consumption of domestic 
refrigeration appliances must be lower than or equal 
to a specifi c maximum allowable value;429 in Australia, 
all ineffi  cient incandescent light bulbs are to be phased 
out through the introduction of minimum energy 
performance standards for lighting products;430 and 
in the United States, the US Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) Standard sets a target in terms of 
minimum fuel effi  ciency.431 
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Th e calculation of the level of performance to be 
achieved by a standard may be based on diff erent 
factors. It may be based, for example, on the most 
effi  cient product in its category, or on the average 
energy consumption or emissions of all products in a 
particular category.432 Japan’s Top Runner Program is 
an example of the fi rst type of performance calculation: 
the most effi  cient model on the market is identifi ed, and 
the energy performance of this “top runner” is used to 
set a target for all manufacturers.433 An example of the 
second approach may be found in the new US CAFE 
standard, which is based on the combined average fuel 
economy of all passenger cars and light trucks sold in a 
given year in the United States.434
Measures may also set out performance standards which 
apply uniformly across an entire product line (e.g. all 
light vehicles must achieve the same minimum fuel 
economy level), or may provide for variation depending 
on categories within the product line (e.g. based on 
aspects such as vehicle weight or engine size). For 
instance, an EU regulation on emission performance 
standards for new passenger cars defi nes a “limit value 
curve” of permitted emissions of CO2 for new vehicles, 
depending on the mass of the vehicle: producers 
will therefore be required to ensure that the average 
emissions of all new cars which they manufacture are 
below the average of the permitted emissions for cars of 
that mass, as given by the curve.435 
Key compliance tools2. 
Information toolsa) 
Labelling schemes are intended to provide information 
to consumers, allowing them to make rational 
decisions which take into account the environmental 
consequences of specifi c products, and thus to stimulate 
manufacturers to design products that achieve higher 
ratings than the minimum standard.436 In other 
words, labelling schemes also aim to stimulate market 
innovation in energy-effi  cient products. 
Labels, displayed on products at the time of purchase, 
encourage responsible action with regard to energy 
use by providing consumers with information on the 
environmental consequences of the use of specifi c 
products and/or the environmental impact of their 
production process. Labels are often based on, and/or 
are used in conjunction with, standards. For example, 
the Seasonal Energy Effi  ciency Ratio label in the 
United States, which displays the effi  ciency of central 
air-conditioning units, is used in conjunction with a 
minimum energy performance standard.437
One of the main objectives of energy labelling is to 
encourage manufacturers to develop and market the 
most effi  cient products, by ensuring that the benefi ts 
of such products can be recognized by the customer. By 
increasing the visibility of energy costs and providing 
an energy benchmark (i.e. a reference point to compare 
the energy performance of one product against that of 
another), labelling schemes also aim to stimulate market 
innovation in energy-effi  cient products, transforming 
the suppliers of such energy-effi  cient products from 
“niche markets” to market leaders.438
Scopei) 
Labelling schemes have been adopted in many countries 
across diff erent sectors.439 While most OECD countries 
have used energy-effi  ciency labelling for a number 
of years, a growing number of non-OECD countries 
are now also using such measures.440 For instance, 
South Africa,441 Argentina,442 Ghana,443 Sri Lanka444 
and Tunisia445 have adopted energy-effi  ciency labelling 
schemes.446 However, a study done by the World Energy 
Council (WEC) (2008) fi nds that labels, despite their 
recent proliferation, are not as widespread in Africa, 
the Middle East, or non-OECD Asia: for example, less 
than 20 per cent of the countries in these regions have 
refrigerator labels (a common energy-effi  ciency label in 
other regions).447 
In addition, labelling schemes can be either mandatory 
or voluntary. Examples of mandatory labels include 
the energy rating labelling programmes for household 
appliances in Australia;448 the CO2 emission labels for 
new cars in Switzerland;449 or the fuel consumption 
labels of new cars in Canada.450 Th ere are examples of 
voluntary comparative labelling programmes in several 
countries,451 including several developing economies, 
such as Th ailand,452 India,453 Brazil454 and Hong Kong, 
China.455
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Type of information coveredii) 
Most labelling schemes provide information on the 
energy effi  ciency of products or production processes. 
Energy-effi  ciency labels are informative labels that 
are affi  xed to a product and that describe its energy 
performance (such as its energy use, effi  ciency or 
energy cost), thereby providing consumers with the 
data necessary for making informed decisions.456 Many 
countries have introduced energy-effi  ciency labels for 
electrical appliances.457 Energy-effi  ciency labels are also 
present in the building sector. For instance, Denmark 
requires large and small buildings to display labels that 
evaluate the building’s consumption of heat, electricity, 
and water.458 Also, general ecolabels such as the 
Nordic Swan, and the German Blue Angel, use energy 
effi  ciency as one of the many criteria used to award the 
label to a product.459
Moreover, several countries have implemented labels 
showing the levels of CO2 emitted by new products. 
For instance, at the point of sale, new vehicles in 
Australia must carry a label on the windscreen giving 
information on the vehicle’s fuel consumption and 
CO2 emissions.
460 In the European Union, new cars are 
also required to display labels showing levels of CO2 
emissions in units of grams per kilometre.461 
In the same way as standards and regulations, on which 
they are very often based, labelling schemes can be 
directed at products’ characteristics and/or production 
processes. However, most environmental labels use 
a criterion that focuses on a product’s performance 
while in operation, such as its energy-effi  ciency or 
CO2 emissions. Such labels mainly concern household 
appliances and cars. For example, Australia,463 the 
European Union,462 Canada464 and the United States465 
all require energy-effi  ciency labels for several household 
appliances. 
Labels may, however, also use broader criteria, such as a 
product’s entire life-cycle, including its production, use 
and disposal. Such labels focus on ways of reducing the 
overall environmental impact of a product, including 
improved energy effi  ciency. Examples of eco-labels, 
which include energy-effi  ciency criteria and life-cycle 
analysis, are the Nordic Swan,466 the German Blue 
Angel467 and the EU’s eco-label Flower.468 Th e Carbon 
Reduction Label in the United Kingdom is another 
example of a label that focuses on the whole life-cycle 
of the products it labels.469 Some companies have also 
introduced their own labels to indicate the energy used 
in the production process of their products.470 
Labelling schemes have also been used by companies to 
show the origin of products, how far they have travelled 
in order to reach the consumer, and the emissions 
generated during their transport.471 In particular, the 
term “food mile” is used to refer to the distance food 
travels from the location where it is grown to where 
it is consumed. Th ere is some debate, however, over 
the validity of food miles as an accurate indication of 
the energy use and greenhouse gas emissions associated 
with agricultural products. More specifi cally, it has not 
only been argued that high food mile ratings do not 
necessarily mean that more greenhouse gas emissions 
were produced during the life cycle of a product, but 
it has also been suggested that airfreight is not a useful 
indicator of environmental damage.472 
Instead of simply focusing on airfreight of food 
products, a number of authors argue that emissions 
from the entire transport chain need to be considered.473 
Others call for the total energy used from ‘‘production 
to plate’’ to be examined.474 
Type of instrumentiii) 
It is possible to distinguish between two main types 
of energy-effi  ciency labels: comparative labels and 
endorsement labels. Comparative labels provide 
consumers with information enabling them to compare 
performance among similar models using categories 
of performance (such as a rating of 1 to 5 stars) or a 
continuous scale (showing where the product stands 
in energy consumption in relation to the amount used 
by the most and least energy-effi  cient models in that 
category).475 
Comparative labels do not explicitly rank diff erent 
products or brands; they simply provide the information 
necessary for consumers to make the comparison. 
Most comparative labels are of a mandatory nature to 
ensure that the least-performing products will also be 
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labelled.476 Comparative energy labels for household 
appliances are in place, for instance, in Australia,477 the 
European Union,478 Canada479 and the United States.480 
Comparative labels have also been introduced in 
some developing countries, for instance in Brazil,481 
Tunisia,482 China,483 Iran,484 Th ailand485 and Korea,486 
and are often modelled on successful developed country 
labels.487
Finally, endorsement labels are also used in some 
cases: these are essentially seals of approval given by 
an independant party, assuring consumers that a 
product meets certain criteria. Endorsement labelling 
programmes are usually voluntary.488 An example of 
an endorsement label is the voluntary Energy Star 
label in the United States, which is now used for over 
60 product categories.489 Th e Energy Star label has 
also been adopted by a number of other countries over 
the years, in an eff ort to provide a single set of energy-
effi  ciency qualifi cations.490 
A number of developing countries have implemented 
their own voluntary endorsement labelling programmes, 
similar to the Energy Star: for instance Brazil,491 
Th ailand,492 and China, whose “China Certifi cate for 
Energy Conservation Product” labelling scheme has 
been run by the China Standards Certifi cation Center 
(CSC) since 1998.493 Endorsement labels can also 
been used in conjunction with comparative labels, as, 
for example, in the United States, where the Energy 
Star and EnergyGuide labels may be used together.494 
Finally, there are examples of labels which are used 
to endorse production methods, as is the case of the 
Carbon Reduction Label in the United Kingdom.495 
Conformity assessment toolsb) 
A conformity assessment procedure is used to determine 
whether the mandatory and/or voluntary requirements 
have been fulfi lled. Conformity assessments give 
consumers confi dence in the integrity of products, 
and add value to manufacturers’ marketing claims. 
Th is section presents the key conformity assessment 
procedures (testing, inspection, certifi cation, 
accreditation and metrology) and provides examples in 
relation to climate change mitigation eff orts. 
Th e fi rst of these procedures involves testing a product 
against specifi c standards, and is the most common 
form of conformity assessment, providing the basis 
for other types of procedures, such as inspection and 
certifi cation. A test is a technical operation carried out 
according to a specifi ed procedure, in order to verify 
one or more characteristics of the product undergoing 
conformity assessment.496 
Products can be tested at diff erent stages of their life. 
For example, the Electricity Generating Authority 
of Th ailand (EGAT) conducts “ex post testing” on 
labelled appliances to ensure their compliance with 
effi  ciency standards. Failure to meet the previously 
awarded effi  ciency rating results in a downgrading 
on the effi  ciency rating scale or complete removal 
of the label.497 Similarly, in Hong Kong, China, the 
authorities monitor the accuracy of energy-effi  ciency 
claims on energy labels through sampling and ex post 
testing.498 
A second procedure – inspection – is the examination 
of a product design, a product, or a process or 
installation, and determination of its conformity with 
specifi c requirements or, on the basis of professional 
judgement, with general requirements.499 
Examples of inspection in relation to climate change 
related requirements are mainly found in the building 
sector. For instance, the Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED) standards, administered 
by the US Green Building Council, are voluntary 
environmental standards for commercial buildings. 
Conformity with these standards is assessed through 
on-site inspection of fi ve key criteria: sustainable site 
development, water savings, energy effi  ciency, selection 
of materials and indoor environmental quality.500 
Similarly, in order for homes in the United States to 
qualify for the Energy Star label, they must be inspected 
by an Independent Home Energy Rater.501 Another 
example, in the European Union, is the requirement 
for regular inspection of boilers and air conditioning 
systems in buildings in order to ensure compliance 
with minimum energy performance requirements.502
A third type of conformity assessment tool, 
certifi cation, involves written assurance (the certifi cate) 
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issued by an independent external body, stating that 
a product, building or company conforms to specifi c 
energy-effi  ciency or emission standards.503 Carried 
out by an independent certifi cation body, certifi cation 
programmes help create transparency in markets, 
where energy costs are not always visible. Certifi cation 
gives confi dence to consumers and helps suppliers 
build their reputation, expand their market and 
promote new products.504 Testing and inspection are 
often integral steps in certifi cation being awarded. For 
example, all regulated energy-using products (such as 
domestic electrical appliances) sold in Canada must 
carry a mark indicating that the energy performance of 
the product has been verifi ed. Th e mark must be that 
of an accredited independent certifi cation body or a 
provincial authority.505 
Accreditation is another conformity assessment tool, 
and is the procedure by which an authority gives formal 
recognition that a particular person or organization is 
competent to carry out specifi c conformity assessment 
tasks.506 Th is can apply to testing laboratories, 
inspection bodies or certifi cation bodies. Accreditation 
bodies do not deal directly with the verifi cation of 
product specifi cations themselves; instead they assess 
the bodies carrying out such functions.507 For example, 
under the Hong Kong Mandatory Energy Effi  ciency 
Scheme, energy test reports must be issued by a 
laboratory that has been assessed and evaluated by a 
recognized independent certifi cation body, or that has 
been accredited by the competent bodies of Hong 
Kong, China, or their counterparts in other countries, 
according to mutual recognition agreements.508 Also, in 
the United States, the Department of Energy requires 
accreditation of the laboratories that perform energy-
effi  ciency testing on lighting and electric motors.509 
A fi nal example of a conformity assessment tool is 
metrology, which involves ensuring that the measuring 
equipment used in conformity assessments complies 
with the requirements for such use.510 For example, 
in order to facilitate its compliance assessments on 
minimum-effi  ciency standards developed by the 
US Department of Energy, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology developed a specialized 
power-loss measurement system for testing the power 
transformers used in the transmission and distribution 
of electrical power.511 
Restrictions and prohibitionsc) 
Measures have been taken by governments to restrict 
the sale or prohibit the import of certain energy-
ineffi  cient products or to ban the use of certain 
greenhouse gases in the composition of products. It is 
common for governments to restrict the use of certain 
substances for environmental reasons.512 However, 
since bans and prohibitions have a direct impact on 
trade (by removing or reducing trade opportunities), 
governments commonly try to take account of factors 
such as availability of viable alternatives, technical 
feasibility and cost-eff ectiveness, when applying such 
measures. 
Such quantitative restrictions include, for example, 
bans to prevent and minimize emissions of fl uorinated 
greenhouse gases (such as hydrofl uorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfl uorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafl uoride 
(SF6)). A number of governments have set up 
regulatory measures to phase out the use of such gases, 
in particular pursuant to the Montreal Protocol.513 For 
instance, national legislation is in place in Austria,514 
Denmark,515 Switzerland516 and the European Union517 
to limit and control the use of HFCs, for example in 
refrigeration equipment, foams and solvents.
In addition, some other regulations and standards may 
also eff ectively ban certain less energy-effi  cient products 
from the market. For example, several countries are 
beginning, or planning, to prohibit the sale of ineffi  cient 
lighting products, such as incandescent light bulbs, as, 
for instance, in Australia,518 the European Union,519 
Canada,520 Chinese Taipei521 and Argentina.522 
Environmental effectiveness3. 
Th e extent to which energy-effi  ciency and emission-
reduction regulations and standards actually contribute 
to achieving their environmental objectives can be 
estimated by comparing measurements of the average 
annual energy effi  ciency and energy consumption 
achieved for a given product when regulations are in 
place with a baseline scenario that assumes no regulations 
Pa
rt
 I
Pa
rt
 II
Pa
rt
 II
I
Pa
rt
 IV
Trade and Climate Change
124
were implemented.523 In addition, some other means of 
measurement may be used, in particular to evaluate the 
environmental eff ectiveness of a labelling scheme: such 
measurements may include consumer awareness and 
acceptance of labels (credibility and understanding) and 
changes in consumer and manufacturer behaviour.524
A number of studies have shown the potential 
of regulations and standards for increasing the 
energy effi  ciency of specifi c products, particularly 
electrical equipment.525 For instance, it has been shown 
that, in California, the energy-effi  ciency standards 
implemented and regularly updated since the late 
1970s have signifi cantly contributed to the reduction 
of energy consumption of major household appliances, 
such as refrigerators: the energy use of refrigerators 
in 2000 was more than two-thirds lower than it had 
been in 1974.526 Some other studies have calculated the 
amount of emission reductions resulting from energy-
effi  ciency policies. For instance, in the United States, it 
was calculated that, if the energy-effi  ciency standards 
for household appliances had not been put in place, 
the total projected CO2 emissions from the residential 
sector would have been 8 per cent higher by 2020.527 
Th e environmental eff ectiveness of labelling 
schemes aimed at promoting energy effi  ciency and 
reducing emission levels can be evaluated through 
examination of the behavioural changes of consumers 
and manufacturers.528 Studies show that consumer 
awareness of environmental labels varies from country 
to country.529 For instance, mandatory energy-effi  ciency 
rating labels in Australia are recognized by more than 
95 per cent of consumers.530 In Nordic countries, 
the Nordic Swan label, which covers a wide range of 
environmental criteria, including energy effi  ciency, 
is recognized by 90 per cent of consumers.531 In the 
United States, several surveys have been conducted to 
assess consumer awareness and understanding of the 
mandatory Energy Guide label. Although recognition 
of the label was found to be quite good, understanding 
was limited, with respondents unable to accurately 
describe the information provided on the label or to 
determine which appliance was more energy-effi  cient, 
based on the labels.532 
A number of factors may aff ect the recognition and 
understanding of labels, which, in turn, infl uence the 
market penetration of labelled products and the overall 
environmental eff ectiveness of the scheme. Th ese 
factors include: (i) the size and diversity of the market 
(i.e. where there is a wide array of brands, models, 
sizes, designs and features, the purchasing decisions of 
consumers may be more complex); (ii) the credibility 
of the labelling programme sponsor (i.e. some studies 
show that government-run labels tend to be more 
credible, better recognized and more fi nancially stable); 
(iii) their clarity and consumer friendliness; and 
(iv) the link to a certifi cation programme.533 
Finally, the environmental eff ectiveness of energy-
effi  ciency conformity assessment may depend on a 
number of other factors, including: (i) the accuracy 
of testing results; (ii) the competence of testing 
laboratories; (iii) the capacity of testing laboratories to 
keep up to date with changes in technology in order to 
be more eff ective; and (iv) the existence of compliance 
monitoring.534 
Certain conformity assessment procedures, such 
as certifi cation and testing, may have a positive 
environmental eff ect by ensuring the introduction 
of more effi  cient technologies. For instance, in the 
US automobile sector, ex post testing and potential recalls 
of vehicles have been an eff ective way of infl uencing 
manufacturer behaviour: the expense and consumer 
dissatisfaction related to “emission recalls”, when 
vehicles fail to meet emission limits, has encouraged 
many manufacturers to implement standards that 
are stricter than the existing legal standards, and to 
design more eff ective and durable emission-control 
systems.535
Relevant WTO rules and work4. 
As outlined in the previous sections, countries have 
developed a number of climate change related standards 
and regulations, including procedures to assess 
conformity. Th e key WTO instrument governing these 
measures is the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT). In addition, certain rules of the General 
Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (GATT) may be 
relevant, such as GATT Article I (the “Most-Favoured 
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Nation” clause), Article III (National Treatment 
principle) and more specifi cally, Article III:4.536 
Other provisions of the GATT 1994 may also be 
relevant. For instance, Article XI requires the general 
elimination of quantitative restrictions on the 
importation or exportation of products. Article XI 2(b) 
introduces an exception to the general rule contained 
in Article XI and allows import and export prohibitions 
or restrictions “necessary to the application of 
standards or regulations for the classifi cation, grading 
or marketing of commodities in international trade”. 
Furthermore, Article XX establishes exceptions to 
GATT obligations which may be applicable to certain 
technical measures.537 
Coverage of the TBT Agreementa) 
Th e TBT Agreement covers three sets of activities: 
(i) the preparation, adoption and application of 
technical regulations by governments;538 (ii) the 
preparation, adoption and application of standards539 
by standardizing bodies; and (iii) the conformity 
assessment procedures used to determine whether 
the relevant requirements in technical regulations or 
standards are fulfi lled.540 
Th e scope of the TBT Agreement extends to all 
technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures that apply to trade in goods, 
i.e. to all agricultural and industrial products.541 
However, two areas of trade in goods are excluded from 
the TBT Agreement:542 sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, which instead are subject to the provisions 
of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS); and government 
procurement specifi cations, which are addressed in the 
plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA). Technical measures which relate to services are 
dealt with under Article VI.4 of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS). 
Mandatory regulations, voluntary i) 
standards and conformity assessment 
procedures
Th e TBT Agreement makes a distinction between 
technical regulations (with which compliance is 
mandatory), and standards (which are voluntary). 
A fair number of climate-related requirements are 
voluntary standards and labelling schemes, including 
some adopted by private entities.543 
Although the key legal principles are broadly similar 
for regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures, there are some diff erences among each 
set of provisions, as well as important diff erences 
in the level of obligation of members with regard 
to mandatory regulations and voluntary standards. 
Indeed, as regards mandatory regulations, members 
have an obligation to ensure that these regulations are 
consistent the provisions of the TBT Agreement. On 
the other hand, with regard to voluntary standards, 
members are only required to take “reasonable 
measures” to ensure, for example, that standardization 
bodies within their territories respect certain disciplines 
of the TBT Agreement.544 
An annex to the TBT Agreement contains the Code 
of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption 
and Application of Standards. Th is Code of Good 
Practice includes all the key legal principles of the 
TBT Agreement (e.g. non discrimination, avoidance 
of unnecessary obstacles to trade and harmonization). 
Th e Code can be accepted, and its provisions followed, 
by any standardizing body within a WTO member’s 
territory; by any governmental regional standardizing 
body of which one or more members are also 
WTO members; and by any non-governmental 
regional standardizing body which has one or 
more members situated within the territory of a 
WTO member.545 Given the recent proliferation of 
private carbon labelling (in particular, “food miles” 
schemes), some authors have also discussed the potential 
relevance of the TBT Agreement to requirements of 
this type, which are developed and adopted by private 
entities (e.g. food supply chains).546 
Finally, given the number of energy-effi  ciency and 
emission-reduction standards that are based on 
performance requirements, TBT Article 2.8 is an 
important element. Th is provision states a preference 
for regulations based on performance – which may also 
be seen as less trade-restrictive measures to regulate – 
rather than for regulations based on design. Indeed, the 
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idea of this provision is to allow producers to fi nd the 
most cost-eff ective way of fulfi lling the requirements 
of a technical regulation. What counts is the result, i.e. 
the performance of a product, rather than the way in 
which this outcome is achieved. 
Products, processes and production ii) 
methods
A technical regulation is defi ned under the TBT 
Agreement as a document which lays down product 
characteristics or their related processes and production 
methods, including the applicable administrative 
provisions, with which compliance is mandatory.547 
Th e Appellate Body, in the EC – Asbestos and the EC 
– Sardines cases, has set forth three criteria in order 
to identify a technical regulation: (i) the document 
must apply to an identifi able product or group of 
products. A product does not necessarily have to be 
mentioned explicitly in a document for that product 
to be an identifi able product, as “identifi able” does not 
mean “expressly identifi ed”;548 (ii) the document must 
lay down one or more characteristics of the product. 
Th is has been interpreted as meaning that the term 
“product characteristics” includes not only features and 
qualities intrinsic to the product itself, but also related 
“characteristics”, such as the means of identifi cation, 
the presentation and the appearance of a product;549 
and (iii) compliance with the product characteristics 
must be mandatory.
As outlined in the defi nitions of technical regulations 
and standards contained in the TBT Agreement,550 
such requirements include documents which specify 
requirements relative to “processes and production 
methods” (PPMs) that are related to the product 
characteristics. However, the second sentence of the 
defi nition of technical regulations and standards states 
that they “may also include or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method”.551 
Th e fact that the second sentence of both defi nitions 
leaves out the term “related” when “labelling” 
(among others) is mentioned, has been interpreted 
by some as providing some scope for the labelling of 
a non-product related process or production method 
(i.e. that does not leave a trace in the fi nal product, 
so-called “unincorporated PPMs”) to be covered by the 
TBT Agreement.552 As has been seen in the previous 
Subsection IV.C.1, a number of energy-effi  ciency and 
emission-reduction standards and labelling schemes are 
based on non-product related PPMs (i.e. the emissions 
involved in the production of a product do not leave a 
trace in the characteristics of the fi nal product). 
Non-discrimination and the avoidance b) 
of unnecessary barriers to trade
Th e TBT Agreement applies the core GATT principle 
of non-discrimination to each set of activities described 
above. Technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures are to be applied to products 
imported from other WTO members in a manner no 
less favourable than that accorded to “like” (i.e. similar) 
products of national origin (national treatment 
principle) and to like products originating in any other 
WTO member (most-favoured nation treatment).553 
A key question in this context is whether goods 
produced with a diff erent emission intensity or energy 
intensity may be considered “unlike” pursuant to the 
TBT Agreement.554
Moreover, technical regulations, standards and 
conformity procedures must also not be prepared, 
adopted or applied with the intention or eff ect of creating 
unnecessary obstacles to trade.555 It is important to 
note, however, that the TBT Agreement recognizes the 
right of members to take regulatory measures to achieve 
their legitimate objectives, including: national security; 
the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of 
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, 
or the environment.556 Th us, the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health and of the environment 
could be relevant to an energy-effi  ciency or emission-
reduction regulation. 
Th e TBT Agreement also provides a number of 
guidelines and tests to avoid unnecessary obstacles 
to trade. For instance, a technical regulation would 
be considered an “unnecessary” obstacle to trade if it 
was found to be more trade-restrictive than necessary 
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to fulfi l a legitimate objective.557 Similarly, conformity 
assessment procedures should not be stricter than is 
necessary to give confi dence that products conform 
with technical regulations and standards.558 Although 
the provisions of the TBT Agreement mentioned in 
this subsection have never been tested in the Dispute 
Settlement Body, it may be relevant to refer to the panels’ 
and the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the word 
“necessary” in the context of GATT Article XX.559 
Th e non-discrimination principle has also not 
been tested in the context of the TBT Agreement. 
However, it may be interesting to note an unadopted 
GATT panel report; the United States – Automobiles 
case. In this case, the panel examined three US measures 
on automobiles: the luxury tax on automobiles, the 
“gas guzzler” tax on automobiles, and the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy regulation (CAFE). Th e luxury 
tax of 10 per cent was imposed on the fi rst retail sale of 
vehicles over US$ 30,000 (a tax paid by customers).560 
Th e gas guzzler tax was an excise tax on the sale of 
automobiles within “model types” whose fuel economy 
failed to meet certain fuel-economy requirements (a tax 
imposed on manufacturers).561 Th e CAFE regulation 
required a minimum average fuel economy for 
passenger automobiles (or light trucks) manufactured 
in the United States, or sold by any importer.562 For 
companies that were both importers and domestic 
manufacturers, the average fuel economy was calculated 
separately for imported passenger automobiles and for 
those manufactured domestically. 
Th e GATT panel found that both the luxury tax 
and the gas guzzler tax were consistent with the 
national treatment principle.563 However, it found the 
CAFE regulation to be inconsistent with this 
principle,564 because the separate calculations of fuel 
economy for the foreign vehicles discriminated against 
foreign cars, and because the fl eet averaging requirement 
diff erentiated between imported and domestic cars on 
the basis of factors relating to control or ownership of 
producers or importers (i.e. based on origin), rather 
than on the basis of factors directly related to the 
products themselves.565
Harmonizationc) 
Energy-effi  ciency standards and regulations and their 
related conformity assessment procedures may act as 
a barrier to trade, in particular when they diff er from 
country to country.566 Diff ering requirements raise 
the cost of information, and make exporting to other 
markets more diffi  cult. A solution to this obstacle is the 
harmonization of norms, which may be described as 
the adoption by several countries of common norms on 
the same subject, where previously each might have had 
its own set of requirements.567 Harmonization is a core 
principle of the TBT Agreement, and the importance 
of international standards is enshrined in its Preamble. 
Th e TBT Agreement strongly encourages eff orts by 
WTO members to harmonize technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures. 
Th e TBT Agreement provides for three approaches to 
harmonization. First, WTO members are to give positive 
consideration to accepting the technical regulations of 
other members as being equivalent to their own.568 
Th e TBT Agreement urges countries to recognize the 
equivalence of the norms set by their trading partners, 
even when they diff er from their own, provided they 
achieve the same fi nal objective. Second, the Agreement 
encourages mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment results.569 Countries are encouraged to 
recognize the procedures that their trading partners 
use to assess compliance with regulations if they are 
convinced of the reliability and competence of their 
conformity assessment institutions.
Th ird, and most importantly, WTO members are 
urged to use international standards as a basis for 
their own technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures,570 except when 
such international standards would be an ineff ective or 
inappropriate means for the fulfi lment of the legitimate 
objectives pursued.571 Moreover, in order to encourage 
members to base their regulations on international 
standards, the Agreement contains a “rebuttable 
presumption” that any technical regulation which is 
prepared in accordance with (and not only “based on”) 
relevant international standards will not be considered 
an unnecessary obstacle to trade.572 In this context, the 
TBT Agreement also provides that members, within 
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the limits of their resources, must play a full part in the 
preparation of international standards, with a view to 
harmonizing technical regulations.573 
Although a list of international standardizing bodies 
for the purposes of the TBT Agreement does not exist, 
guidance on the identifi cation of these bodies may be 
found in a decision adopted in 2000 at the Second 
Triennial Review by the TBT Committee on principles 
for the development of international standards, guides 
and recommendations.574
The TBT Committee and transparency d) 
requirements
Transparency is a core principle of the WTO and 
features in many WTO agreements, including the 
TBT Agreement. It is an important tool to ensure that 
trade fl ows as smoothly, predictably and openly as 
possible. In the TBT Agreement, WTO members are 
required to share information on any draft technical 
regulations and conformity assessment procedures that 
may have an impact on trade: such measures must be 
notifi ed to other members.575 Notifi cations can make an 
important contribution towards avoiding unnecessary 
obstacles to trade and can provide members with the 
opportunity to infl uence proposed regulations of other 
members.576
Moreover, a Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade,577 composed of representatives from each WTO 
member, meets three to four times a year. An offi  cial 
record of the discussions held during formal meetings 
is prepared, and is made available to the public. 
About half of each meeting of the TBT Committee is 
dedicated to the discussion of specifi c trade concerns 
that members may have in relation to technical 
regulations or conformity assessment procedures which 
have been proposed or adopted by other members. Th e 
Committee therefore provides an important forum 
to discuss technical requirements to mitigate climate 
change. Such concerns are often based on a notifi cation 
of a technical regulation or conformity assessment. 
Usually, before raising a specifi c trade concern in the 
TBT Committee, members go through several stages 
of information exchange and consultation. 
Most trade concerns are in relation to the 
implementation of transparency procedures and claims 
that certain measures adopted by WTO members are 
more trade-restrictive than necessary. In recent years, 
a number of measures related to the reduction of 
emissions of certain equipment or the improvement 
of energy effi  ciency of electrical appliances have been 
discussed in the TBT Committee and/or notifi ed to 
other members. 
For instance, in 2007 Brazil notifi ed a draft technical 
regulation which sets down minimum energy 
performance standards for non-electric water heaters;578 
in 2008, the European Communities notifi ed a draft 
regulation that established CO2 emission performance 
standards for new passenger cars;579 Singapore notifi ed 
a regulation that stipulates that motor vehicles must 
be registered and labelled to provide information on 
their levels of fuel consumption and CO2 emissions;
580 
and China notifi ed several technical regulations related 
to the energy effi  ciency and energy conservation of 
electrical storage water heaters, copy machines and 
computer monitors.581 
Technical assistance provisionse) 
Th e TBT Agreement contains detailed provisions on 
technical assistance to developing countries and least-
developed countries.582 Th ese provisions are mandatory 
but most of them are accompanied by one or more 
qualifi cations, such as “take such reasonable measures 
as may be available to them” or “on mutually agreed 
terms and conditions”. Th ese provisions combine 
two sorts of obligations: obligations to advise other 
members, especially developing-country members, on 
certain issues, and obligations to provide them with 
technical assistance. 
Members have an obligation, if so requested, to advise 
developing-country members and provide them with 
technical assistance, on mutually agreed terms and 
conditions, regarding the establishment of national 
standardizing bodies, and participation in international 
standardizing bodies; the establishment of conformity 
assessment bodies; the steps that should be taken by 
developing countries’ producers if they wish to have 
access to systems for conformity assessment operated 
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by governmental or non-governmental bodies within 
the territory of a developed-country member; and the 
establishment of the institutions and legal framework 
which would enable developing-country members to 
fulfi l the obligations of membership or participation 
in international or regional systems for conformity 
assessment.583 Some members regularly inform the 
Committee of their technical assistance programmes in 
the TBT fi eld.584
Moreover, WTO members have, in relation to the 
activities of bodies within their territories, the obligation 
to encourage their national standardizing bodies to 
advise developing-country members and provide them 
with technical assistance regarding the establishment 
of national standardizing bodies, and participation in 
international standardizing bodies. WTO members are 
also obliged to arrange for the regulatory bodies within 
their territories to advise developing-country members 
and to grant them technical assistance regarding the 
establishment of regulatory bodies, or conformity 
assessment bodies, and regarding the methods by 
which their technical regulations can best be met. 
Another obligation of WTO members is to encourage 
bodies within their territories which are members or 
participants of international or regional systems for 
conformity assessment to advise developing-country 
members, and to consider requests for technical 
assistance from them regarding the establishment 
of the institutions which would enable the relevant 
bodies within their territories to fulfi l the obligations 
of membership or participation.
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Th e main purpose of this Report has been to provide 
the reader with an understanding of the debate on the 
linkages between trade and climate change. Th e material 
reviewed shows that trade intersects with climate 
change in a multitude of ways. In part, this is due to 
the innumerable implications that climate change may 
have in terms of its potential impacts and the profound 
regulatory and economic changes that will be required 
to mitigate and adapt to these impacts. 
Moreover, the trade and climate change debate is 
taking place in the context of the current fi nancial and 
economic crisis, making action on climate change even 
more challenging, and the need for vigilance against 
trade protectionism more critical. Th ese multiple 
challenges emphasize that the world cannot continue 
with “business as usual”. Th ere is a profound need for 
a successful conclusion to the current negotiations on 
both climate change and trade opening. 
Most importantly, the debate on trade and climate 
change is taking place against the backdrop of vital 
multilateral climate change negotiations, which are 
due to come to a conclusion at the 15th Conference 
of the Parties to the UNFCCC meeting in December 
2009 in Copenhagen, Denmark. Addressing climate 
change represents one of the most urgent challenges 
of our time, and requires concerted action at both the 
national and the international level. A multilateral 
agreement with binding commitments establishing the 
framework for reducing greenhouse gas emissions for 
post-2012 and beyond should be the main instrument 
for addressing climate change.
As the scientifi c literature on climate change illustrates, 
greenhouse gas emissions generated from human 
activities have resulted in global warming. Th is trend 
is projected to continue unless there are signifi cant 
changes to current laws, policies and actions. Most 
sectors of the global economy are likely to be aff ected 
by climate change, and this will often have implications 
for trade. 
Furthermore, many of the sectors most aff ected, such 
as agriculture, forestry and fi sheries, are critical for 
developing countries. Climate change is likely to alter 
the comparative advantage of these countries in such 
sectors, and thereby alter the pattern of international 
trade. Moreover, climate change is expected to have an 
impact on trade infrastructure and trade transportation 
routes. More studies quantifying the impact of climate 
change on trade are needed.
Economists have developed an analytical framework 
that is useful in conceptualizing how trade opening 
impacts on greenhouse gas emissions. On the one hand, 
the literature indicates that more open trade is likely to 
increase CO2 emissions as a result of increased economic 
activity (the scale eff ect). On the other hand, trade 
opening could facilitate the adoption of technologies 
that reduce the emission-intensity of goods and their 
production process (the technique eff ect) and lead to a 
change in the mix of production from energy-intensive 
to less energy-intensive sectors if it is where it has a 
comparative advantage (the composition eff ect). 
Although most studies to date have found that the scale 
eff ect tends to outweigh the technique and composition 
eff ects in terms of CO2 emissions, it remains diffi  cult 
to determine in advance the magnitude of each of 
these three eff ects, and therefore estimating the overall 
impact of trade on greenhouse gas emissions can be 
challenging. More ex post studies in this area would be 
helpful to fi ne-tune the analytical framework. 
As noted in this Report, international trade 
involves emissions of greenhouse gases through the 
transportation of goods. However, most transportation 
is through maritime transport, which accounts for a 
relatively small share of the greenhouse gas emissions of 
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the transport sector, and in terms of some indicators, is 
the most energy-effi  cient form of transport in terms of 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Th is Report identifi es a few key areas where technology 
has the potential to signifi cantly reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. For example, there is scope for energy-
effi  cient technologies in transport, buildings and 
industry, and for production to switch to zero- or 
low-carbon energy technologies. International trade 
can serve as a conduit for diff using these technologies 
which mitigate climate change. 
A successful conclusion of WTO negotiations on 
opening markets to environmental goods and services 
will help improve access to climate-friendly goods and 
technologies. However, more research is needed on how 
trade and trade opening contribute to the development 
and diff usion of climate-friendly technology.
Th e review of national mitigation and adaptation 
measures, provided in the last part of the Report, 
illustrates the wide range of policy measures available to 
governments to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
It also highlights the impact that this complex web of 
measures might have on international trade and the 
multilateral trading system. 
Th e measures reviewed range from traditional 
regulatory instruments to economic incentives and 
fi nancial measures. For instance, the Report provides 
ample evidence that in recent years there has been a 
proliferation of technical requirements (including 
voluntary standards and labelling schemes) related to 
climate-friendly goods and energy effi  ciency. Likewise, 
the number of fi nancial support programmes, 
including support for the deployment of renewable 
sources of energy, has also increased recently. 
WTO bodies provide an important forum to debate 
policy measures: the Committee on Trade and 
Environment, for example, could discuss, among 
others, trade-related measures that could help support 
climate change mitigation and adaptation or to what 
extent trade is aff ected by requirements for emissions 
reduction and energy effi  ciency. 
Price-based mechanisms, such as a carbon tax on 
fossil fuels or a tax on energy, have been employed in 
several countries over the past two decades as a means 
of internalizing the environmental cost of greenhouse 
gas emissions. More recently, attention has focused on 
emission trading schemes. Th ese involve fi xing a cap 
on total emission levels, translating this into allowances 
to cover emissions, and creating a market to trade 
these allowances at a price determined by the market. 
More empirical work on the economic implications 
and environmental eff ectiveness of emission trading 
schemes would be useful. 
Th ere is considerable debate on the extent to which 
certain industrial sectors may be economically aff ected 
by carbon-constraining domestic policies, and in 
particular, by emission trading schemes. Policies 
aimed at preventing carbon leakage (i.e. the risk that 
energy-intensive industries will simply relocate to 
countries with less rigid emission regulations) and at 
protecting competitiveness in these sectors are also 
under discussion. 
Government policies range from exemptions from 
participation in emission trading schemes to the use 
of border trade measures. Th e debate on the potential 
use of border measures has highlighted the formidable 
diffi  culties involved in applying such measures. Th ese 
include the challenge of precisely assessing the quantity 
of CO2 emitted during a product’s production, which 
may depend on the company and the country, and 
the diffi  culty of measuring the economic impact of 
an emission trading scheme on a particular industry. 
Further research on methodologies to address these 
diffi  culties could be useful to policy-makers. 
Th ere are a vast number of views expressed by 
academics, policy-makers, and various stakeholders 
on how trade is aff ected by measures to mitigate 
climate change, and on the extent to which these 
measures are consistent with WTO rules. A number 
of GATT and WTO rules deal specifi cally with many 
of the economic and regulatory instruments used in 
a number of countries. However, the relevance of 
WTO rules to climate change mitigation policies, as 
well as the implications for trade and the environmental 
eff ectiveness of these measures, will very much depend 
on how these policies are designed and the specifi c 
conditions for implementing them. 
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Abbreviations and symbols
BTA Border tax adjustment
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CH4 Methane
CO2 Carbon dioxide
CO2-eq Carbon dioxide equivalent
COP Conference of the Parties
CTE Committee on Trade and Environment
EC European Community
EIA US Energy Information Administration
ETS Emission trading scheme
EU European Union
EU-ETS European Union Emission Trading Scheme
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade
GCMs General Circulation Models
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
GtCO2-eq Giga tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent
GWP Global Warming Potential
HCFC Hydrochlorofl uorocarbon
HFCs Hydrofl uorocarbon
HS Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
IEA International Energy Agency
IMO International Maritime Organization
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPRs Intellectual property rights
ISO International Organization for Standardization
MEA Multilateral Environmental Agreement
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market
N2O Nitrous oxide
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
ODS Ozone Depleting Substances
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PFCs Perfl uorocarbons
ppm parts per million
PPMs Processes and production methods
R&D Research and Development
RTA Regional Trade Agreement
SCM Agreement Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
SF6 Sulphur hexafl uoride  
SRES Special Report on Emission Scenarios
TBT Technical barriers to trade
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US$ US dollar
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Climate Change
What do we know about climate change? What is the relationship between trade and climate 
change? How does trade affect greenhouse gas emissions and can more open trade help to 
address climate change? What is the range of national measures that can contribute to global 
mitigation efforts? These are just some of the questions discussed by this report by the World 
Trade Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme.
The Report aims to improve understanding about the linkages between trade and climate 
change. It shows that trade intersects with climate change in a multitude of ways. For example, 
governments may introduce a variety of policies, such as regulatory measures and economic 
incentives, to address climate change. This complex web of measures may have an impact on 
international trade and the multilateral trading system.
The Report begins with a summary of the current state of scientifi c knowledge on climate 
change and on the options available for responding to the challenge of climate change. The 
scientifi c review is followed by a part on the economic aspects of the link between trade and 
climate change, and these two parts set the context for the subsequent parts of the Report, 
which looks at the policies introduced at both the international and national level to address 
climate change. 
The part on international policy responses to climate change describes multilateral efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the effects of climate change, and also 
discusses the role of the current trade and environment negotiations in promoting trade in 
technologies that aim to mitigate climate change. The fi nal part of the Report gives an overview 
of a range of national policies and measures that have been used in a number of countries to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to increase energy effi ciency. It presents key features 
in the design and implementation of these policies, in order to draw a clearer picture of their 
overall effect and potential impact on environmental protection, sustainable development and 
trade. It also gives, where appropriate, an overview of the WTO rules that may be relevant to 
such measures.
